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This thesis discusses the black nationalist movement in
Zimbabwe. The first part is a history of the Zimbabwean
nationalist movement, including the emergence and evolution
of xhe nationalist organizations and leaders, the guerrilla
war, and the diplomatic negotiations that occurred up to the
Lancaster House Settlement of 1979. The second portion
explains why and how Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African
National Union won the 1983 elections. The author compares
Mugabe with his two principle opponents, Joshua Nkomo and
Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The personal backgrounds, political
careers, leadership abilities, and bases of support of the
three candidates are examined and analyzed. The author
concludes that Mugabe^s personal reputation and credibility
enabled him to win the loyalty of the majority of the guer-
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I. I NTRODOCriDN
As of mid-February 1 980, most of those who were
following the birth of the nation of Zimbabwe were very
hesitant to attempt to predict the outcome of the nation's
first national elections. Although no one would predict
which, if any, party was going to win the most votes, most
observers agreed that the election would be very close. It
was thought that since no single party was expected to win a
clear-cut majority in the slection. Lord Soames, the British
governor in Salisbury, would have a certain amount of
flexibility in selecting a premier to form a government.
Most observers felt that the Ziababwe African National
Onion (ZANO) and and the Zimbabwe African Peoples 1 Onion
(ZAPO) , the two externally based nationalist political
parties, together would win at least the requisite majority
of forty-one African seats in parliaaent. The problem with
this, however, was that ZANO and ZAPO were running
separately and there was no guarantee, if a coalition was
not formed, that the new government wculd represent a
majority of Africans- Joshua Nkomo (ZAPO) was not committed
to forming a coalition government with his rival, Robert
Mugabe (ZANO). Bishop Abel Muzorewa's Onited African
National Council (OANC) needed only thirty-one seats between
his own and another African party to form a government in
alliance with the Hhodesian Front's twenty white seats.
With Mugabe's decision, after three ansuccessful
assasination attempts upon his life, not to appear at any
public rallies, most analysts believed that ZANO would be
the loyal opposition in any government. [ Ref . 1] As Lord
Soames and the British Government had expressed their

dislike and fear of the Marxist Mugabe on a number of
occasions, it was probable that Shames would be able to
select either the moderate Muzorawa or the less radical
Nkomo to form a government. [Ref. 2]
An unnamed "international marketing research company"
commissioned by a pro-Muzorewa newspaper, The Natio nal
Observer, to run a public opinion poll, predicted that the
OANC would win the largest number of seats. [Ref. 3 ] In
Salisbury, The Times, commenting on Nkomo's apparent move
towards moderation vis a vis Mugabe's Marxist radicalism
wrote that:
Mr. Nkomo. ..has. made a big . comeback. .- Mr.
Mugabe, already soliciting an alliance with the
white group in parliament, appears to foresee that
he may not emerge as the largest Darty.-.The
Marxist: society in which he personally believes
has no electoral appeal [Ref. 4].
Martyn Gregory conducted an interview on 10 April 1980
with an unnamed employee of the Rholesian Ministry of Home
Affairs who acknowledged that that agency, which managed the
election, privately predicted after polling had finished
that Muzorewa would win 3'4 seats, Mugabe 26, and Nkomo 20
[Ref. 5 ]• Thus, the common belief held, up -o the day the
votes were tallied, was that ZANU would probably not win the
election and that even if it did, it would be excluded from
power by a RF-UANC-ZAPU coalition.
Thus, it came as quite a surprise to most observers when
the election officials announced that Mugabe and ZANU had
emerged as landslide victors, winning fifty-seven out of
eighty black seats (seventy-one percent) or fifty- seven
percent of all the seats in parliament. The next day Soames
asked Mugabe to form a government. Mugabe's overwhelming
victory was the final act of a play that had begun over
forty years earlier with the rise of the organized
Zimbabwean nationalist movement and had climaxed with an
eight-year guerrilla struggle of international importance.

This study has two primary purposes. The first, purpose
is to present a history of the nationalist movement in
Zimbabwe, to include the emergence of nationalist organiza-
tions and leaders, the guerrilla war, and the diplomatic
negotiations that occurred during the period. The second
purpose of this paper is to determine how and why Robert
Mugabe became the first black prime minister of an indepen-
dent Zimbabwe.
This thesis is divided into three basic sections. The
first section, which begins after a brief historical intro-
duction to Rhodesia, covers the years from 193U to 1972. It
deals with the creation and early evolution of the
Zimbabwean nationalist organizations, the early
Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations, and the beginning of the guer-
rilla war. For organizational purposes, this period has
been divided into three historical phases. The second
section, which includes historical phases IV and V, covers
the period from 1972 to 198 0. This section deals with the
struggles within and between the nationalist organizations,
the expansion and intensification of the guerrilla war, and
the series of diplomatic negotiations that finally culmi-
nated in a final settlement of the Rhodesian crisis in
December 1979. The thiri sectioQ of this thesis shows why
Robert Mugabe and ZANO were the overwhelming victors in the
February 1980 elections. The position taken in this section
is that the outcome of the election was determined by the
relative credibility of the three primary nationalist candi-
dates with the electorate. Thus, this section focuses on a
comparison of the candidates 1 personal backgrounds, poli-
tical careers, leadership qualities, and sources of support.

II- HISTORICAL SETTING
From 1890 to 1923, Southern Rhodesia was settled and
ruled by the British South Africa Company under a charter
from the British government. When the royal charter expired
in 1923 , the territory became a colony under direct British
rule. In 1952, the British government joined Southern
Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia with Nyasaland to form the
Central African Federation. The purpose of this federation
was primarily economic--to use Southern Rhodesia's
managerial and financial resources and coal and Nyasaland*s
labor force to develop Northern Rhodesia f s mineral wealth in
order to support both Northern and Southern Rhodesia.
The organized black nationalist movement, exclusive of
the anti-colonial wars which occurred at the turn of the
century, began in 1 934 with the founding of the African
National Congress (ANC) . The history of the Zimbabwean
nationalist movement and of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe between 1934
and 1980 can be divided into five phases. The first phase,
lasting from 1934 to 1964, was characterized by the rise and
evolution of a number of black nationalist organizations and
the increasing repression of thesa organizations by the
Rhodesian government. The foci of the second period, which
lasted from 1964 through 1965, were the struggles between
the British and Rhodesian governments over what would be the
political character of Rhodesia and the whole question of
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (DDI) . The third
historical phase, beginning in early 1966 and ending with
the report of the Pearce Commission in 1972, was typified by
intense diplomatic negotiations between the British and
Rhodesian governments over the issues of Rhodesian
10

independence and majority rule and concurrently, the
formation of black nationalist guerrilla organizations and
the beginning and intensification of guerrilla warfare. The
determining factors in the fourth period, 1973 through 1978,
were the inter and intra party rivalries and splits in the
nationalist movement and the prospect of an "internal
settlement" between the Smi th-Rhodasian Front government and
a faction of the nationalist movement. Phase five, which
lasted from 1978 until the assumption of the
prime-ministership by Robert Mugabe in 1980, was dominated
by the interim internal settlement, the controversies
surrounding the Muzorewa government, and the final
settlement formulated at the Lancaster House Conference.
Action during each one of these historical phases
generally occurred at three levals. The first level
consisted of actions by and within the black nationalist
movement. The second level consisted of actions on the
diplomatic scene, to include negotiations between the
primary actors—the Rhodasian government, the British
government, and the b lack nationalist leaders and
organizations. This level also included the roles of the
United Nations, the Frontline States, and South Africa in
influencing the situation. At the third level, the action
consisted of the guerrilla war and the counterinsurgency.
These three levels of action in Rhodesia frequently ran




III. THE RISE DP ZIMBABWEAN. NATIONALISM
A. THE EARLT NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: 1934 - 1964
The first African National Congress in Southern Rhodesia
was founded by Aaron Jacha in 1934. The first ANC was an
elitist political party whose membership was limited to
upper and upper-middle class urban residents who had the
potential to vote. The goals of the ANC were not to
acquire, gain, or control political power, but to influence
the decision- making process through dialogue and cooperation
with the Rhodesian government. The first ANC was neither
nationalist nor revolutionary and by the beginning of the
Second World War it had oeased to exist as a functioning
organization.
In 1948, the Reverend Thomas Samkange and the Reverend
E. Nemapare resurrected the ANC. Membership was again-
restricted to westernized Zimbabwean elites. The ANC
attempted to influence the Rhodesian government to insure
Zimbabwean civil rights by giving Zimbabweans the right to
participate in the colonial parliament. The most revolu-
tionary action taken by this organization was its support of
the general strike of 1948, Generally, the ANC believed
that petitions, delegations, and representations by respon-
sible black citizens were better methods of influencing the
government than mass strikes ani protests. The ANC
achieved little success and had all but disappeared by 1953.
The formation of the Central African Federation in 1952
created a rift among the Southern Rhodesian African leaders.
A number of African leaders, including Joshua Nkomo, Mike
Hove, Jasper Savanhu, and Charles flzengeli, supported the
formation of the Federation because they hoped that it would
12

end racialism and discrimination. These leaders joined
white political parties with the hope of achisving a part-
nership with the white ruling regine. Another group of
black leaders, led by George Nyandoro, Henry Hamadziripi,
and Paul Mushonga, opposed the Federation and multira-
cialism. In August 1955, these mors radical leaders formed
the City Youth League (CYL) in Harare. The CYL was the
first truly nationalist political organization in Southern
Rhodesia. Its membership was open to all classes of blacks
living in Rhodesia, not just the educated urban elite. The
goals of the CYL were to make Africans aware of their poli-
tical, social, and economic position and to inculcate a
feeling of pride and dignity in then. The efforts of the
CYL were targetted against the district native commis-
sioners, who were considered the epitome of white domination
in Rhodesia. 3y 1956, the CYL had gained considerable popu-
larity. In that year, dus to its mass appeal, the CYL was
able to win the Harare Advisory Board elections. The signi-
ficance of the CYL for the evolution of the Zimbabwean
nationalist movement was two-fold. First, it was the first
supra-ethnic African nationalist party to draw its member-
ship from the profess ional- elite, urban-working, and rural-
peasant classes. Second, although the CYL had a more
radical philosophy towards change than any previous nation-
alist organization, it still believed in working within the
colonial political system to bring about change.
In September 1957, Samkange's ASC and the 3YL merged to
form the Southern Rhodes ian African National Congress
(SRAMC). By combining the organizationally and increasingly
politically strong Harare CYL with the widely recognized
ANC, the black leaders were able to create a nationalist
organization with the potential for great growth and a truly
nation-wide appeal. After much debate and disagreement, the
13

Congress alectai Joshua Sfccao president, Jazias Chikereaa
vice-president, George Nyandoro general secretary, and Paul
Hushonga treasurer- The SRANC was a relatively moderate
organization. Its philosophy was non-racial. Its goals
were national unity and an equal partnership between all
inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia, regardless of race, color,
or creed. The SRANC felt that Rhodesia would prosper only
if a completely integrated society was created as a alterna-
tive to tribalism, racialism, and discrimination. The SRANC
swore its allegiance to the British Crown and hoped to
obtain reforms within the British colonial administration.
Like the CYL, the SRANC continued to denounce, criticize,
and embarrass the native district commissioners of the
Department of Native Affairs in front of the Zimbabwean
masses in the hopes of convincing these Africans that
settler power was not that invincible when faced with an
organized African opposition.
The SRANC rapidly gained a large mass following among
urban and rural blacks from all aconomic sectors. As
mentioned earlier, the SRANC belisvad in working peacefully
and lawfully through the 3ritish colonial government. Its
goal was not a new black government through revolution, but
an equal partnership bat ween blacts and whites through
mutual cooperation. It should be noted that before the
collapse of the Central African Fedaration in 1963, Prime
Ministers Garfield Todd and Sir Hdgar Whitehead had made
attempts to ease racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia.
The Public Service Amendment Act No. 42 (1962) opened up the
civil service on a non-racial basis. The pass system was
eased by the Pass Law (Repeal) Act No. 50 (1960) . The Land
Apportionment (Amendment) Act No. 54 (1960) aased regula-
tions affecting urban blacks. Nevertheless, this trend
towards reform never satisfied the SRANC nor convinced it
14

that the white government sincerely wanted to end racial
discrimination. The SRANC made repeated appeals to the
government to repeal the 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act.
The act was designed to prevent the soil erosion being
caused by traditional African tribal farming methods. It
was viewed as discriminatory by the SRANC because its imple-
mentation involved cattle destocking and the introduction of
individual land tenure, both of which were contrary to
African traditions. At the same time, white farmers were
not required by the act to destock their herds, thus
creating the appearance of an attempt by whites to mono-
polize the cattle industry.
In late 1958 and early 1959, there were a series of
civil disturbances in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
These violent protests coincided with protests in Southern
Rhodesia and the Southern Rhcdesian government accused the
SRANC of complicity in the rioting. Although these charges
against the SRANC were never provsn, in late February 1959
the Southern Rhodesian government declared a state of emer-
gency and, claiming it was a subversive organization, banned
the SRANC. Over 500 members of the SRANC were arrested, of
which 300 were detained without trial. Joshua Nkoaio, who
went into voluntary exile, was the only SRANC leader to
escape arrest and detention.
The white settlers in Southern Rhodesia feared that the
black nationalist organizations were nothing more than
covers for a world-wide communist conspiracy. Consequently,
the Rhodesian government enacted a number of laws aimed at
stemming the spread of communism and severely limiting the
effectiveness of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. Among
these laws were the Unlawful Organizations Act and the
Preventive Detention Act of 1959 and the Emergency Powers
Act, the Vagrancy Act, and the Law and Order Maintenance kct
15

of 1960- These acts were the beginning of a repressive,
anti-nationalist trend that was to continue until indepen-
dence was achieved in 1980.
The void left by the banning of the SRANC was filled on
1 January 1960 when the National Democratic Party (NDP) was
formed. The formation of the NDP wi s a significant turning
point for a number of reasons. First, the tactics and ulti-
mate goals of the NDP differed dramatically from those of
the SRANC. The SRANC had sought to achieve reform by
working through the Souths rn Rhodesian government bureauc-
racy and by applying internal pressure upon the white
minority regime. The SRANC believed that change could be
achieved through peaceful means. The NDP, on the other
hand, felt that change could only be achieved if external
pressure was exerted, upon the Southern Rhodesian government.
Believing that Great Britain should retain its reserve
powers over Southern Rhodesia, the NDP placed greater
emphasis upon lobbying the British government than working
through the Shodesian government itself. In addition, the
NDP sought to mobilize international support for its cause
by lobbying other independent black states and the United
Nations. Events in the 3elgian Zongo and Nigeria and the
improving status of the nationalist movements in Northern
Rhodesia and Nyasaiand gave the NDP the hope that the inter-
nationalization of an internal problem might improve the
situation in Southern Rhodesia. Another tactical difference
between the SRANC and NDP was the willingness of the latter
to resort to violence. SJhile the 3RANC never approved of
violence as a means of achieving an end, the NDP did. In
1960, the NDP organized a large number of riots in Salisbury
and Bulawayo for the purpose of pressuring the British and




The ultimate goals of the SRANC and the NDP also
differed. The NDP was more radical and revolutionary.
While the SRANC looked f or a non-racial society and an
equal partnership with the white minority within the frame-
work of the current governaental system, the NDP wanted "one
man, one vote," an end to colonialism, complete indepen-
dence, and closer cooperation with other black governments
and black nationalist movements in Africa.
The NDP was also significant in that it demonstrated the
splits within the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. The
first division among Zimbabwean nationalists involved class.
While the SRANC could claim a membership from all class
groups and had a wide popular base, the NDP was an elitist
organization whose membership, like that of the old ANC, was
drawn primarily from the urban intalLengencia. Because the
activities of the NDP were often centered around the urban
industrial areas and schools, the HDP often neglected the
needs and desires of the rural peasant population.
Consequently, the NDP's ef fectiveness as a national organi-
zation was limited by its failure to develop either a wide
popular base or a grass- root organization in the rural
areas.
The other split within the nationalist movement revolved
around Joshua Nkomo. When the NDP was formed in January
1960, Michael Mawema was appointed its interim president as
Nkomo was in self-exile in Great Britain. The party was
divided between those who wanted Nkomo as president and
those who felt that he was a coward for leaving Rhodesia.
The critics of Nkomo within the NDP broke away and formed
the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) , which later became the
Pan-African Socialist Onion (PASD) .
Nkomo again became a controversial figure at the London
Constitutional Conference of 1961. While Nkomo was in
17

£s*»i 1c *• 1- a 'v I r!'D % -a ^ )-)& s-n TXT1 a H e ;t : ^ •"' ~ K 2 ^T"' " J «f fi a ~ •! P^fc'cs^sie^l -x. 5 , - -i— Ji>£ .»>_*— jc .,. £. _ _ — ~» -- — . . j _ ... _ ___-_.>—-. —.._ ... — *. _-.__.
governments to hold a constitutional conference. It was
hoped by the NDP that a constitution would be framed that
would fulfill its nationalist aspirations— a non-racial
society, the end of colonialism, and independence. Nkomo
returned from exile in October 1960 and became the president
of the NDP and subsequently led the NDP delegation to the
London Constitutinal Conference in early 195 1. At the
convention, Nkomo, who was politically a moderate conserva-
tive, and Sithole, Chitepo, and Silundika, agreed to a
constitution that provided for fifteen African seats in a
parliament of sixty-five seats. »hen Nkoao returned to
Rhodesia, he came to the realization that the constitution
was not acceptable to the majority of the NDP. Michael
Mawema and Leopold Takawira , nembers of the NDP executive,
had already publically criticized hia and others had accused
him of selling out the black masses to colonialism and white
racism. Consequently, Nkono felt obliged to repudiate the
constitution. Unfortunately, the NDP could not reject a
constitution that it had already agreed to. The greatest
irony of the entire episode, however, was the fact that the
NDP*s boycott of the 1962 election due to the unaccept-
ability of the constitution to Africans enabled Winston
Fields conservative Rhodes ian Front (RF) Party to come to
power almost unopposed. Thus, because of its internal disa-
greements, the NDP had shot itself in the foot.
On 9 December 1961, the NDP was banned. All of the
executive members were arrested and detained, with one
ironic exception. Joshua Nkomo again escaped arrest and
detention because he was out of the country at the time of
the crackdown.
The Zimbabwe African Peoples anion (ZAPO) was founded on
17 December 1961. Although, for obvious reasons, its
18

leadership did not acknowledge it publicly, ZAPU was the
direct descendent of the NDP. It was, in fact, the NDP with
a different name. Headed by Joshua Nkomo, ZAPO had the same
organization and leaders as the banned NDP. Although
anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, ZAPO was neither
socialist nor communist. It was the first Zimbabwean
nationalist organization to apply the concept of
Pan-Africanism to the liberation movement. Its objectives
were as follows:
A.. Aims and Objectives:
I. To establish the policy of the one-man-one-
vote as the basis of government in this country.
II. To maintain the spirit of democracv and
love of liberty among the people of Zimbabwe.
III. To unite the African oeode so that they
liberate themselves from all forms of imperi-
alism and colonialism.
IV. To fight relentlessly for the elimination
of ail forms of opression.
V. To create tha conditions for the economic
Erosoerity of the people under a government
ased on the principle of ona-man-one-vote.
VI. To foster the development of the best
values in African culture and traditions, so as
to establish a desirable ordar.
B. Pan- Africanism:
I. ZAPO shall instill and maintain the spirit
of Pan- Africanism in Zimbabwe.
II. It shall work co-operatively wi^h any. other
movement in Africa or elsewhere which fosters
the spirit of Pan-Africanism.
C. International:
I- ZAPO shall observe, respect and oromote
human rights contained in the Declaration of
Human Rights of tha Onited Nations Charter.
II. It shall maintain peaceful and friendly
relations with such nations as are peaceful and
friendly towards the African people of Zimbabwe.
III. It shall co-operate with any such interna-
tional forces as are genuinely engaged in the
struggle for the total and immediate liquidation
of colonialism and imperialism. [ Ref . 5]
19

During 1962, the ZAPU leadership more and more came to
believe that change would only occur through violent revolu-
tion. As Rhodesian security forces continued to arrest and
detain nationalist subversives, the ZAPU leadership came to
the decision that if ZAPU were to be banned, it would go
underground rather than form a new organization [Ref. 7].
During that same year, the Zimbabwe Liberation Army was
created. Nathan Shamuyarira notes that during this period
the philosophy of the ZAND leadership that independence






present nature of politics that we have been
following. • [Ref. 8 ]
ZAPU was banned -in September 1952. Ironioally, Nkomo
was again on a trip away from Southern Rhodesia. In Lusaka
at the time ZAPU was banned, Nkomo, after several days hesi-
tation, fled into hiding in Tanganyika. Thus, three organi-
zations of which Nkomo was the head had been banned and on
all three occasions he was conveniently out of the country
at the time of the crack-down by the security forces. To
many of the other nationalists, it appeared that, at the
very best, Nkomo was a coward who was only interested in
saving his own skin and at the worst a traitor who was
collaborating with the secirity forces. Amid these accusa-
tions and because of pressures applied by the Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole, the ZAPU National treasurer, and
Presidents Nyerere of Tangankyika and Kaunda of Northern
Rhodesia, Nkomo was persuaded to fly back to Salisbury for
three months restriction. [Ref. 9]
At this time a split occurred within the nationalist
movement and ZAPU. There were two basic reasons for the
split. First, for the reasons mentioned previously, many
20

Zimbabwean nationalists lost confidence in Nkomo' s personal
leadership ability. Secondly, ZAPU had failed tD organize a
domestic revolutionary liberation movement with a mass
popular base. Instead, ZAPU had placed its amphasis, as
demonstrated by Nkomo' s constant foreign travel, upon
rallying international support for the Zimbabwean liberation
movement. This strategy had failed. In 1963 the split
within ZAPU manifested itself in the formation of two
splinter groups. The organization that supported Nkomo was
the Peoples Care-taker Council (PCC) . The anti-Nkomo organ-
ization was the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) .
After Nkomo had served his detention in Rhodesia in
196 2, he called the ZAPU executive council, to include
Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert ttugabe, together for a confer-
ence in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Mkomo desired to form a
government in exile in Tanzania. President Julius Nyerere
opposed this plan on the grounds that the liberation move-
ment would only be successful if ZAPU operated within
Southern Rhodesia. He felt that Nkomo's leadership was
needed in Southern Rhodesia, not Tanzania. Ths ZAPU execu-
tive council also disagreed with Nkomo in this matter. The
excutive council was also disappointed in Nkomo' s lack of
decisiveness as a leader and was concerned about the lack of
confidence in Nkomo that many Pan-African leaders had
expressed to them [Ref. 13]. Unwilling to tolerate this
criticism or to compromise on these issues, Nkomo left his
executive council financially strandad in Dar-es-Salaam and
returned to Rhodesia. Seven of the executive council
members denounced and deposed Nkomo and appointed Ndabaningi
Sithole as their leader. Nkomo scheduled a conference at
Cold Comfort Farm near Salisbury for 10 August 1963. The
purpose of the conference was to solve the split and deter-
mine the leadership of the nationalist movemant. Nkomo
21

invited over 5,00 pecpi- to z'ae conference, including the
dissident executive council members- Having returned to
Southern Rhodesia, the executive council declined the invi-
tation to Cold Comfort Farm and on 9 August 1953 formed the
Zimbabwe African National Onion (ZAND) and elected
Ndabaningi Sithole as the interim president. At the Cold
Comfort Farm Conference, Skomo was confirmed as the primary
Zimbabwean nationalist leaier (presiient of ZAPO and leader
of the PCC)
.
At the same time, Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe,
Washington Salianga and Leopold Takawira were suspended from
the nationalist movement.
Between August and September 1953, several attempts to
reconcile the PCC and ZAND failed. Although officially the
PC3 was not a political party, and thus less susceptable to
Rhodesian government repression, in reality it was still
ZAPO". Both the PCC and ZAND* professed anti-colonialism,
pan-Africanism, and socialism. The biggest difference
between the two organizations was in the manner in which
they wanted to bring about Zimbabwe's liberation. The PCC
still emphasized the use of international arenas and consti-
tutionalism to affect raform. ZANO, on the other hand,
believed in self-reliance and the direct confrontation of
the enemy. Although ZANO criticized ZAPO for failing to
develop a revolutionary program of national liDeration, at
this point in time it did not itself have such a program.
Both the PCC and ZANO were banned on 26 August 1964. At
this time, hundreds of ZANU and PCC members, among them
Nkomo, Sithole, and Mugabe, began more than a decade of
detention.
Inspite of these apparent set-backs to the nationalist
movement in Zimbabwe, events in Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland from 1960 to 195 3 gave Southern Rhodesians cause
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to hope that change and even independence might be around
the corner. After intensified opposition, riots, and
strikes in the two northern territories, Great Britain set
up two commissions to investigate the political situation
there- As a result of these commissions. Great Britain held
a constitutional conference in 1963. The right of Northern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland to secede from the Central African
Federation was recognized. When the two territories
declared their intention to secede, Britain agreed to
dissolve the federation on 31 December 1963. At that time.
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were granted independence
from Great Britain and became the black governed nations of
Zambia and Malawi, respectively. The granting of indepen-
dence with majority rule was a great encouragement to
Zimbabwean nationalist aspirations. Surely Great Britain
would do the same for Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, this
hope would soon be shattered when the Zimbabwean black
nationalists came to the realization that the white
Rhodesian Front government was also determined to achieve
independence from Great Britain, but without majority rule-
On the whole, the levels of violence and guerrilla
activity were extremely limited during Phase I. Zimbabwean
nationalist leaders still held the hope that, with the help
of Great 3ritain, change and independence could be brought
about largely through peaceful, constitutional aeans. Most
of the violence was limited to confrontations between the
nationalists themselves, such as those that occurred between
the PCC and ZAND in 1964. Guerrilla activities were limited
largely to organizing forces, training cadre, and planning
acts of sabotage. In February 1954, the PCC decided to
divide Southern Rhodesia into command regions, or fighting
zones. At around the same time, ZANO" also planned a number
of acts of sabotage aimed at impressing black opinion and
23

lowering white morale. .lost of thsse sabotage plans were
thwarted by Rhodesian intelligence before they could be
implemented. One successful attack was made, however, by
the infamous "Crocodile Commando" group which killed a white
farmer, Petrus Oberhultzer, on 4 July 1964. [8ef. 11] This
event was notable because it was the first attack on a white
settler since 1897 and because it signified the beginning of
the guerrilla war.
B. THE ODI QUESTION: 1964 - 1965
The period from early 1964 to November 1965 was domi-
nated by the question of whether or not the Rhodesian
government would unilaterally declare Rhodesia* s indepen-
dence from Great Britain. While the action during Phase I
was dominated by the nationalist movement and, in parti-
cular, the political in- fighting within the nationalist
movement, the action in Phase II was dominated by the
struggle between Great Britain and Rhodesia and the struggle
within the Rhodesian government over who would determine the
future political disposition of Rhodesia. The question of
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was brought
to a head by the events and trends of Phase I.
A number of issues lei to the UDI by Ian Smith and his
Rhodesian Front Party (RFP) . First of all, the dissolution
of the Central African Federation and the granting of inde-
pendence to Zambia and Malawi by Great Britain made white
Rhodesian settlers extremely nervous. The white settlers
felt that the British government had sold cut their counter-
parts in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the black
nationalists and were fearful that Britain would do the same
to white Rhodesians if gi/en the opportunity. This fear was
reinforced by several other circumstances. The rise of
African nationalism within the Central African Federation
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had demonstrated to whit? Rhodesians that there was a new,
powerful force with which they would have to deal. It was
also feared that the Labor Party victory over the
Conservative Party in the 1964 elections would result in
greater pressure from Great Britain for majority rule in
Rhodesia. This pressure for majority rule was intensified
by the internationalization of the problem by the black
nationalist organizations, the nawly independent black
nations of Africa, the Organization of African Unity (CAO)
,
and the United Nations. Pinally, there was an historical
and cultural imperative among whita Rhodesians to improve
and solidify their own positions vis a vis Africans and to
strengthen their power over the African through institution-
alized racism.
White Rhodesians had good reason to believe that they
would be able to hold off indef inits ly, if not eliminate,
the black nationalist onslaught. Ths distribution of mili-
tary forces at the time of the dissolution of the Central
African Federation had provided Rhodesia with an over-
whelming regional military superiority and white Rhodesians
were confident that any threat, either internal or external,
could be successfully met. In addition, repressive measures
had been quite successful in crippling the nationalist
movement.
After the break-up of the Central African Federation,
Great Britain and Rhodesia began preliminary discussions
concerning Rhodesia's independence. The policy of the
British government was that no independence would be granted
to Rhodesia without the gradual termination of racial
discrimination and progress towards majority rule. This
prerequisite for independence was totally unacceptable to
the Rhodesian Front government. When, the RFP suggested that
UDI was the only solution to the problem. Prime Minister
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Winston Field objected to the suggestion. lie Shodesian
cabinet replaced him with Ian Smith. On 11 November 1965,
Prime Minister Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia's inde-
pendence from Great Britain.
During this phase, the nationalist parties and organiza-
tions were relatively inactive, with one important excep-
tion. Guerrilla forces were being trained in ozher
countries. Between September 1954 and March 1965, forty
ZANU members went to Ghana for guerrilla training.
Meanwhile, between March 196 4 and October 1965, fifty-two
ZAPU recruits took guerrilla training in Moscow, Nanking,
and Pyongyang, North Korea. [Ref. 12] By the time of UDI,
guerrillas had already started infiltrating back into
Rhodesia.
C. POST-DDI NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GUERRILLA WAR: 1966 - 1972
Phase III, which began immediately after the UDI and
lasted until the announcement of the Pearce Commission find-
ings in May 1972, was dominated by two major sets of devel-
opments. First there ware the efforts of the British
government, first Labour and later Conservative administra-
tions, to negotiate a peaceful settlsment with the Rhodesian
Front government to end the crisis. The second set of
developments concerned the dramatic change in tactics by the
nationalist organizations. Specifically, the Zimbabwean
nationalists came to the realization that the solution to
the crisis and ultimate majority rule would not come about
through legal, non-violent constit ational or diplomatic
efforts but would only be achisved through guerrilla
warfare. As will be shown, the irony of this phase is that
the British commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement
in many ways forced the black nationalists to resort to
guerrilla warfare. The British refusal to even consider the
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use of military force to solve the problem in Rhodesia had
the unwanted effects of bouying the RF government's confi-
dence in its ability to ride our the crisis and driving the
Zimbabwean nationalists to desperate measures when they
realized that the British government was unwilling to take
the necessary steps to solve the Rhodesian problem.
Just prior to UDI in November 1965, Harold Wilson's
newly elected Labour government warned the Rhodesians of the
consequences of GDI. An UDI would be considered by Great
Britain to be an act of defiance, and as such would have no
constitutional effect on Rhodesia's status. No Commonwealth
government would be able to recognize the UDI. The 3ritish
government would sever relations with Rhodesia and initiate
economic sanctions against her. Financial and trade rela-
tions between Great Britain and Rhodesia would be jeopard-
ized. Further financial aid would be terminated. In short,
Britain would make every effort to isolate Rhodesia diplo-
matically and to cripple her economically. Despite making
these diplomatic and economic threats against Rhodesia,
Wilson refused to threaten the use of force against Rhodesia
should she unlilaterally declare he independence [Ref- 13 ]«,
British overtures towards Smith's RF government began
immediately after U DI. In August 1966, the British govern-
ment announced the start of exploratory talks between offi-
cials of the two governments and on 19 September 1966 the
first British delegation arrived in Salisbury to meet with
Rhodesian officials. On 28 Septeaber 1966, the British
diplomats returned to London with little to show for their
efforts. In October 1965, the British government again
threatened the Rhodesian government with economic sanctions
unless it agreed to renounce its UDI.
The first round of serious negotiations between Great
Britain and Rhodesia began on 1 December 1966 aboard the HAS
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Tiger . The discussions aboard the HMS Tiger between the
Wilson and Smith governments resulted in a wording document
that was to be the basis for a constitutional agreement. The
basic provisions of this document were as follows:
A. Unimpeded progress to majority rule:
1. The creation of a legislative assembly with
33 "A" roll seats, 17 "3" roll seats, and of 17
reserved European seats and of a senate
consisting of 12 Europeans, 8 Africans, and 6
chiefs to be elected by the chiefs council.
2. The extention of the franchise to all
Africans over 30 who could fulfill citizenship
and residence requirements.
B. Guarantees against retrogressive amendments to
the constitution:
1. A provision that any amendments to specifi-
cally entrenched provisions of the constitution
would require a veto of three-quarters of the
total membership of both the assembly and the
senate voting together and be subject to an
appeal to- a constitutional commission in
Rhodesia consisting of the chief justice and
other justices with further appeal to the judi-
cial committee of the privy council.
C. Immediate improvement in the political status of
Africans.
D. Progress towards ending racial discrimination:
1. The establishment of a royal commission on
racial discrimination.
E. The British government would have to be satisfied
that any proposed basis for independence would have
to be acceptable to the peode of Rhodesia as a
w ho 1 e.
F. That there would be no oppression of majority by
minority or of minority by majority:
1. The creation of a broadly-based interim
government headed b y la n 5m"iT!YT~
2. Responsibility for the maintenance of law and
order and protection of human rights to be in
the hands or the 3ritish governor who would be
advised by a securitv council consisting of the
responsible ministers, the heads of the defense
forces, the chief of police, and a representa-
tive of the British government.
3. Free . elections which would include peaceful




The Wilson government accepted this working document in
its entirety, the Smith government refused to accept those
provisions leading to majority African rule. Thus, the
requirements for African participation in government led to
a Rhodesian rejection of the proposed settlement and the
collapse of the Tiaer talks.
Having failed in its first attempt to negotiate a
settlement with the Rhodssians, the British government
hardened its stance against Smith* s Rhodesian Front govern-
ment. First of all, the British government adopted the
policy of no independence before majority rule (NIBNAR) . As
far as Great Britain was concernsd, the mere progress
towards majority rule would no longer be an acceptable prer-
equisite for independence. Secondly, Britain decided to
pressure the Rhodesian government by following through with
its threats. The British government, under the provisions
of Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter, intro-
duced a resolution to the UN Security Council calling for
mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia's most important exports.
On 16 December 1966, determining that the situation in
Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace, the 3N
Security Council voted to impose selective mandatory sanc-
tions against Rhodesia that would include certain specified
Rhodesian exports and the supply to Rhodesia of arms, mili-
tary equipment, vehicles and aircraft, and oil and oil
products.
Throughout 1967 and 1968, the Wilson government
continued to keep the channels of communication with
Rhodesia open. The British government sent a number of
representatives to Salisbury to discuss a possible settle-
ment with Ian Smith. Thase diploaatic missions were led
respectively by Lord Alport (June 1967), ar. George
Thomason, the British Commonwealth Secretary (November
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happened before, none of the British emissaries was able to
convince Smith to agree to a settlement. Again Great
Britain had to increase the pressure against Rhodesia in
order to force the Smith government into serious negotia-
tions. In March 1968, 3 reat Britain called upon the ON
Security Council to discuss the imposition of further
economic sanctions against Rhodesia and on 29 May 1968 a
resolution was passed which imposed comprehensive mandatory
sanctions upon Rhodesia. The resolution required all UN
member states to join in an emoargo of all trade with
Rhodesia (with minor exceptions such as medical and educa-
tional supplies), on all air and sea shipments of goods to
and from Rhodesia, and on the investment of funds in
Rhodesia. In addition, meaber countries were to prevent the
entry into their territory cf persons travelling on
Rhodesian passports, persons believed to be aiding the
Rhodesian regime, and aircraft from airlines operating to
and from Rhodesia. The UN resolution required member
nations to discourage emigration to Rhodesia.
On 20 September 1968, Mr. James Bottomly, the Under
Secretary at the British Foreign Office, began further
discussions with Ian Smith in Salisbury. These discussions
led to negotiations between Great Britain and Rhodesia
aboard the HMS Fearless from 9-13 October 1968. Almost
all of the proposals made during the Fearless negotiations
were drawn from the Tiger proposals of two years earlier.
In addition to the original Tiger proposals, the following
were added:
(1) Action was to be taken to provide more educa-
tional facilities for African Rhodesians. The
British government would provide 5 million pounds a
year for ten years, waich would be matched bv equal
sums from the Rhodesian government, in pursuit of
this goal.
12) The British gp/eriment would act as the trustee
for African Rhodesians and because of this the fifth
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principle, acceptability to the people of Rhodesia
as a whole, was transcendent and would over-ride all
other principles.
Despite the additional safeguards proposed for the
African majority in the Fearless talks, the real signifi-
cance of these negotiations lies in the fact that they
demonstrated the willingness of the British to compromise on
"principle" and grant concessions in order to reach a
settlement with the Rhodes ian Front government. The fact
that the British revived the basic Tiger proposals at the
Fearles s talks shows that they had abandoned the principle
of NIBMAR as a prerequisite for Rhodesian independence. In
addition, the terms of the proposed Fearless agreement
ensured that the Rhodesian administration, rather than the
British governor, would retain control if the constitutional
proposals were found to be unacceptable to the people of
Rhodesia as a whole. Calculations indicated that, should the
Fea rles s proposals have been accepted, even under the most
favorable conditions, majority rule would not have been
attained until 1999- [Ref. 15]
As was the case before, the proposals were unacceptable
to Smith's Rhodesian Front government. The Rhodesian
government rejected the aspects of the proposed agreement
dealing with the composition of the legislature, the appeal
to the judicial committee of the privy council, and the
extent to which voting would count during elections.
Consequently, the Fearless talks broke down on 13 October
196 8.
The final break between Great Britain and Rhcd^ia came
in June 1969 with the decision by the Rhodesian Front
government, endorsed by a referendum of the overwhelmingly
European electorate, to declare Rhodesia a republic under a
new constitution. The ODI , or Republican, Constitution was
introduced to replace the 1965 Constitutution which the
Rhodesian government considered to be
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no longer acceptable to the oaoole of Bhodesia
because it contains a number* of objectionable
features, the principle one beiag that it provides
for eventual majority rule and, inevitably. the
domination of one raca by another and that it does
not guarantee that the government will be
retained- [Hef. 16]
The new constitution was based upon the premise of separate
racial development in all spheres and envisaged the attain-
ment of racial parity between blaoks and whites in the
parliament only in the vary distant future. The major
provisions of the Republican Constitution, which went into
effect on 2 March 1970, were as follows:
A. The Rhodesian legislative assembly was to be
composed of:
1. Fifty European members alectad on the roils
of European voters for fifty European consti-
tuencies.
toral colleges comprised of the chiefs, headmen,
and elected councilors of the African councils
of the Tribal Trust Lands.
B. The number of African members in the legislative
assembly would be increased, but the ratio of the
African to European membership in the house assembly
was directly related to the proportion of the total
income tax revenueeach community' paid.
C. Shc-uld the African ever reach parity representa-
tion with the Europeans (i.e., 50 seats apiece),
there would be no rurther increase in their* repre-
sentation.
D. The senate was to oonsist of 10 European members
elected by European members of the lower house, 10
African members electa! by all \frican chiefs, and
three members appointed by the president.
The effect of the Republican Constitution was that after
the elections 250,000 Europeans had 50 representatives in
the assembly and U, 000, 000 Africans had only 15 representa-
tives, half of whom were chiefs, headmen, and councillors
who were for all practical purposes nothing mere than
government employees. Thus, by means of the new constitu-
tion, the Smith regime was not only able to postpone poli-
tical parity indefinitely, but also was able to foreclose
altogether any future possibility of majority African rule.
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The implementation of the Republican Constitution on 2
March 1970 effectively isolated Rhodesia from the interna-
tional community. The British residual mission in Salisbury
and Rhodesia House in London were both closed- The British
governor. Sir Humphrey Gibbs, who had been nothing more than
a figure-head since UDI in 1965, resigned. On 18 March
1970, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling
for the immediate rupture of all relations with Rhodesia.
Eleven of the thirteen diplomatic missions in Rhodesia were
withdrawn, leaving only the South African and Portuguese
missions. The Rhodes ian Republic was denied official recog-
nition by all the members of the United Nations.
No sooner had the British government broken off rela-
tions with Rhodesia when it decided to re-open a dialogue
with the Rhodesian Front government in the hope of getting
the negotiating process going again. This was due to the
fact that the Conservatives, led by Edward Heath, came to
power in June 1970 when Wilson's Labour government was voted
out of office- The Conservative Party lacked the Labour
Party's anti-Rhodesia wing and thus was in a much better
position to make concessions to the Rhodesian regime during
the formulation of a settlement. In addition, the interna-
tional climate was more favorable -co a compromise solution
to the Anglo-Rhodesian crisis. There were indications that
the Nixon administration was going to be more favorably
disposed towards the Rhodesian Republic and on 6 October
1971 the U.S. Senate would vote to defy the UN sanctions and
to permit the importation of chrome from Rhodesia. Also,
the Heath government felt that, due to the general inst-
ability in Africa, which was typified by the overthrow of
President Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, international organiza-
tions such as the OAU, the Commonwealth, and the UN were
unlikely to actively oppose a compromise Anglo-Rhodesian
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would improve the stability of the rsgion.
Shortly after it came to power ia June 1970, the British
Conservative government announced that it was initiating new
attempts to re-open negotiations with the Rhodesian Front
government. The initial contacts were through private,
unofficial channels. On 16 February 1971, Ian Smith
confirmed that contact had been made between the British and
Rhodesian governments in Salisbury. In April 1971, Lord
Goodman led what would be the first of five missions to
Salisbury to prepare the way for the Anglo-Rhodesian Summit
Conference. During October, Lori Goodman was able to
achieve a basis for negotiations with the Rhodesians.
On 15 November 1971, a British dslegation of 27, led by
the foreign minister, Sir Alex Douglas-Home, arrived in
Salisbury to begin the Anglo-Rhodesian Summit Conference.
On 24 November 1971, the Anglo-Rhoiesian Accord was signed
in Salisbury. The Anglo-Rhodesian Accord represents a major
compromise by the British in that the British government
accepted, almost completely in tact, the Rhodesian constitu-
tion of 1969, removed the principle of NIBKAR as a prerequi-
site for independence, and of the original six principles
agreed upon in the Tiger and Fearless negotiations, gave
away on all of them except principle number five, which
allowed the British government to satisfy itself that the
proposed settlement was acceptable to the peopla of Rhodesia
as a whole. In addition to the 1969 Republican
Constitution, the Anglo-Rhodesian igreement also included
the following important proposals:
1. A commission was to be formed to inquire into
and make recommendations concerning discriainatory
legislation and a justiciable declaration of
rights. However, attempts to remove racial
discrimination may be vetoed if the government
considers that there are "overriding considera-
tions" and the declaration of rights (which is
qualified by numerous exceptions and provisos)
could be rendered largely ineffectual bv the
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suspension of rights after the declaration of a
state of emergency.
2. The prospect of eventual political parity
followed by a black parliamentary majority in the
subsequent election.
3. .Amendments to entrenched sections of the
affirmative votes of the majority of the white
representatives and a majority of black represen-
tatives in the house of assembly. These proce-
dures, while guarding against possible future
retrogressive measures, could also be used to
block progressive legislation- [Ref. 17]
Both the British and Rhodesian governments expected the
majority of Rhodesians, black and white, to accept the
Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement. On 25 November 1971, the 3ritish
government appointed a commission, headed by Lord Pearce, a
former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, to canvass the views of
all sections of Rhodesian opinion, including Rhodesians in
detention and living abroad, to determine the acceptability
of the proposals to Rhodesians as a whole. The Pearce
Commission visited Southern Rhodesia from 11 January to 12
March 1972. During that period there was considerable civil
unrest and a number of demonstrations organized by Africans
opposed to the settlement. Much of this opposition was due
to the efforts of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who had emerged as
the leading African politician in Rhodesia. On 16 December
197 1, Muzorewa had formed the African National Council (ANC)
for the express purpose of organizing opposition to the
Anglo-Rhodesian Accord. On 12 lay 1972, the Pearce
Commission presented to the British Parliament a report
which concluded that, the proposals were not acceptable to
the people of Rhodesia as a whole:
We are satisfied on our evidence that the propo-
sals are acceptable to the great majority of
Europeans. we are equally satisfied, after
considering all our evidence, including that on
intimidation, that the majority of Africans
rejected the proposals. In our opinion the oeople
of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the orobosals




The Commission believed that the main reasons for the
rejection of the proposals by the black majority were a deep
distrust of the government, the failure of the British and
Rhodesian governments to consult African nationalist leaders
during any stage of the negotiations, and a persistent
belief in Britain's ability to continue influencing events
in Rhodesia,
The political wings of ZAPO/PCC and ZAND* were relatively
inactive and ineffective between 1966 and 1972. The mili-
tary wings, ZIPRA and ZANLA, on the other hand, were very
active militarily, although still very ineffective. The
most straightforward method of discussing the problems faced
by the political and military wings of the nationalist
organizations is by dealing with each separately. For many
of the difficulties- faced by ZAPOYPCC and ZAND were due to
the fact that the political effort was not coordinated with
the military effort.
The low profile and resulting ineffectiveness of the
political wings of the nationalist organizations between
1966 and 1972 vas due to a number of conditions prevailing
in Rhodesia. First of all, the nationalist movement had
never recovered from the split that had occurred between
ZAPO/PCC and ZANO in 1963. Consequently, ZAPU and ZAND
expended more effort denouncing each other than dealing with
the problems of GDI and majority rills. This lack of co-op-
eration prevented the nationalists from providing a united
front to negotiate with the British and Rhodesian
governments.
Secondly, by 1966, most of the nationalist leaders had
been imprisoned in Rhodesia. Those who were not in prison
were in exile abroad. This situation had a number of nega-
tive effects on the nationalist movement in Rhodesia.
Communications between the imprisoned nationalist leaders,
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the exiled nationalist leaders, and the guerrilla leaders
was very difficult, making any kind of coordinated effort
nearly impossible. With the majority of the leaders in
prison or in exile, the leadership of the nationalist move-
ment inside ahodesia was often left to young and inexperi-
enced members of the nationalist organizations.
Finally, the credibility and coirage of the nationalist
leaders in exile was always very muoh in question. While
the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders abroad worked to court
the support of the ON, the OAO, the Commonwealth Nations,
and the Frontline States and to set up a government in
exile, they received increasing pressure from the Frontline
States, particularly Tanzania and Zambia and the FRELISO
guerrilla movement in aozambigue, to say nothing of the
guerrillas and imprisoned nationalists within Rhodesia, to
return to Rhodesia so that they could better lead the masses
in the fight for independence and majority rule. The final
result of these problems was a lack of leadership, organiza-
tion, and coordinated effort within the nationalist movement
inside Rhodesia between 1966 and 1972.
This struggle within the struggle was typified by the
continuing rivalry between ZAPO and ZANO in late 1965 and
1966. ZANO called for a united front with ZAPO as long as
such a u nification did not result in the subordination of
ZANO under Nkomo's PCC- ZANO wanted unity only in the
military aspects of the liberation struggle. However, ZAPO
demanded nothing less than the compLate disbanding of ZANO
and the subordination of its membership under Nkomo's lead-
ership. Consequently, neither organization would give in to
the other's demands and the united front was not formed. By
1966, the Liberation Couiittee of the 0A0 had recognized
ZAPO as the largest and most authentic Zimbabwean natinalist
party and had stopped financial support of ZANO. The
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cut-off of funds to ZANJ dv the OAU did not prevent ZANU
from going to individual countries and other organizations
for support. As a result, while both ZAPU and ZANU were
claiming to be more revolutionary than the other and
spending much of their time trying to gather support from
the UN, Commonwealth of Nations, and various Afro-Asian
organizations, neither of them was carrying on a revolution
inside of Rhodesia.
Because of their lack of organization, unity, and
pur posef ulness, neither of the two major nationalist organi-
zations participated in any of the Anglo-Rhodesian negctia-
tias that occurred between 1966 and 1972. Nevertheless,
blame for this cannot be placed solely at the doorstep of
the nationalist leaders. Ironically, they were never
invited to participate in the negotiations to determine the
future of the black majority of Rhodesia. The idea of
majority rule was abhorrent to the Rhodesian Front govern-
ment. Certainly the Rhode sian government could not invite
organizations that it had banned to participate in discus-
sions abcut power-sharing. The British governaent, on the
other hand, talcing a paternalistic view of the situation,
felt that the nationalists were not yet ready to speak for
themselves and that thereforethe British would have to look
out for their interests for them.
Not surprisingly, both ZAPO and ZANU rejected all of the
agreements that had been negotiated between the British and
Rhodesian governments between 1966 and 1972. It was the
feeling of the black nationalist organizations that these
talks were irrelevant to the Zimbabwean struggle for inde-
pendence. In a memorandum to the Commonwealth Heads of
States Conference on 7 January 1969 on the Fearl ess
Proposals, ZAPU stated that:
Any solution to the Rhodesian problem will have to




1. immediate and in cond itional Release of all
freedom fighters condemned to death; all freedom
fighters in imprisonment and all those under
detention and restriction; dropping of all charges
and release of any freedom fighters under arrest;
2. free and unfettered conditions for Mr. Joshua
Nkomo, leader of the African people of Zimbabwe,
to take full charge and conduct of all the affairs
of the African people in ordar to bring about
immediate and unqualified majority rule;
3. dissolution of the minority regime and all of
its institutions;
U. drawing of an. unqualified najority rule inde-
pendence constitution with no elements whatsoever
of class, racial, or tribal distinctions or
differentiations
;
5. immediate, total, and radical reconstruction
of the army, police. and administration so that
these correspond with the principles and purposes
of majority rule;
6. all racist and reactionary laws must cease to
have effect immediately and be expunged from the
statutes.
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The position of ZANO on the Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations
was exemplified in the following:
Britain and Ian Smith have no right to talk about
African independence without African consent and
participation. Both of them are imperialists and
nave no interest in liberating the Africans.
Their talks about settlement have virtually no
effect on the Africans and can never be regarded
as serious. [Ref- 20]
As mentioned earlier, Bishop Abel Muzorewa founded the
African National Council ( ANC) in December 1971 for the
purpose of opposing the Anglo-Rhodesian Accord. In a state-
ment to the Pearce Commission made on 3 January 1972, the
ANC concluded that:
It is clear that the proposals as they now stand
do not provide a satisfactory arrangement accep-
table to the vast majority of the people in tne
country. On behalf of these people, the ANC calls
for the Pearce Commission to rsport the rejection
of these terms, which, if accepted, can only serve
to perpetuate the existing divisions and injustice
in Rhodesia. [Ref. 21 ]
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In a letter to Sir Alec Douglas-Home concerning the
Pearce Commission and the Anglo-ahodesian Accord, the
Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the imprisoned leader of ZANO",
wrote from Salisbury Prison in January 1972 that:
The fundamental point you should bear in mind
Sir Alex, is that the problem facing this country
is basically a political one. But your kith ana
kin, with your support, hope to solve it bv police
and military action. The Anglo-Rhoaesian
Proposals cannot be implemented without military
and* police actions over many years, because they
lack one fundamental thing, and that is majority
rule now.
I sincerely hope that yoa will giye this
matter a further rethink so that a realistic solu-
tion to the present problem may be hammered out
for good, for the good of black and white, and
this can only be done if all interested parties
meet together, at a conference table on a basis of
give-and-take. [Ref. 22]
Two key events occurred during Phase III that would have
'an important effect* in determining the future leadership of
the political wings of the nationalist movements in
Zimbabwe. First of all, the formation of the African
National Council in 1971 had an importance that would reach
far beyond the immediate issue of the Anglo-Rhodesian
Proposals. The creation of the ANC signified the emergence
of the heretofore relatively obscure 3ishop Abel Huzorewa as
a nationalist leader to be reckoned with. The second event
involved the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the leader of
ZANU.
In 1969, Sithole was sentenced to six years in prison
for allegedly plotting to assasinate Ian Smith and two of
his cabinet members. During his trial, it is still unclear
for what reasons, Sithole denouncad the armed struggle.
Although Sithole would later disavow his own repudiation of
the armed struggle, the damage to his credibility with the
other nationalist political and guerrilla leaders had
already been done. Although Sithole would at times again
become a dominant actor in the nationalist movement, the
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questions about his sincerity and dedication '*ould prevent
him from ever completely recovering his reputation as a
leader. This beginning of Sithole's gradual demise is
important because it marked the beginning of Robert Mugabe's
emergence as the leader of ZAND". Mugabe and Suzorewa, along
with Joshua Nkomo, as will be seen, were to become the
triumvirate of Zimbabwean nationalist leaders.
The black nationalist guerrilla effort went through a
number of transitions between UDI and 1972. The realization
by the guerrillas of the political and military strength of
the Smith regime forced the guerrilla armies to change both
their overall strategy and their tactics between 1966 and
1972. Strategically, very early in the phase, the guer-
rillas came to realize that they would not be able to force
a British military intervention in Rhodesia by bringing
about a breakdown of law and order. Conseguently , they
accepted the fact that independence and majority rule would
not come about through British military intervention, but
only through the military and political defeat of the
Rhodesian Front regime by the nationalist forces. In regard
to the tactics, in ZIPRA and ZANLA there was a change from
quasi-conventional warfare to classical guerrilla warfare.
The guerrillas knew by 19 69 that they could not hope to
defeat the might of the Rhodesian security forces in deci-
sive military engagements. Consequently, the guerrillas
began to avoid conventional battle with the security forces
and starred to use classec hit-and-run guerrilla tactics.
An important part of these guerrilla tactics would be the
politicization of the indigenous population which had been
sorely neglected during the earlier stages of the armed
struggle.
Although the nationalist organizations had adopted guer-
rilla warfare as a means to independence and majority rule
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in the early 1960 's,
of British military intervention . Shortly after UDI, the
nationalists had viewed guerrilla activity as a means of
provoking British intervention because the British had said
that only a breakdown of law and order would cause them to
intervene militarily. Thus, before 1966 f guerrillas were
not being used to wage an armed struggle to win national
liberation, but as a means of intimidating Smith and Wilson
into concluding a settlement favorable to the nationalists.
Consequently, a number of small guerrilla bands, most of
which were trained abroad, were infiltrated into the
country, under the auspices of ZANtJ and ZAPU, to harrass the
Smith regime. The Crocodile Commando was an example of such
a group. Nevertheless, when it became apparent that the
Rhodesian Front government would not give an inch and that
the British government *ould not intervene militarily, the
nationalists decided that they would have to use their guer-
rilla forces to overthrow the white regime to achieve inde-
pendence and majority rule.
Immediately after GDI, the infiltration of guerrilla
bands into Rhodesia intensified. On 1 April 1966, a group
of thirteen or fourteen ZAtfLA guerrillas crossed the Zambezi
River by canoe and entered Rhodesia. This force broke into
three groups. Two of the groups »ent to Umtali and Fort
Victoria, respectively, with arms, explosives aad pamphlets.
Both groups were captured within two weeks by the Rhodesian
security forces, although not without a struggle. The third
group was captured during an attempted attack on the town of
Sinoia on the night of 27— 28 April 1966. [Ref. 23] In May,
ZIPRA also infiltrated guerrillas into Rhodesia and operated
in the Binga area west of Lake Kariba and in Bulawayo. The
ZIPRA guerrillas participated in a number of acts of
sabotage, but like their ZANLA counterparts, inevitably
i*2

ended up on the short end of the stick when they made
contact with the Rhodesian security forces. Throughout
1966, both ZANLA and ZIPS A continued to infiltrate small
bands of guerrillas into Rhodesia. The guerrillas
participated in a number of relatively small and usually
unsuccessful raids and acts of sabotage. Host of the
guerrillas were either killed or captured by the Rhodesian
security forces.
In 1967 and 1968, Rhodesian security forces and the
nationalist guerrillas fought a series of conventional
battles that not only caused the nationalists to modify
their tactics but also resulted in a intensification of the
divisions both within and between ZAND and ZAPO. The Wankie
Battles, which occurred from July to September 1967, repre-
sented the first large-scale confrontation between the
security forces and the guerrillas. In mid-1967, represen-
tatives of the African National Congress of South Africa
(SAANC) met with representatives of ZAPU to discuss and plan
cooperative military action against the Rhodesian security
forces. As a result of these meetings, a ZAPU-SAANC alli-
ance was formed. In late July 1957, a joint ZAPU-SAANC
guerrilla force of about eighty men crossed the Zambezi
River west of Victoria Palls and moved into Rhodesia's
Sankie Game Reserve. Shortly after their entry into the
country, the presence of the guerrillas was discovered by
the security forces. In late July and early August a
number of clashes occurred between the guerrillas and
Rhodesian Army patrols. As Oliver Tambo, the Deputy
President-General of the SAANC, and James Chikerema, the
acting president of ZAPU, had issued a joint statement on 19
August 1967 confirming the ZAPU-SAANC alliance, the
Rhodesian Front government felt compelled to ask the South
African government for assistance in fighting the guerrillas
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lest Rhodesian security forces be stretched too thin. South
Africa responded by sending a contingent of para-military
police and a number of helicopters to Rhodesia to back up
the security forces. In a series of clashes between the
security forces and the guerrillas from mid-August to late
September, nearly all of the guerrillas were either killed
or captured.
The Wankie Battles ware significant for a number of
reasons. First, they demonstrated that the guerrillas could
not hope to succeed in a one-to-one conventional confronta-
tion with the security forces, particularly when the
security forces were backed up by Rhodesian close air
support and South African police and helicopters. Although
the guerrillas fought well and inflicted light to moderate
casualties on the security forces, they had neither the
command structure nor the sophisticated weaponry with which
to defeat the security forces in a set battle. Second, the
alliance between ZAPO and the SAANC widened the rift between
ZAPO and ZANU. ZANU felt that the SAANC should have stayed
in South Africa to fight the white regime in that country
instead of provoking the South Africans into sending forces
into Rhodesia to kill Zimbabwean nationalists. In arguing
against the ZAPU/SAANC alliance, ZANO made the following
statement:
In guerrilla warfare we must strive to soread the
enemy forces so that we can wipe them out one by
one. The greatest help we can get from ANC is for
ANC to wage intensive guerrilla warfare in South
Africa. If ANC can pin down the whole South
African force within South Africa, then
Zimbabweans shall be left with Smith alone without
South African aid ...As it is now, the ANC and
PCC-ZAPO alliance has made it easy for Smith and
Vorster to unite and concentrate their forces to
slaughter Zimbabweans. [Ref. 29]
In South Africa, the SAANC's rival, the Pan-Africanist
Congress (PAC) also criticized the joint ZAPtJ-SAANC alliance
when it declared that:
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You cannot hope to gobble up a regular army, all
at once in a conventional" style war, as our
brothers tried to do, and still claim to be waging
guerrilla warfare. It is wholly unacceptable noth
in theory and practice. [ Sef . 25]
According to Anthony A. Wilkinson, the debate between
ZANU and ZAPO" which was sparked by the Hankie failure points
out one of the main theoretical and practical differences
between the two rival nationalist organizations. ZANU, on
the one hand, believed that the liberation of southern
Africa could only be obtained through the simultaneous
revolt by blacks in all the countrias under white minority
rule. ZAPQ, on the other hand, felt that the liberation
struggle should "be approached as a project to be achieved
in geographic stages--first Mozambique, then Angola, and in
the end South Africa." [Baf. 26]
The Hankie failure also emphasized to the guerrilla
leaders the need of obtaining the support of the indigenous
population if they hoped to win the guerrilla struggle.
ZAPU/ZIPRA had failed to prepare the way for the guerrilla
struggle inside Rhodesia. The native population had not
been politicized. Trustworthy collaborators had not been
identified nor informers cultivated. Food, weapons, and
ammunition caches were not in place. Consequently, when the
guerrillas were being pressured by the security forces, the
local population, which was the very object of the libera-
tion struggle, was of little or no assistance. In fact, the
local population was often a hindrance to the guerrillas as
the security forces had cultivated many informers among
them.
The second group of battles to be fought between the
security forces and the guerrillas were the Zambezi
Escarpement Battles which lasted from December 1967 to April
1968. Having learned from their mistakes in the Hankie
Battles, the ZAPU-SAANC high command had dispatched several
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reconnaissance elements to the vicinity of the Chigwasa
River to establish base camps for ths main body which was to
follow. During December 1967 and January 1958, approxi-
mately 150 ZAPO-SAANC guerrillas infiltrated from Zambia
across the Zambezi into Rhodesia. Again the presence of the
guerrillas was discovered by the security forces. Between
January and April, the guerrillas, which had broken up into
a number of small bands, were constantly pursued by the
security forces and again most of them were either killed or
captured. But the fact that this time it took the security
forces four months instead two months to eliminate the guer-
rillas indicates that there were two factors working in the
guerrillas 1 favor. First, the guerrillas had evidentally
gained the support and loyalty of some of the local popula-
tion. Second, ZANU, probably desiring to take advantage of
the confusion caused by the ZAPO-SAANC guerrillas in eastern
Rhodesia, began activities in other areas of the country.
This caused the security forces to spread themselves much
thinner than before.
The Kariba Battles of July and August 1968 involved
mostly SAANC guerrillas. On 12 and 13 July, a total of
ninety-one revolutionaries infiltrated across the Zambezi
and made their way to an area the other side of Kariba.
Within a month, Rhodesian security forces had killed or
captured all of the guerrillas. During that same period,
ZAND also attempted to infiltrate fourteen guerrillas into
Rhodesia. The guerrillas were engaged by the security
forces on 7 August as they were crossing Lake Kariba and all
of them were killed or captured during the next ten days.
There was very little guerrilla activity in 1969. This
was probably due to the severe defeats suffered by the
nationalist guerrillas in 1967 and 1963. In early January
1970, approximately 100 Z&PO guerrillas infiltrated into the
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Victoria Falls region of Rhodesia. Thess guerrillas
launched several moderarely successful attacks on several
Rhodesian and South African security force units and one
installation. Nevertheless, by early February, most of the
guerrillas had been tracked down and eliminated by the
security forces.
ZAPU was not reported as being involved in any guerrilla
activity in 1971. The ZANU underground, which had been
relatively inactive from 1968 through 1970, began to take
more action in 1971. Throughout 1971, Rhodesian security
forces intercepted ZANLA guerrillas attempting to smuggle
arms, ammunition, and explosives. In addition, a number of
caches of ammunition and explosives were uncovered in
Salisbury. During this period, ZAND also made a concerted
effort to recruit Zimbabweans for guerrilla training in
Zambia. A number of school teachers were arrested and
convicted of indoctrinating their students in the nation-
alist ideology and of planning to take some of their
students out of the country over the holiday periods for
guerrilla training. In any event, the level of ZANU guer-
rilla activity from 1963 to 1971 never did reach the level
of activity by ZAPQ. [Ref. 27]
ZANU's guerrilla movement was torn during this period by
a number of internal divisions that made successful guer-
rilla action difficult. One of the earliest signs of the
problems within the ZANtf guerrilla movement was, as
mentioned earlier, the denunciation of the guerrilla move-
ment by the ZANO president, Ndabaningi Sithole, at his trial
in 1969. The ZANLA guerrillas particularly objected to
Sithole^ reference to them as terrorists when he said:
I want to disassociate my name in thought. word,
deed, from any subvarsive activities, trom any




ZANO also suffered another major problem. ZANO had
always claimed to be the most militant and revolutionary of
the nationalist organizations. Yet, from 1966 to 1971, the
level of guerrilla activity by ZAND" was much lower than that
of ZAPO*. Richard Gibson has written that:
In ZANO's case, with great emphasis placed on
militancy, it was also inevitable that some
leaders and rank and file members should feel
after a relatively short while that the struggle
was not proceeding towards victory at a rapid
enough Dace. Complaints were raised about alleged
"bourgeoise leaders" in Lusaka. [ Ref . 29]
A number of ZANU guerrillas and ZANO students living abroad
felt that the ZANO party leadership was hiding out in
Zambia. They felt that the party leaders should undergo
military training and return to Zimbabwe to lead the guer-
rilla freedom fighters.
The final strav that broke the camel's back came in
October 1971 at the ZANO Delegate Conference which was held
near Lusaka, Zambia. ZANO" announced that it was discontin-
uing negotiations with ZAPO because it was impossible to
talk to an organization (ZAPU) that had so many divisions.
This announcement was accoa panied by a reorganization of the
ZANO leadership in which the members of the Central
Committee, led by Nathan Shamuyarira, who supported
continued negotiations with ZAPO, were ousted from the
conference. Shamuyarira' s bloc of dissidents included many
of those who believed that the ZANO leadership was not mili-
tant enough.
As was alluded to earlier, ZAPO was also suffering from
a number of internal conflicts. Largely because of the
defeats suffered in 1967 and 1968, there was a lack of
confidence by the rank and file ZIPRA guerrillas in the ZAPO
leadership. Also, ZAPO suffered from low morale and commu-
nications problems because of the imprisonment of Joshua
Nkomo. Nkomo and his two main lieutenants were kept in two
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separate prisons inside Rhodesia. Because of very tight
security measures, they ware unable to communicate between
themselves or with the remainder of the ZAPO* leadership in
Lusaka. As a result, by 1969, rumors were flying.
Accusations were make that the guerrilla commanders were
spending their time in Lusaka fraternizing with women and
using guerrilla labor to build homes for themselves. In
addition, there were disagreements along ethnic lines.
Disputes arose with Chikerema, the acting president, and
Nyandoro, the secretary-general, who were both Shona, on one
side, and Moyo, the treasurer, Silundika, in charge of publ-
icity, and Ndlovu, the assistant secretary, who were all
Sindebele-speaking Kalanga, on the other side. In January
1970, Chikerema offended part of the ZAPU leadership and
embarrassed the Zambian government when he gave permission
to a television film crew to interview a guerrilla group on
the Zambia side of the Zambezi River. In February 1970,
Moyo issued "Observations on Our Struggle," in which he
criticized Chikerema* a leadership. In this article, Moyo
expressed concern at the poor state of ZAPU'z command struc-
ture, discipline, organization, training, recruitment, and
intelligence [ Ref • 30]. Several days later, Chikerema
rebutted Moyo's accusations with "Reply to Observations on
Our Struggle." He asserted that Joshua Nkomo had vested the
power of the ZAPU presidency in him during Nkomo' s imprison-
ment and took control of all party functions, to include
finance. Chikerema also accused Moyo and his associates of
planning a coup against him. [Ref. 31]
In April, Moyo 1 s group conceded Chikerema' s authority
with the proviso that Chikerema could only act with the
approval of the ZAPU Executive Committee. Throughout 1970,
tensions continued between the Chikerema and Moyo factions.
Finally, President Kaunda called the five ZAPO leaders
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together and demanded that they start to work together or
face the prospect of being deported from Zambia. At this
time, the ZAPO leaders raada an effort to cooperate.
The truce between the two ZAPO factions was broken in
June 1970 when Chikerema began talks with Nathan Shamuyarira
of ZANO to discuss the unification of ZANU and ZAPO. These
talks accelerated in December 1970 when a report came from
Salisbury that the imprisoned Sithole and Nkomo had agreed
to step down from the presidencies of their respective
parties to permit Robert Mugabe, the detained
Secretary-General of ZANO, to become president of a new
party that would unite ZANO and ZAPO. Chikerema* s opponents
within ZAPO opposed these unification discussions. This
feud within ZAPO manifested itself in a number of violent
confrontations and kidnappings. In early 1971, President
Kaunda in order to maintain civil order, deported to
Rhodesia a number of ZAPO members who were promptly
arrested, tried, and convicted by the Rhodesian government.
Thus, by late 1971, both ZANO and ZAPO were divided in
to two factions, one wanting to maintain the status cjuo by
keeping ZANO and ZAPO separate and the other wanting to more
aggressively prosecute the guerrilla war by uniting ZANO
and ZAPO. In October 1971, the Shanuyarira faction of ZANO
and the Chikerema faction of ZAPO broke away from their
parent organizations and merged to form the Front for the
Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). The Chairman of FROLIZI
was Shelton Ziwela, an ex-ZIPRA guerrilla who had partici-
pated in two missions into Rhodesia. The Secretary was
Godfrey Savanhu, a former ZANO member. James Chikerema,
Nathan Shamuyarira, and Seorge Nyandoro were all on the
FROLIZI council. As would be expected, Zambia welcomed the
formation of FROLIZI. Both ZANO and ZAPO denounced FROLIZI




A comparison of the strategies and goals of ZAND, ZAPU r
and FROLIZI as of 1971 is very enlightening. By 1971, ZANU
had abandoned the strategy of direct confrontation with the
Bhodesian Army. Instead, greater emphasis was to be placed
upon the political education of the workers and peasents in
Zimbabwe, The purposes of this change in emphasis were to
gain the support of the masses and to recruit more people
for guerrilla training. The strategic aim of ZANU was to
demoralize white Rhodesia ns and cripple the Rhodesian
economy by forcing the Rhodesian government to draw civilian
manpower away from industry, agriculture, and business to
fill the ranks of the army which would be tied down fighting
small guerrilla bands in many parts of the country-
ZAPO advanced a similar strategy. ZAPU believed that
the white settler power was based in a large, well-equipped
army, a good transportation network, and communications
facilities. ZAPO, like ZANU, also realized that the white
regime was financing these things with industry and trade.
Consequently, instead of trying to tie down the security
forces, ZAPtJ concentrated its efforts on acts of sabotage
against industrial, transportation, and communications
facilities, the use of land mines, and limited, well-planned
armed attacks. Although it was the philosophy of both ZAND
and ZAPU to avoid decisive engagements, ZAPU's tactics were
much more risk-free.
FROLIZI advocated tactics that were similar to those of
both ZAND and ZAPO. However, FROLIZI espoused a more revo-
lutionary strategy. To FROLIZI, a true, national, and
democratic revolution was the ultimate goal. A simple
transfer of power would not suffice.
In late 1971, FROLIZI^ immediate goal was still to
unite ZANU and ZAPO. Ironically, it was to have very little
to do with the unification. At a meeting of the OAU
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Liberation Committee in January 1972, ZANU and ZAPU made a
joint declaration of their intent to unite. FROLIZI was to
be asked to join this united front later. The OAU declared
that it would give money only to this united front. In a
February 1972 meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee, ZANU
and ZAPU agreed to form a Joint Military Command (JMC) . The
JMC was to be responsible for planning and conducting all
aspects of the "revolution ary" war. Ultimately, FROLIZI
never was allowed to join the united front, but the OAU gave
money to both the JMC and FROLIZI.
FROLIZI held a conference in August 1972 at which James
Chikerema was elected Chairman and Stephen Pazrienyatwa was
elected Secretary. FROLIZI never was able to become a
viable guerrilla or political organization. Torn internally
by ethnic rivalries", its guerrilla activities were extremely
limited. As a result, by Juna 1973 it had virtually
collapsed. Three members of FROLIZI* s seven-man national
executive and another nineteen ordinary members rejoined
ZANU. Among them were Nathan Shamuyarira and G. G. Parirewa.
In November 1973, the OAU Liberation Committee finally
rejected FROLIZI 1 s application for membership.
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IV. FROH CONFLICT TO A SETTLEMENT
A. RHODESIAN FRONT GOVERNMENT-NATIONALIST NEGOriATIONS AND
NATIONALIST SPLITS: 1972 - 1978
Phase IV of the Rhodesian crisis, which lasted from June
1972 through March 1978, was the most important period in
the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle. Beginning with the
emergence of Bishop Abel Mazorewa's ANC as the most influen-
tial nationalist organization and culminating with an
internal "settlement" between the Smith regime and Bishop
Muzorewa, this period was significant because of the devel-
opment of events and treads that would determine the final
outcome in Rhodesia. The first significant event in this
period was the virtual withdrawal of the British government
from the negotiating process after the failure of the
Anglo-Rhodesian Accord in the Spring of 1972. The British
would not re-enter the negotiating process as active parti-
cipants until late 1976. This change in the Anglo-Rhodesian
negotiating relationship was in nany ways the crucial
turning point in the nationalist struggle.
Because of the successful campaign mounted against the
Anglo-Rhodesian Accord by Muzorewa's ANC and because of the
British withdrawal from the negotiating process, Ian Smith
finally came to the realization that any settlement would
have to include the nationalist leaders. Consequently,
Smith began negotiations with Muzorewa in early 1973.
Nevertheless, Smith*s willingness to negotiate with the
nationalists was not motivated so much by altruism as it was
by pragmatism. For although Smith gave the outward appear-
ance of negotiating seriously with the nationalists, in
reality he was not doing this. In fact, Smith used the
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negotiations with the various nationalist leaders between
1973 and 1977 as a means of playing upon the divisions
within and between the nationalist organizations.
At various times during this phase. Smith negotiated
with Muzorewa, Sithole, and Nkomo. But never did he nego-
tiate with the nationalist leader wh3 had, at the time, the
backing of the majority of the nationalist organizations,
popular support, or, most importantly, the power and the
authority to speak for the black majority. Through this
strategy of divide and conquer. Smith hoped, at the very
least, to get a settlement that would insure a privileged
position for the white minority and, hopefully, maintain the
sta tus quo indefinitely.
Indirectly, Smith's actions would determine who would be
the future leader of Zimbabwe. The divide and conquer stra-
tegy had the effect of making Muzorewa, Nkomo, and Sithole
change their positions on a. number of issues. Consequently,
at different times each one of them appeared to be an incon-
sistent opportunist whose basic motives, credibility, and
sincerity were very much in question. Throughout this
period, only Robert Mugabe would refuse "to blow with the
wind" and it would be his unyielding consistency and a
strict adherence to a basio set of principles and goals that
would insure his ultimate victory. Out of this internal
bickering and distrust, ZANU would emerge as the most
powerful Zimbabwean nationalist organization, and it would
be ZANLA that would carry on an intensified and successful
guerrilla war during the final years of the nationalist
struggle.
Finally, the significance of the 197U Portuguese coup
and subsequent transfer of power in Mozambique to a new
FRSLIMO government in 1975 cannot be underestimated. The
existence of a government, who had itself been a nationalist
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guerrilla organization only a few months earlier, adjacent
to and sympathetic to the nationalist cause, had a dramatic
influence on the negotiating process, the struggles within
the nationalist movement, and the guerrilla war.
In late 1972 and early 1973, Bishop Abel Muzorewa's ANC
began preliminary negotiations wilth the Smith regime.
Although the ANC was opposed to guerrilla warfare and
violent revolution, it was nevertheless unyielding in its
demands for immediate majority rule. Initially, Smith
attempted to circumvent tha ANC by dealing only with his own
hand-picked group of African leaders and organizations. But
as the ANC's influence and ability to organize popular
support increased. Smith gave up these tactics and began
dealing with Muzorewa. Thus, because the ANC was the only
nationalist party officially recognized by the R?G and
because it was the only nationalist organization that could
operate overtly and legally within Rhodesia, Muzorewa's
power and influence increased dramatically. Muzorewa hoped
that the fact that the ANC was based -inside of Rhodesia
would serve as his ace in the hole during the negotiating
efforts.
Although the nationalist guerrilla organizations outside
of Zimbabwe (ZANO, ZAPU, and FROLIZI) had supported
Muzorewa's campaign against the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals of
1972, they were denouncing his negotiations with the
Rhodesian Front government. The more radical nationalist
organizations did not agree with Muzorewa'a strategy of
achieving democratic rule through non-violent aeans. They
still felt that violent revolution was the only means of
getting independence and majority rula in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe.
In addition, ZANO", ZAPO, and FROLIZI were still wasting
precious effort on verbal attacks on one another, each one




The situation was further complicated by the weak link-
ages between the guerrilla and political wings of the
nationalist organizations. The JHC had never gotten off the
ground. ZANU and Z APU did not aaks any sincere effort to
coordinate military planning and operations. 3y 1973, ZANU
was very far advanced in infiltrating guerrillas into
Rhodesia and setting up a political infrastructure in the
Rhodesian country-side. ZANU leaders felt that joint mili-
tary operations with ZAPU would only serve to slow their own
progress. In March 1973, an OAU concilliation council
persuaded ZAPU and ZANU to form a joint military and poli-
tical council. As might have been axpected, this organiza-
tion was no more effective than the JMC, and both ZANLA and
ZIPRA continued to go thair own independent, uncoordinated
ways.
In addition to this split betwesn ZANU and ZAPO", there
was an additional split between the ZANU political leaders
and the ZANLA guerrilla commanders. The military leaders.
Rex Nhongo and Josiah Toagogara, refused to subordinate
their guerrilla army to the ZANU political leaders and did
not acknowledge Sithole as the legitimate leader of ZANU.
They felt that, since they had the military power, that they
also had de facto political power.
Muzorewa and Smith began unofficial discussions during
the first several months of 1973, the first official talks
not occuring until 17 July 1973. Throughout these discus-
sions, which lasted into 1974, Muzorewa stuck to the prin-
ciple of immediate majority rule while Smith was unyielding
in his demand that the nationalists would have to accept the
197 1 Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals. Smith totally rejected all
ANC demands to end racial discrimination in land tenure,
education, franchise, and the civil service and to free
political detainees on the grounds that the 197 1 proposals
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were not negotiable. Partly as a reaction to increasing
pressure from the guerrillas and partly to pressure the ANC
to accept the 1971 proposals, Smith introduced a number of
repressive laws in 1973 and 1974.
In a 20 March 1974 letter from six imprisoned members of
ZANU's central committee, including Sithole and Mugabe,
Muzorewa was condemned for conducting negotiations with an
illegal regime and asked to terminate all discussions with
the Smith government. The ANC gave Muzorewa a mandate to
reach an agreement with Smith that would provide for unim-
peded progress towards majority rule. By March 1974, Smith
was still refusing to budge from the 1971 proposals. The
ANC rejected Smith's offers and on 20 June 1974 Muzorewa
suspended the constitutional talks. At this time, Smith
leaked information that was intended to undermine Muzorewa's
credibility with the nationalists. Smith claimed that
Muzorewa had agreed to the 1971 proposals. Muzorewa denied
the accusations saying that he had only agreed to the 1971
proposals as a "basis for negotiation." In September 1974,
Smith produced a document signed by Bishop Muzorewa which
stated -hat "Bishop Muzorewa, in his capacity as President
of the African National Council, ga/e an understanding that
he accepted the 1971 proposals for a. settlement and that he
would urge the British government, on behalf of th African
people, to implement the proposals." [Ref. 32] This agree-
ment had been signed on 17 August 1973 and the key phrase,
"as a basis for negotiation (or discussion) ," was missing
from Smith* s version of the agreement, which was reprinted
in the Rhodesia Herald on 2 7 September 1974. This incident
is probably best elucidated by Martin and Johnson in The
Str uggle for Zimbabwe:
/
On 15 October, in a. circular distributed to ANC
offices, the SishoD claimed that he had been
cheated into signing' the documsnt. He said that
he had initiated the talks, to which Smith had
come with a prepared statement apoarently under
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the assumption that the ANC had changed their
minds over the 1971 settlement proposals and were
now willing to accept then. This was not the
case. "when Mr. Smith produced the prepared
statement for signing, we signed, but I said that
the 1971 settlement proposals could only form the
basis for discussion. I asked Mr. Smith to amend
his coDy of the document and I believed he had
done so in the presence of the two witnesses."
One of the witnesses, Chad Chipunza, an uncle of
Muzorewa and a conservative politician from
Federal days, who favoured a settlement based upon
the 1971 proposals, issued a statement saying he
was amazed at the bishop's claim that he had Been
cheated and suggested Muzorewa should aracefully
retire from politics and shepherd his flock. Even
taking into account Muzorewa' s political inepti-
tude, it is incredible that he should have signed
an agreement which went totally against the
African opinion exoressed to the Pearce
Commission. Even more incredible, or perhaps
merely naive, is the fact--even if he really meant
to include the phrase that the proposals ware only
a "basis for discussion"--he signed the document,
before ensuring that it had been inserted.
[Ref. 33]
Meanwhile, events in Portugal had had a dramatic effect
on the situation in Rhodesia. On 25 April 1974, the
Portuguese armed forces conducted a successful coup d'etat
against the government of Dr. CaetanD . The primary reasons
for the coup were the disillusionment and war weariness of
the Portuguese Army over the counterinsurgencies in Guinea
Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique and the rampant inflation in
Portugal. The coup affected the situation in Rhodesia in
three ways. First of all, the Portuguese-South
Africa-Rhodesia alliance against nationalist guerrillas was
about to be broken up. It was obvious that Portugal was
withdrawing from Africa. South Africa, who had economic
involvement in Mozambique, was faced with the prospect of
having to develop a good working relationship with a new
(probably FRELIMO) governient in Mozambique. The Vorster
government had given immediate recognition to the new
Portuguese government. In addition, the South African
forces were starting to take heavier casualties in Rhodesia.
Consequently, it was very possible, from Ian Smith's point




Secondly, the Smith regime was faced with the prospect
of hostile governments on two of its borders. Indeed, in
1975 FRELIMO came to power in Mozambique and the MPLA came
to power in Angola, giving the Zimbabwean guerrillas
increased sources of sanctuary, supply, and assistance.
Finally, involvement and failure in Angola would ultimately
cause both the United States and South Africa to pressure
Ian Smith to seriously negotiate a solution to the Rhodesian
dilemma.
3y mid-1974. Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa
realized that it was in South Africa's best interests to
defuse the situation in Rhodesia. Vorster felt that the
Portuguese coup d'etat and the likelihood of a FRELIMO
government coming into power in Mozambique made the Smith
regime* s military defeat inevitable unless a constitutional
solution could be worked out in Rhodesia. Indeed, the
changed situation in Mozambique was the primary factor
influencing Vorster's attitudes and policies towards
Rhodesia. South Africa's dependence upon Mozambique's
seaports, labor, and hydroelectric power would require
Vorster to develop a working relationship with the new
government in Mozambique. Also, Vorster felt that he had to
do something to defuse the popular appeal of radical black
leaders such as FRELIMO's Samora Machel. Thus, Vorster
hoped that by assisting in a settlement of the Rhodesian
problem and aiding, rather than hindering, Mozambique's
transition to an independent government, he might be able to
obtain the respect of the moderate black states and possibly
revive his dream of a South African dominated southern
African economic community.
If Vorster was going to have any hope of success in
pressuring Smith to work for a constitutional settlement, he
would need an ally among one of the African states to apply
59

the same type of pressure upon trie nationalist guerrillas
and to act as an intermediary between Smith and the nation-
alists. Countries such as Malawi, Senegal, and Ivory Coast
were out of consideration because thsir close relations with
South Africa and the former colonial powers gave them little
credibility with the guerrillas. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania
was out because since 1971 he had consistently opposed all
negotiations between nationalists and the illegal Smith
regime and because he was still providing the guerrillas
with rear base training facilities. It was also unlikely
that Vorster could hope for any help from Hachsl's FR2LIM0,
which was still a radical Marxist guerrilla movement and
assisting in the infiltration of ZANLA guerrillas through
Tete Province into Rhodesia. The only alternative left to
Vorster was Zambia, who, although still allowing ZIPRA guer-
rillas to infiltrate from Tanzania through Zambian terri-
tory, had the most no gain economically and politically,
from a Rhodesian settlement.
Representatives of Vorster* s government net secretly
with representatives of Kaunda's government in New York in
early October 1974. Zambia asked South Africa if she would
be willing to help get rid of the Smith regime and help
bring about majority rule and independence in Rhodesia. The
Zambian government also asked if the South Africans would be
willing to allow the UN to assume responsibility for guiding
Namibia towards independence. The South Africans replied
that they would be willing to assist in a negotiated settle-
ment in Rhodesia as long as there was a guaranteed transi-
tion period in Rhodesia and a guarantee that, once Zimbabwe
was independent, it would net be used as a base for guer-
rilla attacks on South Africa. On 3 October 1974, the
Zambian government in Lusaka drafted a document that was to
be come known as the "Detente Scenario." Entitled "Towards
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the Summit: An Approach to Peaceful Change in Southern
Afria," the aost important provisions of this document were
as follows:
i. Zambia agreed to work for a peaceful solutionm Rhodesia, along with the governments of Tanzania,
Botswana, and Mozambique as long as such a solution
would provide for freedom and justice for all
people, regardless of race, color, creed, or ethnic
group.
2. Zambia and the o^her Frontline States would not
support an increase in the war effort if peaceful
conditions are possible.
3. The Zambian, Tanzanian, Botswanan, and
Mozambiquen governments would agree to a summit with
the Vorster government only if its objectives were
clearly defined.
4. South Africa was to promise to recognize dejure the new FRELIM3 government and promise "Jo"
support it politically, economically, and finan-
cially.
5. South Africa was to prevent attacks upon
Mozambique by mercenaries based in Rhodesia and
South Africa.
6. South Africa was to initiate action to renego-
tiate terms on harbors, railways, and port charges,
the supply of hydroelectric power from Cabora Bassa,
migrant* labor, and any other South African interests
in Mozambique.
7. Mozambique would reaffirm its policy of non-ag-
gression against South Africa and would not allow
its territory to be used as a base for mercenaries
or insurgents attacking into South Africa.
8. Mozambique would nor interfere in the internal
affairs of other indaoendent countries, including
South Africa.
9. South Africa would advise the Smith regime that
a political solution to the Rhodesian problem is
"most negotiable and urgent."
10. South Africa would not interfere in Rhodesia's
internal affairs and would withdraw all security
personnel and equipment for Rhodesia.
11. South Africa would declare that a negotiated
settlement was in Rhodesia's best interests and that
it was against any further escalation of the war.
The above conditions of the "Detente Scenario" were to
be met by the end of November. Vorster had no trouble doing
so. In addition, the South African government was to ensure
that the Rhodesian government moved rapidly towards a
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constitutional conference by implementing the following six
points:
1. Releasing all. political da^ainees and orisoners
since their voice is both credible and final in any
negotiations. In this connection, Mr. Joshua Nkomo,
Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and their lieutenants
command tremendous influence and will for a long
time remain the voice of reason;
2. Lifting the ban on ZAPU and ZAND and the
restrictions of movements on leaders so that they
participate fully and constructively in the search
for a just political solution as an alternative to
the current armed struggles;
3. Suspend political trials and revoke death
sentences for political offenders;
4 t Suspend all politically discriminatory legisla-
tion;
5- Gearina the SAG (South African Government)
administration to help defuse racial tension ana
create a political climate for the acceptance of the
proposal of the constitutional conference repre-
senting ZAPO and ZAND*, the Rhodesian Front, and
other oolitical parties in Rhodesia under British
chairmanship. In these circumstances the current
armed struggle will be replaced by a new sDirit of
cooperation and racial harmony *hich is the founda-
tion for political stability and therefore justif-
ying withdrawal of the South African security
forces
;
6. SAG to make it clear that they will support any
legally constituted government irrespective of it's
racial composition in Rhodesia- [Ref. 34]
Zambia and her "friends" (Tanzania, Botswana, and
Mozambigue) in turn promised to publicly welcome these moves
by the South African and Rhodesian governments and to use
their influence to ensure that ZAND" and ZAPU cease the armed
struggle and work towards a political solution to the
problem.
In regard to Namibia, South Africa was asked to reaffirm
its policy of self-determination in accordance with the will
of the majority, to recognize SWAPO as a political organiza-
tion in Namibia, to cease physical abuse of prisoners, and
to encourage ex-patriot Namibians to return to the country
to participate in the political process. It should be noted
that the "Detente Scenario" did not ask South Africa to
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release Namibian political prisoners, to acknowledge Walvis
Bay as an intergral part of Namibia, or to allow the UN to
carry out the process of Namibia's decolonization. In
return, Zambia and her "friends" would ask StfAPO to cease
violent activity and to register itself as a legitamate
political party opposed to violent change, provided South
Africa allowed it to do so.
All of these commitments in the "Detente Scenario" were
to be met by mid-December 1974 whan a summit conference
would be held between Vorster and Kaunda (and hopefully the
other Frontline leaders) . Unfortunately, the conference was
cancelled when Vorster was unable to keep his part of the
agreement. He had to postpone his plans to withdraw South
African military personnel from Rhodasia.
Nevertheless, Vorster was able to convince Smith to
release the detained nationalist leaders to go to a confer-
ence with the leaders of the Frontline States in Lusaka in
November 1974. It wasn't just the pressure from Vorster
that had caused Smith to release the nationalist leaders.
In 1974 in Rhodesia security forces had started taking much
heavier casualties. Iha ratio of guerrillas to security
forces killed was five to one, which was unacceptable in a
guerrilla war and in a country where blacks outnumbered
whites twenty to one. ZANLA's change in strategy was taking
its toll against the security forces. In addition, when the
nine-month transition period preceding an independent
Mozambique was over in June 1975, the Rhoiesian Front
government would be facing a hostile PHELIHO government on
one of its borders. Thus, it was to Smith's advantage to
free the imprisoned nationalist leaders in the hope that
they would agree to a caasefire that would eliminate the
military threat to the Smith regima.
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On 1 November 19 74, N&abaningi Sithoie was, while in
prison, suspended as the president of ZANU by the imprisoned
ZANG Executive Committee. There ware several reasons for
Sithoie' s suspension. The central committee was still
enraged at Sithoie' s denunciation of the armed struggle at
his 1969 trial. In 1974, Sithoie refused to appear before
the ZANU central committee to answer questions about his
1969 denunciation. Also in 1974, Sithoie had had several
discussions with Rhodesian special branch officers.
Consequently, he was suspected by the other ZAND* leaders of
being a "quisling." Finally, the straw that broke the
camel's back was Sithoie' s statement that "one-man, one-
vote" was not an immediate goal bat merely a slogan to be
used in mobilization and negotiations. In the 1 November
vote on Sithole's suspension, Tekere, Nkala, and Nyagumbo
voted for the suspension while Mugabe abstained from voting.
Malianga, as chairman, did not vote but opposed Sithole's
suspension on the grounds that it was unconstitutional
without a meeting of the ZANU Congress. [ Ref . 35]
When Zambian government officials arrived in Salisbury
on 8 November 1974 to pick up Sithoie fox the Lasaka confer-
ence, they were instead a et by Mugabe and Malianga. The
ZAND" central committee had decided that Mugabe, the
General-Secretary, and Malianga, the Secretary for Youth and
Culture, should replace Sithoie in Lusaka. Arriving in
Lusaka, Mugabe and Malianga, who were unknown to the
Frontline State leaders, were confronted by Kaunda, Nyerere,
and Machel. Accused of instigating a coup in prison and of
acting against the ZANU constitution, they were prevented
from contacting their ZANU colleagues in Lusaka, placed
under house arrest over night, and unceremoniously flown
back to detention in Rhodesia the next morning.
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On «2 November 1974, Kaunda called Sithole to Lusaka,
either as a private individual or as the ZAND president. In
Lusaka, Kaunda told Sithole that while the Frontline State
leaders did not want to impose Sithole's leadership upon
ZAND", ZANU ran the risk of losing the support of the
Frontline States if it did not resolve its internal crisis.
Sithole met with five members of the ZANLA war council, the
Dare re Chimurenga (DAHE) ; Nyangumbo, who had been in prison
with Sithole, Chitepo, the ZAND National Chairman who had
been in Zambia, Mudzi, the Administrative Secretary,
Tongogara, the Chief of Defense, and Matuare, the Politcal
Coamisar. Tongogara stated that the decision to suspend
Sithole had endangered ZANJJ training facilities in Tanzania
and Chitepo expressed the opinion that Kaunda might use the
suspension as an excuse to throw ZAND out of Zambia. The
six leaders came to the oonclusion that Sithole had been
betrayed by the executive committee and that Nyangumbo
should return to Que Que Prison to convince them to change
their minds. Meanwhile, Sithole and his associates flew to
Tanzania where they were assured by Nyerere of his continued
support of ZAND. Dpon arriving in Mozambique, Machel told
them that he would arrest every guerrilla in lozambique if
the ZAND executive committee did not change its decision on
Sithole's suspension. After much criticism by Nkaia and
Tekere at Que Que, Nyagumbo was able to convince the execu-
tive committee to adopt a resolution suspending the effect
of Sithole's suspension pending a final decision by the
congress. (Ref. 36]
With Sithole reinstated as ZAND'S president, the
Frontline state leaders were free to concentrate on the
larger and more critical problems of uniting the ANC, ZAND,
ZAPO, and FHOLIZI and initiating a peace summit with
Rhodesia. Betweeen 3 and 8 December 1974, meetings were
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held in Lusaka between the Frontline State leaders (Samora
Machel of Mozambique, Secetse Khama of Botswana, Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia) and the
leaders of the ANC (Muzorewa), ZAND" (Sithole), ZAPO (Nkomo)
,
and FROLIZI (Chikerema) . As a result of these discussions,
on 7 December 1974 the nationalist leaders agreed to
dissolve their individual o rgan izations and to form a united
front under the name African National Council (ANC). Bishop
Muzorewa was appointed the president of the new ANC. The
organization and functions of this new ANC were explained in
the "Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity" of 7 December 1974:
ZANU, ZAPO, FROLIZI, and ANC hereby agree to unite
in the ANC.
2. The parties recognize the ANC as the unifying
force of the people of Zimbabwe.
(a) They agree to consolidate the leadership of
the ANC bythe inclusion into it of the presi-
dents of ZANO t ZAPO, and FROLIZI under the
chairmanship ct the president of the ANC.
(b) ZAPO, ZANO, and FROLIZI shall each appoint
three other persons to join the enlarged ANC
executive.
4. The enlarged ANC executive shall have the
following functions:
(a) To prepare for any conference for the
transfer of power to the majority that might be
called.
(b) To prepare for the holding of a congress
within four months at which
—
(i) A revised ANC constitution shall be
adopted.
(ii) The leadership of the united people of
Zimbabwe shall be elected;
(iii) A statement of policy for the new ANC
will be considered.
(c) To organize the people for such conference
and congress.
5. The leadership of the ZAPO. ZANO, and FROLIZI
call upon their supporters and all Zimbabweans to
rally behind the ANC under its enlarged executive.
6. ZAPO, ZANO, and FROLIZI will take steps to merge
their respective organs and structures into the ANC
before the congress to be held within four months.
7. The leaders recognize the inevitability of
continued armed struggle until the total liberation
of Zimbabwe.
Signed: Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa President of ANC
Signed: Joshua Mquabuko Nkomo President of ZAPO
Signed: Ndabaningi Sithole President of ZANO





The "Salisbury Declaration " of 11 December 1974 furthei
elaborated on the basic position and goals of the new ANC:
Recognizing the paramount need for unity in the
Zimbabwe liberation struggle, the executive commit-
tees of ZAPU, ZANU. FROLIZI. and AMC have met in
Lusaka to discuss the aims, objectives, and methods
to be pursued. Full agreement was reached on the
following points:
1, We have agreed to unite under one organiza-
tion with immediate effect. We have agreed
further, that this organization shall be the
African National Council.
2. We shall be working for the indeoendence of
our country. We assume that on this demand for
independence there is no difference among
Rhodesians of all races. But there nas until
now been a difference on the kind of indepen-
dence which Zimbabwe must have. The Rhodesian
Front has, in the past, sought independence on
the basis of minority rule. We reject that.
The indeoendence we still seek, is independence
on the basis of majority rule.
3- For the purposes of achieving that Dbject^ve
we have alwavs been ready to enter into negotia-
tions with others concerned. Now that some of
us have been released from detention, we believe
the time is ripe for us to repeat this offer.
Without pre-conditions on both sides we are
ready to enter into immediate and meaningful
negotiations with* leaders of the Rhodesian
Front, and with the British government in
Britain. on the steps to be taken to achieve
independence on the basis of majority rule.
4. As a demonstration of our sincerity, all
freedom fighters will be instructed, as soon as
a date for negotiation has been fixed, to
suspend fighting.
5. We are not racialists. We accept the right
of white Rhodesians to li?e in Rhodesia and
share the same rights and obligations of citiz-
enship as their fellow Hhodesians of the
majority community, without any discrimination
on the grounds of race, colour, or creed.
6. We call udoq all Rhodesians, and all who
reside in Rhodesia, to remain calm, maintain
peace and to go about their normal business,
while these matters are being considered, and
while any negotiations are proceeding.
7. We call upon all Zimbabweans, wherever they
are, to remain united behind the demand for
independence on the basis of majority rule. and




abroau to continue zheir support ror our
struggle until independence is achieved or. the
basis of majority rule.
Signed: Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa President of AHC
Signed: Joshua Mgabuko Nkomo Former President of
ZAPU
Signed: Ndabaningi Sithole Former President of ZANU
Signed: James Robert Dambadza Chikerema Former
President of FROLOZI [fief- 38]
It was clear from the Lusaka and Salisbury agreements
that the new ANC was willing to negotiate directly with
Smith's Rhodesian Front government ia order to bring about a
peace settlement and majority rule. This differed from the
statements and policies of previous nationalist organiza-
tions who viewed the Smith government as an illegal regime
that could not be negotiated with. Ne vertheless, discus-
sions between the Smith government and the new ANC were in
trouble from the very start . Smith accused the nationalists
of not enforcing the ceasefire which had been agreed upon as
a precondition for any future talks. Additionally, Smith
refused to attend talks outside of Rhodesia and refused to
grant immunity from arrest to exiled nationalist: leaders to
allow them to attend talks within Rhodesia. After prelimi-
nary talks in Salisbury between the RFG and the AHC, a
conference was finally held between the two parties in a
railway car on the Victoria Falls Bridge on 26 August: 1975.
Inspite of the personal efforts of both Kaunda and Vorster,
the talks broke down soon after they began. The primary
reason for the deadlock was Smith's refusal to even consider
any transfer of power from minority to majority rule.
Realizing the futility of peaceful negotiations, the ANC
had already begun to make preparations to renew and accel-
erate the guerrilla war. On 8 July 1975 , ANC leaders had met
in Dar es Salaam to establish the Zimbabwe Liberation
Council (ZLC) and to send Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole, and
Chikerema to visit guerrilla camps in Tanzania. The ZLC was
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-zc be responsible for training and squipping the guerrillas
and planning and carrying out the guerrilla war should the
peace talks break down. is might have been expected the ZLC
failed in its attempts to to coordinate the guerrilla effort
due to the rivalries and factionalism within the nationalist
movement. Ian Smith would go to great efforts to take
advantage of this internal factionalism in the ANC and its
sub-organizations in order to negotiate an internal settle-
ment with what he felt were the more moderate and respon-
sible and reasonable members of the nationalist movement.
The first split within the ANC that Smith was able to
exploit was that between Bishop Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo.
Shortly after the breakdown of the 7ictoria Palls talks,
disagreements between Muzorewa and Nkomo came to a head. On
11 September 1975, Muzorewa expelled Nkomo, who had aspira-
tions of challenging Muzorewa' s authority and heading the
ANC himself, from the ANC for initiating independent discus-
sions with and collaborating with the Smith government. In
late September 1975, Nkomo held his own ANC congress, which
was attended by six thousand delegates, including nearly
two-thirds of the old ANC executive committee. On 28
September 1975, Nkomo was elected president of the ANC and
shortly thereafter he began preliminary meetings with Smith
to discuss the possibility of reopening formal negotiations.
On 1 December 1975, Smith and Nkomo announced their intent
to negotiate a constitutional settlement. This declaration
to negotiate was immediately denounced by both Muzorewa and
Sithole. Sithole declared that ZANLA guerrillas would begin
anew the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe. As will be discussed
shortly, Sithole*s threat was meaningless as he no longer
had control over the ZANLA forces.
Formal negotiations between Smith and Nkomo occurred
during the first half of March 1975. During this period,

both the British and United States governments urged Smith
to moderate his stand against majority rule. Nkomo proposed
to Smith the creation of a 144-seat Legislature with between
36 and 58 seats to be held by whitas. Smith, on the other
hand, wanted a three-tier assembly with one-third of the
seats reserved for whites, one-third for blacks, and one-
third selected by electors on a common role with high quali-
fications. The Rhodesian Front government felt that this
system would insure whita control of the majority of the
assembly seats for at least ten to fifteen years. Nkomo and
Smith failed to reach an agreement and the talks between
them collapsed on 1 9 March 1975.
During this same period, the ANC was also being torn
apart by a power struggle that was taking place between the
leaders of ZANO" and ZANLA.. Although this rivalry within
ZAND" had been brewing for a long time, the split within ZANO"
was brought to a head on 13 March 1975 with the assasination
in Zambia of Herbert Chitapo, the ZANU national chairman.
Chitepo, a militant nationalist, had opposed the consolida-
tion of all the nationalist organizations under the new ANC.
He had also opposed the planned ceasefire and negotiations
with the Hhodesian governaent. By early 1975, Chitepo's
primary concerns were reinforcing and resupplying the ZANLA
guerrillas fighting inside of Rhodesia. Consequently, this
brought him into direct conflict with the Sithole wing of
ZANO", the ANC, and the government of Zambia. In pursuance
of a constitutional settlement, these three organizations
had cut back on the assistance they had been giving to
Chitepo and his ZANLA guerrillas. »hen Chitepo was murd-
ered, a number of groups were accused of being responsible
for his death, including the Rhodesian government, ZAPU, and
Sithole' s wing of ZANU. In ordar to prevent further
violence and to prevent ZANLA from using Zambia as a base
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from which to intensify the guarrilla war, or. 23 March 1975
the Zambian government arrested most of the ZANO/ZANLA
leaders who were residing in Zambia. Kaunda was not to
release these leaders until 17 October 1976. The ultimate
effect of the Chitepo assasination and the subsequent crack-
down on ZANLA guerrillas in Zambia was to further faction-
alize both ZANO and the ANZ
.
On 10 May 1975, Sithole, in accordance with the Lusaka
Unity Accord of December 1974, ordered ZANO to dissolve and
to integrate into the new ANC. The ZANU DA32 in Zambia
refused to obey Sirhole's orders and denounced the ANC,
Sithole, and the peace a egotiatioas. On 8 July 1975,
Sithole attempted to regain his lost control over the ZANLA
guerrilla forces by creating the ZLC, which was an alliance
between ZANU and ZAPU. The more militant ZANU guerrilla
leaders in Zambia opposed this Sithole-ANC effort and initi-
ated what would turn out to be a complete break with Sithole
and the ANC.
In mid-1975, four DAS2 members detained at Mpima Prison
in Zambia, Tongogara, Sudzi , Kangai, and Gumbo, decided that
Sithole would have to be removed as the head of ZANU. The
four ZANLA commanders began to lobby guerrillas based in
Zambia to gain support foe their plan to replace Sithole.
Their position was further strengthened when Sithole failed
to back up the ZANLA guerrillas after a number of them had
been fired upon and killed by Zambian troops during an inci-
dent in a guerrilla camp on 11 September 1975. The final
result of the DAEE members 1 efforts was the "Mgagao
Declaration" of late September 1975. Signed by forty-three
ZANLA officers at the Mgagao guerriLla camp in Zambia, the
main points of the document are summarized below:
1. The ZANLA guerrillas thanked the OAU Liberation
Committee, the Tanzanian government, and FRELIMO for
their support of the armed struggle.
71

2. The guerrillas reaffirmed their conupitipent to an
armed struggle as the only means of achieving liber-
ation and denounced all negotiations with tae Smith
government.
3. Although the guerrillas believed in, nationalist
unity and affirmed the "Lusaka Declaration of
Unity," they asserted that unity could not come at
the expense of the armed struggle.
The guerrillas condemned Nkomo for holding his. own
ANC congress and creating an Nkomo ANC faction.
Furthermore, the guerrillas accised Nkomo of colla-
borating with the Salisbury and Pretoria govern-
ments.
5. The guerrillas denounced the ZLC and condemned
Sithole and Muzorewa for appointing incompetent
politicians rather than guerrilla commanders to head
the ZLC.
6. The guerrillas accused Muzorewa, Sithole, and
Chikerema of being incompetent leaders and declared
them incapable of leading the AN3.
7. The guerrillas condemned Sithole and the Zambian
government for their poor treatment of ZANLA detai-
nees in Zambia. Zambia was declared an enemy of the
guerrillas.
8. The guerrillas appealed to the OAU and the
Tanzanian and Mozambiquen governments for support
for the continuation of the guerrilla straggle*
[Ref. 39]
A critically important aspect of the "Mgagao
Declaration " was that it foreclosed any chance Sithole evor
had of reasserting his authority over ZANLA (and thus ZANU) .
It was also the first acknowledgement of Robert Mugabe as
the popularly accepted leader of ZANU. At the meeting in
September between the four DARE comnanders ana the detained
ZANU executive committee members at Mpima, the executive
committee members told the commanders that Mugsbe, as the
party secretary-general, was the next man in the ZANU poli-
tical hierachy and should take over as leader, pending
approval by a party congress. In the "Mgagao Declaration,"
the guerrilla commanders did not go so far as to declare
Mugabe the leader of ZANU, but did state that:
An executive member who has been outstanding is
Robert Mugabe. He has demonstrated this bv
defying the rigours of guerrilla life in thejunales of Mozambiaue. Since we respect him most,
in all our dealings with the ANC leadership, he is
the only person who can act as a middle man. We
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will not accent any direct discissions with any of
the leading three members of the ANC we aa7e
described above. We can only talk through Robert
Mugabe to them. [Ref. 40]
By January 1976, the DARE had officially removed Sithole
from the ZANU presidency and had replaced him with Robert
Mugabe. Mugabe did not become the president of ZANU at this
time because of the legal and procedaral ramifications. He
continued to maintain his title of secretary-general and
picked up the additional title of leader. On 1 September
1976, Sithole denounced the ANC and reclaimed the leadership
of ZAND, thus claiming to be the leader of an organization
that he himself had disbanded. Sithole's attempt to regain
the party leadership failed as Mugabe was already firmly
entrenced as ZANU's leader. Sithole's career as a promi-
nent, influential nationalist leader was over.
With the breakdown of the Victoria Falls talks and the
change in ZANO's leadership, the stage was set in late 1975
for the formation of the Zimbabwe Peoples' Army (ZIPA) and
the resumption of the guerrilla war. Shortly after the
"Mgagao Declaration," discussions were begun between ZANU,
ZAPU, and the Frontline States that would lead to the forma-
tion of ZIPA. There were several reasons for the formation
of ZIPA. First, two of the Frontline State leaders, Nyerere
and Machel, had concluded as early as July 1975 that the
Smith-ANC negotiations were going nowhere. Smith's
unyielding stubborness, the divisions within the ANC, and
their generally low opinisns of Muzorewa, Nkotno, Sithole,
and Chikerema, convinced the two leaders that negotiations
were hopeless and that they ought to prepare to revitalize
the war effort. The Frontline leaders had decided in Lusaka
in July 1975 that, should the Victoria Falls talks fail, the
ZANO, ZAPU, and FROLIZI guerrillas should be moved from
Zambia and Tanzania to camps in Sozambique in preparation
for the resumption of the war. This time around, the
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Frontline State leaders wanted the war to be fought by one
army, not two.
Second, the ANC-formed ZLC had failed miserably. No
major ZANLA or ZIPRA commanders had been appointed comman-
ders in the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA) , which was the
military wing of the ZLC. Muzorewa had instead appointed a
number of political leaders to leadership positions in the
ZLA. In addition, he had appointed a number of junior guer-
rilla leaders over the heads of their more senior comman-
ders. Sithole had appointed guerrilla leaders who had been
suspended from the DARE to positions of authority in the
ZLA. In addition, the fact that Muzorewa had expelled Nkomo
from the ANC all but ruled out ZAPOVZIPRA participation in
the ZLC/ZLA. Consequently, the ZLC/ZLA had no leaders who
had the respect or following of the guerrillas.
Third, the detained ZiNU leaders in Zambia felt that if
they were going to get assistance from the OAU and the
Frontline States for the war effort, they would have to
create some sort of military alliance. Consequently, they
saw the necessity of forming a joint coramani with ZAPU.
Their professed militancy and belief in the armed struggle
would get them nowhere without a unified military effort.
Finally, there was a desire among leaders of both ZAND" and
ZAPO to short-stop competing FROLIZI efforts to gain influ-
ence in Rhodesia and valuable support from the OAU and the
Frontline States. The best way to do this was to form a
joint military command that excluded FROLIZI.
During September and October 1975, Rex Nhongo, the
senior ZAND guerrilla commander at liberty, and Jason Moyo,
the external ZAPO Secretary-General in Zambia, met to
discuss the possibility of bringing ZANLA and ZIPRA under a
unified command. Neither ZANLA nor ZIPRA wanted to be domi-
nated by the other. ZANLA had aore guerrillas, more
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experience, and more current operations in Rhodesia. On the
other hand, most of ZANO's political leaders, with the
exception of Mugabe and Tekere who ware in Mozambique, were
in prison in either Rhodesia or Zambia. By contrast, Nkoao
in Rhodesia and Moyo in Zambia were still free. The ZANLA
guerrillas felt that they would be at an unfair disadvantage
if they had to deal with the ZAPU political leaders while
their own political leaders were unavailable. Nyerere and
Machel supported the ZANLA position. Agreement was finally
reached and ZIPA was established on 12 November 1975. The
ZIPA military committee had eighteen members, half of which
were from ZANLA and half of which were from ZIPRA. Rex
Nhongo of ZANLA was the army commander while John Dube of
ZIPRA was his deputy. Each functional area on the staff had
two officers, with the director coming from one guerrilla
organization and his deputy coming from the other.
[Ref. 41]
The ZIPA military command consisted of the most militant
members of ZANLA and ZIPS A. The ZANLA commanders were
anti-ANC, anti-Sithole, pro-DARE, and pro-Mugabe. The ZIPRA
members were anti-ANC and pro-Nkomo. Although ZIPA began to
fall apart after the Geneva Conference in December 1976 due
to several violent conflicts between the guerrillas,
initially the command was fairly successful. ZIPA resumed
the guerrilla war against the Rhodesian Front government on
17 January 1976. During the first four months of 1976, the
Rhodesian Front government estimated that over 900 guer-
rillas had entered Rhodesia while thousands moce were being
trained in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. The guerrillas
adopted hit and run tactics aimed at crippling Rhodesia's
economic sector. Reads, railways, farms, and plantations
were the primary targets. On 18 April 1976, ZANLA guer-
rillas blew up the Beit Bridge rail link with South Africa.
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Daring this attack, three whits South African tourists wars
killed, shattering the illusion that Rhodesian security
forces were in complete control of the situation.
Originally created as an apolitical military organiza-
tion whose sole function was to provide military support to
the political wings of ZANO and ZAPO", it is ironic that
ZIPA's downfall came when it became involved in politics-
From ZIPA* s very inception, its young ZANLA commanders had
pledged their allegiance to Robert Mugabe and the ZANO
leaders detained in Zambia. In October 1976, Mugabe began
negotiations with Joshua Mkomo for the formation of a
ZANU-ZAPO Patriotic Front so that the two organizations
could present a united front at the Geneva Conference in
December. On 17 October 1976, President Kaunda finally
released the detained ZAN3 leaders, including the charis-
matic ZANLA guerrilla commander, Josiah Tongogara. Op to
this time, the ZANLA coamanders had acknowledged Mugabe,
Tongogara, and the other detained ZANU leaders as their
leaders. They had worked for the release of the leaders and
the revitalization of ZANO. Upon the release of the ZANO
detainees, the ZANLA commanders in ZIPA reversed their posi-
tion. They claimed the right to choose among the detainees
for their leaders. They refused to accept Tongogara as a
guerrilla leader. In addition, they rejected Mugabe's poli-
tical leadership when he began negotiating for a political
settlement. They claimed the right to have more input into
the political processes. The ZIPA commanders felt that
because they had the military forces, they could force the
issue. However, ZIPA had overestimated its ability to
influence the situation. The ZIPA commanders had failed to
take into account Tongogara f s leadership abilities and popu-
larity with the rank and file guerrillas. They had underes-
timated Mugabe in the same way. In addition, ZIPA was
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totally dependent upon Machel f s government in Mozambique for
support. Machel had spent too much effort getting the
Zimbabwean nationalist movement unified to risk it ail by
supporting the rebellious military commanders. Also, both
Nyerere and Machel were death on coups. Consequently,
ZIPA's challenge to the authority of Mugabe and Tongogara
was a failure. This failure, coupled with the internal
fighting among the ZIPA guerrillas in the Mozambique camps,
spelled the end of ZIPA as an affective or influential
organization by the end of 1976.
Returning to the diplomatic arena in early 1976, the
British and United States governments again became involved
in seeking a settlement in Rhodesia. On 22 March 1976,
three days after the collapse of the Smith-Hkomo talks,
British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan delivered a speech
which declared Britain*s willingness to assist in convening
a constitutional conference providing the Smith government
agreed to certain preconditions. The preconditions imposed
by the British government on the RF government were the
principle of majority rule, that elections for majority rule
must be held in eighteen months to two years, that indepen-
dence would only occur after majority rule, that negotia-
tions must not be protracted, and that no attempt should be
made to thwart the progress towards majority rule and
independence. [Ref. 42]
The British proposals placed the onus to act right in
Ian Smith's lap. Smith rejected the British proposals as
being as extreme as those of the ANC. The American
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, outlined the following
American proposals on 27 April 1976 while in Zambia:
1. American support for the Callaghan proposals of
22 March 1976;
2, A declaration of America's "unrelenting opposi-




3. A commitment to repeal tha Byrd Amendment which
allowed American firms to import strategic materials
from Rhodesia in violation of the UN sanctions;
4. Support for a rapid negotiated settlement
leading to majority rule;"
5. A promise to discourage American citizens from
travelling to Rhodesia;
6 and 7. A promise to give $12.5 million in assis-
tance to Mozambique and other states on Rhodesia's
borders who suffered as a result of enforcing U.N.
sanctions;
8. U.S. assistance for Rhodesim refugees;
9. A promise of economic, technical, and educa-
tional assistance ones an agreement had been reaced;
10. Support for protection of minority rights after
independence. [Ref. 43]
Kissinger's speech in Zambia became the basis for inten-
sive negotiations which occurred between Hay and September
1976. The negotiations involved Kissinger, Smith, the South
African Prime Minister, Vorster, Great Britain, the nation-
alist leaders, and the Frontline State leaders. Kissinger
himself met with Vorster twice while other American offi-
cials made several trips to Africa to meet with other
African leaders. On 24 September 1976, Kissinger returned
to Africa with the hope of finalizing an agreement. The
result was a settlement package *hich became known as the
"Kissinger Proposals" and which included the following six
points:
1. Majority rule in two years;
2. An immediate conference with African leaders to
organize an interim government;
3. The interim government was to consist of a
council of state, half of whose members would be
black and half white, with a white chairman without
a special vote. This council would be responsible
for drafting a new constitution. There would also
be a council of ministers with executive authority
during the interim period. The two Ministries of
Defense and Law and order on this council were to be
held by whites;
4. Great Britain would enact enabling legislation
once an agreement had been reached;




6- The international community would groyide
"substantial economic support" to assure Rhodesia's
economic future, [Ref. 44]
While Smith accepted the Kissinger Proposals in their
entirety, as a "packaged i eal, " it should be noted that the
nationalist leaders and the Frontline State presidents did
not totally accept the proposals but only viewed them as a
basis for further discussion. Consequently, the Geneva
Conference, which convene! on 28 October 1976, was doomed
from the very beginning because the nationalists believed
the Kissinger Proposals were negotiable while Saith demanded
that they accept all or nothing.
In early October 1975, Robert Mugabe and Jason Moyo
began negotiations in Mozambique to form an alliance between
ZAND and ZAPU at the Geneva Conference. Immediately before
the conference, Mugabe and Nkomo finalized an agreement
which formed the Patriotic Front (PP) . Thus, Mugabe and
Nkomo attended the conference as a joint delegation. The
conference was also attended by Bishop Muzorewa, the leader
of the UANC-ZLC, the Rhoiesian government, and the 3ritish
government. The Frontline. States and the United States sent
observers to the conference. The Reverend Ndabaningi
Sithole, claiming to be the legitamate leader of ZANO, also
attended the conference. Mugabe did not object to Sithole's
attending the conference as long as he did not claim to
represent ZANU. Mugabe and the PF successfully blocked
Sithole f s attempts to be recognized as ZANO*s leader. When
Sithole offered to form a patriotic alliance with Muzorewa's
UANC, the bishop, who airaady had a large following, turned
him down. It should be noted that on 14 September 1976
Muzorewa had changed the name of his organization to the
UANC in order to differentiate it from the Sithole organiza-




While the smith government viewed the primary purpose of
ths Geneva Conference as being the implementation of the
Kissinger Proposals, the nationalists had other proposals
they wanted implemented. The UANC demands, which were also
supported by the other Zimbabwean participants, were as
follows:
1. The immediate release, without condition?, of
ail political prisoners—detainees and restrictees
including people in the concentration villages.
2, The revocation of all death sentences on poli-
tical prisoners and prisoners of war aad their
immediate release.
3. The granting of general aanesty to a:
considered to have committed political crime,
il those
_ 1 i t_ i c
including those outside the country^
4. The creation of conditions conducive to free
political activities and freedoa of expression in
the country.
5. The halting of all political trials.
6. The lifting of the state of emergency together
with all restrictive regulations at present in
force.
7. In short, we demand the immediate suspension of
the present racist and oppressive constitution.
[Ref. 45]
The Rhodesiar delegates ignored the nationalist demands,
whereupon the nationalist organizations informed the
Rhodesian and British representatives that they would
continue the guerrilla war if the conference did not come up
with an acceptable solution leading to majority rule. On 29
October 1976, Robert Mugabe issued the following statement
which represented the position of the Patriotic Front:
In conclusion, let me say, Mr, Chairman* that our
presence at this conference is indicative or our
preparedness to pursue the method of peaceful
negotiations. It' is indicative of the fact thatJ-L_ 1_ I l__J J — J J _ J 1_
-sly pi-
will therefore fail to produce a settlement of the
nature we desire, we shall have no option but to
continue to resort to war in ocder to achieve our
freedom and independence. We have always loved
Deace, but when peace was lost we resorted to war
in order to achieve the lost peace. Let us
achieve peace in Geneva for failure to do so will
necessarily mean the continuation of war in
pursuit of peace. [Ref. 46]
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as the Geneva Conference continued, so did the problems.
The African nationalists could not reach agreement among
themselves over most of the major issues, including the
structure, composition, and duration of the transitional
government before independence. The Smith government felt
that there was no need for the conference if the national-
ists were not going to accept the Kissinger package. On 5
November 1976, Smith threatened to negotiate a separate
internal settlement with one of the other nationalist
parties in order to implement the Kissinger package if the
Geneva Conference broke down. The main issue that signalled
the death knell of the Geneva Conference was the question of
who would control the security and defense forces during the
interim government. The white regime insisted that the
ultimate authority over the security and defense forces
should lie with it during the transitional period before
majority rule. This was an acceptable to the African nation-
alists. The Smith regime argued that unless it maintained
control over the ministries of defease and police, discip-
line in the security forces would coLlapse and anarchy would
result during the transitional period. The nationalist
leaders, on the other hand, believed that to leave the
police and defense ministries in white hands would give the
Smith government too much influence during the transitional
period. Shen the 3ritish government offered to appoint a
British governor-general in Salisbury to control the
security forces. Smith rejected the offer. Ail negotiations
deadlocked, the Geneva Conference was adjourned on 14
December 1976 with the hope that it would be reconvened on
17 January 1977.
The stalemate between the nationalists and the Rhodesian
Front government continued and the Geneva Convention was not
reconvened in January. 3 n 21 January 1977, the British
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ambassador to the UN and chairman of the Geneva Conference,
Ivor Richard, offered Ian Smith a new set of proposals which
he hoped would break the deadlock. The main provisions of
Richards' proposals were as follows:
1. A transitional
.
go yernment to be headed by a
British interim commissioner.
2. Goyernment to be led by a council of ministers
comprising equal representation by each of the dele-
gations represented at Geneva plus representatives
of the European community appointed by the commis-
sioner. (Such a council would have a substantial
African majority.)
3. The commissioner to be gaided by an advisory
council consisting of the heads of the delegations
at Geneva.
4. The heads of the Geneva delegations along with
the heads of the army and the police force to serve
on a national security council headed by the commis-
sioner.
5. Foreign affairs, defence, and internal security
to come under the commissioner. [Ref. 47]
The Richards Plan scrapped the provisions of the
Kissinger Proposal that would have guaranteed the white
chairmanship of the council of state and Rhodesian Front
control of the Ministries of Defence and Law and Order. On
24 January 1977, Smith rejected the new British proposals
and insisted that he would not accept anything other than
the Kissinger Proposals. Smith announced that he was begin-
ning necrotiations with Bishop Muzorewa to obtain a separate,
internal settlement.
Smith had a number of reasons to believe that he would
be able to reach an agreement with Muzorewa. Throughout the
Geneva Conference, Smith felt that Muzorewa had demonstrated
a more moderate position than had lugabe and Nkomo on the
issues of majority rule and control of the security forces
during the interim government. The Rhodesian Front govern-
ment believed that, even though he had no control over the
nationalist guerrilla armies, Muzorewa did command the
loyalty of more Africans inside of Rhodesia than did" the
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Patriotic Front. Consequently, it would be to Huzorewa's
advantage to negotiate a settlement with Smith rather than
to risk losing his position as the dominant nationalist
leader in Rhodesia to either Mugabe or Nkomo. Smith's stra-
tegy was given a big assist on 9 January 1977 when, after a
two-day meeting in Lusaka, the presidents of the Frontline
States (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, and Angela)
announced that they were going to throw all of their support
behind the Patriotic Front which thsy considered to be the
sole, legitamate, representative Zimbabwean nationalist
organization. In a statement read by President Nyerere, the
five leaders said that they had decided to give their "full
political, material, and diplomatic support to the Patriotic
Front to enable them to achieve tha Dbjectives of their just
struggle" [ Ref. 48]. The decision of the Frontline State
leaders was backed-up by the Liberation Committee of the OAU
in Lusaka on 8 February 1977 when it gave the Patriotic
Front a mandate to- escalate the guerrilla war against
Rhodesia's white minority government. Thus, Muzorewa found
himself isolated from the aainstream support for the nation-
alist cause and was faced with the choice of either negoti-
ating with Smith or being left out in the cold.
The escalation of the guerrilla war by ZANLA and ZIPRA
was also bringing domestic: and economic pressures to bear
upon Smith. The increased guerrilla activity in late 1976
and early 1977 had convinced many white Rhodesians that
their privileged position in society was not worth dying for
and that the days of the white majority regime were
numbered. Consequently, white emigration increased dramati-
cally. The emigration aeant a drain of skilled labor and
currency cut of the country. By January 1977, guerrillas
were active in virtually all of Rhodesia and of Rhodesia's
1,842 - mile border, only the South Africa portion could be
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considered secure. With the security forces stretched to
their maximum capabilities, the Rhodesian Front announced on
27 January 1977 that it would call up all able-bodied men
between the ages of thirty-seven and fifty for military
service and tighten up on draft exemptions. The opposition
from the business community to the cancellation of all
deferments for men under thirty-eight years of age caused
the Minister of Defense, Sr. Cowper, to resign in disgust on
13 February 1977. Twenty-three percent of the 1976-77
national budget, or $186 million, was being devoted to
national defense. This was about four times the outlay of
fiscal year 1972-73. The situation was made more difficult
in June 1977 when the- United States reimposed UN economic
sanctions on Rhodesia. 3y June 1977, the escalating guer-
rilla war was costing the Smith government $300,000 a day.
That same month, the RF government announced that all white
males under thirty-eight years of age would be required to
serve 190 days per year in the security forces while those
thirty-eight to fifty would serve a minimum of seventy days.
The wider call-up accelerated white emigration which in tarn
had the duel effects of lowering the gross domestic product
and decreasing the number of whites available for military
service. By October 1977, the war was costing twenty-seven
percent of the national budget, or over one million dollars
per day. The pressure was on Smith to reach an agreement
with black leaders of his own choosing and to bring about a
ceasefire. [ Ref . 49]
From January through Ai gust 1977, Smith moved towards an
internal settlement with Bishop Muzorewa. On 1 September
1977, British Foreign Secretary David Owen and the United
States Ambassador to the UN , Andrew Young, presented Smith
with the Anglo-American Peace Proposals on Zimbabwe. On 13
September 1977, Smith temporarily shelved his plans for an
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internal settlement in order that the Anglo-American
Proposals might be further discussed. The basic provisions
of the proposals were as follows:
1. -Surrender of power by the oresent regime and a
return to legality.
2. An orderly and peaceful transition to indepen-
dence in the course of 1978.
3. Peaceful and impartial elections on the basis of
universal adult suffrage.
U. The establishment, by the British government, of
a transitional administration with the task of
conducting elections for an independent government
(Field Marshal Lord Zarver would represent Britain
as resident commissioner during the transition
period) .
5. A United Nations presence, including a UN force,
during the transition" period.
6. An independent constitution providing for a
democratically elected government, -he abolition of
discrimination, the protection of individual riahts,
and the independence of the judiciary.
7. A development fund to revive the economy of the
country which Britain and the U.S. view as predi-
cated upon the in pieman tation of the settlement as a
whole. [Ref. 50]
The new Anglo-American Proposals were really no diffe-
rent from earlier British proposals. They envisaged the
Ehodesian Front government giving up its power immediately,
to include security forces, and nearly immediate majority
rule. Obviously, Smith could not be expected to accept such
terms. On 23 October 1977, Smilth rejected the
Anglo-American Proposals and pushed ahead with his internal
settlement plans.
Since January, Smith had take several actions to pave
the way for his internal settlement. In February, he had
announced plans to end racial discrimination within the
country. In April he had expelled twelve extreme right-wing
radicals from the Rhodesia n Front Party. On 18 July he
dissolved parliament and called for new elections in which
he would seek white support for an internal settlement. The
icing on the cake came whan Smith announced on 24 November
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that he accepted the principle of najority rule and would
begin official talks with Muzorewa, Sithole, and two tradi-
tional leaders. Chief Zhirau and Chief Ndiweni, on 9
December.
The Frontline State leaders, seeing that Smith was
stealing the initiative from the Patriotic Front, had
attempted to get negotiations going in December 1977 and
January 1978 that would involve all parties. On 13 December
1977, the Frontline State leaders reaffirmed their support
for the Anglo-American Proposals. Samora Machel began to
pressure the PF to reopen n egotiatioas with Smith and on 13
January 1978 he even admitted that PF demands for control of
the security forces during the transition period were unrea-
sonable [Ref. 51]- Plans were made for the PF leaders to
meet with Anglo-American representatives at Malta in late
January 1978. Although the Malta talks were held, they had
no effect on the Smith-3 uzorewa-Sithole negotiations in
Salisbury which were near oompletition by that time. After
nearly three months of negotiations. Smith and the four
internal leaders finally reached an agreement for an
internal settlement on 3 March 1978. Signed by Smith,
Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau, this settlement was obtained
without consulting PF-ZANO-ZAPU. The settlement, which
provided for a transitional government, had the following
provisions:
1. A new constitution would be drafted providing
majority rule based on adult suffrage;
2. A legislative assembly of one-hundred members
with seventy-two seats reserved for black and twen-
ty-eight seats reserved for whites (enough to
provide whites a veto over constitutional changes)
;
3. The reserved seats for whites would be retained
for at least ten years and would be reviewed at the
end of that period, at which time a commission
headed by the judge of the high court would be
appointed to undertake the review. If the commis-
sion were to recommend that the reserved seats for
whites should be changed, an amendment to the const-
itution to effect such change by a bill which would
require the affirmative votes of not less than
firty-one members of the legislative assembly;
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4. The independence and the qualifications of thejudiciary would be entrenched and the judges would
have security of tenure ;
5. The civil service, the police. and the defense
forces would be free from political interference;
6. The above provisions would be set cut in the new
constitution ana would be regarded as specifically; <
entrencnea provisions wnicn couia not oe amenaea
except by a bill that required the affirmative votes
of at least seventy-eight members of the legislative
assembly. [Hef. 52]
Thus, the agreement insured that whites, which made up
only four percent of the population, would control twenty-
eight percent of the legislature. In addition, it provided
for the continued white domination of the judiciary and
security forces. Smith had secured an agreement that, in
effect, would insure the privleged position of the white
minority for at least another ten yaars.
B. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE FINAL AGREEMENT: 1978 -
1980
The action in Phase V, which lasted from the signing of
the interim agreement on • 3 March 1978 until the ZANO-P?
election victory on 4 March 1980, was dominated by several
different themes. The first concerns the efforts of the
Smith-Muzorewa government to consolidate its position and
eliminate the Patriotic Front opposition in order to
confront the external nationalist leaders and guerrillas and
the international community with a de facto "solution" to
the Rhodesian problem. Ihe second theme deals with the
refusal of Great Britain, the United States, the United
Nations, and most of the rest of the international community
to recognize the Smith-Muzorewa agreement and efforts to
diplomatically pressure the Smith-Muzorewa bloc to agree to
a settlement involving all concerned parties and providing
uninterrupted movement towards majority rule. The third
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theme is concerned primarily with the intensification of the
guerrilla war by ZANLA and ZIPRA in order to force mean-
ingful change and the failure of the Smith-Muzorewa coali-
tion to bring an end to the guerrilla war.
Almost immediately after the internal agreement was
signed, the Smith-Muzorewa led multi-racial Salisbury group
embarked upon policies designed to solidify their own posi-
tion as Rhodesia's leaders and to exclude the Patriotic
Front from the constitutional negotiations. On 12 March
1978, the signatories of the internal settlement announced
that they were not interested in an all-parties constitu-
tional conference and that they intended to exclude the
ZANU-ZAPO-PF from the constitutional conference. Smith
wanted to deal only with what he considered to be "moderate"
black leaders and Muzorewa and Sithole were more than
willing to go along with him on this to preserve their new-
found prestige. During that same week, Muzorewa travelled
to the UN to seek support for the internal settlement. But
on 10 March 1978 r a coalition of African, socialist, and
third world countries in the Security Council prevented
Sithole from addressing tha General Assembly and on 14 March
the Security Council voted to condemn all attempts by the
illegal regime in Rhodesia to retain power or to prevent the
achievement of independence. It also declared the internal
agreement illegal and unacceptable.
Evidently, Smith believed that Muzorewa and Sithole had
greater influence with the guerrillas than they really did.
What he failed to realize was that the vast majority of the
guerrillas were controlled by Mugabe and Nkomo. On 2 May
1978 r the Rhodesian government announced that a general
amnesty would be granted to all guerrillas who laid down
their arms and turned themselves in. Smith believed that
Muzorewa and Sithole could "swing enough weight with the
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Rationalist guerrillas to bring about a ceasefire,"
[Ref. 53] On 16 May 1978 he announced that it would be
possible to defuse the situation in eastern Rhodesia where
Huzorewa and Sithole supposedly had a following among the
guerrillas [Ref. 54].
All of Smith's attempts to achieve a ceasefire failed
miserably. Throughout June 1978, the Patriotic Front accel-
erated the guerrilla effort within Rhodesia. Not only were
attacks on white settlers and the security forces
increasing, but even some of Muzorewa f s and Sithole*s own
followers were killed by the guerrillas. The guerrillas had
been buoyed not only by the obvious weakness of the coali-
tion regime, but also by the prospect of external assis-
tance. The UN Security Council had already condemned the
internal settlement. The United States and Sreat Britain
were pressuring the regime for an all-party settlement and
constitution. Mozambique was giving increasing aid to the
ZAHU guerrillas. On 24 April 1978, the USSR and Cuba
announced that they intended to increase aid to the guer-
rilla forces. By 15 June 1978, Smith was forced to admit
for the first time that military af forts to stop the guer-
rillas were not succeeding.
In July 1978, the Salisbury regime launched a number of
air strikes against guerrilla bases in Mozambique. This
action was defended by none other than Sithole on the
grounds that the government was attempting to move towards
democracy. [Ref. 55]
On the home front, the increasing guerrilla pressure had
forced the government to enact policies designed to obtain
support for the internal settlement from among the African
masses. On 3 August 1978, the new regime announced that it
had ordered the end to discrimination in public places,
although separate educational and health systems and
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segregated neighborhoods would still be maintained. On 16
September 1973, the interim government, with Sithole as its
spokesman, announced that, for the first time, blacks would
be drafted into the army. Sithola explained that since
blacks would benefit from majority rale, they were obligated
to fight to defend the internal settlement. Muzorewa
vehemently opposed this policy on the grounds that unless
there was majority rule there should be no military call-up.
[Ref. 56]
Probably realizing that Muzorewa and Sithole had little
control over the nationalist guerrillas, Smith allowed
President Kaunda of Zambia to arrange a meeting between him
and Joshua Nkomo. Smith probably viewed Nkomo as the oldest
and most respected of the nationalist leaders and hoped that
he carried greater influence with the guerrillas.
Additionally, this was another opportunity for Smith to
weaken the Patriotic Front by playing upon the divisions
between ZAND" and ZAPO. Smith still believed that Nkomo,
inspite of the fact that he was receiving Soviet assistance,
was more moderate that Sugabe. Smith hoped that Nkomo, as
was the case in 1975 when he broke away from Muzorewa's ANC,
could be convinced to desert the Patriotic Front and nego-
tiate a separate agreement with the Salisbury regime. Smith
and Nkomo met secretly in Zambia on 14 August 1978. All
prospects for a Smith-Nkomo deal were shattered on 4
September 1978 when guerrillas shot down an Air-Rhodesia
airliner and killed all forty-eight passengers. When Nkomo
announced that ZAPO guerrillas were responsible for this
action, the public outcry from white Rhodesians prevented
Smith form even considering a settlement with Nkomo. An
important aspect of the Smith-Nkomo Liaison is that it again
placed Nkomo«s credibility in the nationalist movement in a
questionable light. Was Nkomo a dedicated nationalist
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searching for a workable solution or a political opportunist
trying to enhance his own position? This question would
cone back to haunt Nkomo in the 1980 elections.
On 14 September 1978, the Salisbury government, citing
the escalation of the guerrilla war by ZANLA and ZIPRA,
banned the ZANO-ZAPO-PF from Rhodesia and thus prevented
them frcm participating in the scheduled elections. On 29
October 1973, Smith, apparently without consulting either
Muzorewa or Sithole, postponed the elections from 31
December 1978 to April 1979, supposedly because of adminis-
trative problems in setting up the elections. The real
reason for the election postponeaent was the unstable
security situation in Rhodesia. Despite the airstrikes,
increasingly large numbers of guerrillas were infiltrating
into Rhodesia from Zambia and Mozambique. On 31 October
1978, large sectors of southern and western Rhodesia were
placed under martial law. Guerrillas had begun to attack
previously immune targets in urban areas. On 11 December
1978, a large oil storage depot in Salisbury was blown up.
Military manpower was being strained because of the fact
that increasingly large numbers of whites were leaving the
country. [ Ref . 57] On 12 January 1979, the Rhodesian
government announced that white males between the ages of
fifty and fifty-nine would be called up for emergency mili-
tary service.
Throughout this period since the March 1973 settlement,
the Rhodesian government was also being pressured by the
international community through diplomatic channels. In
aid-April 1978, David Owen, Cyrus Vance, Andrew Young, the
Prontline State leaders and the Patriotic Front leaders met
in Dar-es-Salaam to discuss the Rhodesian problem. All of
the participants agreed on the necessity of having an all-
party constitutional conference, but no one was willing to
set a timetable for the conference.
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On 26 July 1978, tha U. S. Ssr.ata adopted the Case-Javits
Amendmentment to the International Security Assistance Act
of 1978. The Amendment provided for the removal of U.S.
sanctions against Rhodesia aftsr 31 December 1978
provided that the President determines that p)
the Government of Rhodesia has demonstrated its
willingness to negotiate in good faith at an all-
parties conference held under international
auspices, on all issue s; and (2) a government has
been installed, chosen bv free elections in which
all political and population groups have been
allowed to participate freely, with observation by
impartial, internationally recognized observers
[Ref. 58].
On 15 August 1978, the House of Representatives also agreed
to accept the amendment. Throughout October 1978, Rhcdesian
government and business representatives lobbied in the
United States for acceptance of the internal settlement and
the lifting of the sanctions. They were able to rally some
support from conservative a embers of Congress.
On 21 December 1978, the DN Seaeral Assembly voted to
condemn and reject the internal settlement of 3 March 1978.
The UN denounced all maneuvers of the Rhodesian regime aimed
at retaining power for the white ninority, declared the
internal settlement null and void, and declared illegal any
internal settlement under the auspices of the illegal
regime, and called upon all states not to recognize any such
settlement. [Ref. 59]
On 2 January 1979, the Rhodesian government unveiled its
new "Majority Rule Constitution." Dn 30 January 1979, an
all-white referendum of Rhodesian whites approved the new
constitution. The main provisions of the "Majority Rule
Constitution" were as follows:
1. The country was to be renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
2. Parliament was to consist of two houses— the
House of the Assembly and the Senate.
3. The Senate would consist of thirty members, ten
of whom would be elected by the seventy-two black
members of the House of Assembly: ten would be
whites elected by the twenty-eight white members of
the House of Assembly and tea would be African
chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs.
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4. There would be two voting rolls, a common voters
roll on which both black and whites could vote and a
separate white voters roll. (Thus whites could vote
twice.
)
5- The creation of four commissions— Judicial
Service, Public servioa , Police Service, and Defense
Forces Service. The qj alif ication for membership in
the commissions were so high that they virtuallv
ruled out black members.
On 8 March 1979, the United Nations Security Council voted
to condemn the new constitution and the scheduled April
elections.
The elections under tha new constitution were held from
17 April to 20 April 1979. When the results were revealed
on 24 April 1979, Muzorawa's party had won a landslide
victory, having taken fifty-one of the seveaty-two black
parliamentary seats, or sixty-sevei percent of the vote.
Sithole's party had won only twelve seats. Smith's
Rhodesian Front Party had taken all twenty-eight white
seats.
The credibility of the elections was questioned immedi-
ately after the results were announced. Sithole charged
that the elections had been rigged acid demanded a commission
of inquiry. On 9 May 19 79, Sithole boycotted the first
session of parliament and on 28 May his party refused to
fill its two cabinet seats. The value of the election was
also questionable because all of the parties had agreed,
prior to the elections, that cabinet posts would be distri-
buted on the basis of the number of parliamentary seats each
party won. Thus, whites would be assured of retaining at
least one-quarter of the cabinet seats and thereby be in a
position to restrain a black prime minister.
The announcement of the election results brought the
expected reaction from the PF leaders. Mugabe and Nkomo met
for three days in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At the end of the
meeting, they announced that a joint military command would
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b€ formed to coordinate the actions of ZANLA and ZIPSA. The
guerrilla war was again escalated.
The elections also received generally negative reactions
from the international coamunity. One positive reaction
came from the U.S. Congress when on 15 Hay 1979 it called
for President Carter to lift the sanations against Rhodesia.
On 29 May 1979, the OAU refused to recognize Muzorewa's
regime and warned 3ri-:ain and the United States not to
recognize the regime either- In a statement issued through
Kenyan foreign ministry, the 0A0 expressed concern at move-
ments in London and Washington to remove the sanctions.
That same day, President Nyerere stated that if the United
States and Britain recognized the Suzorewa government and
lifted the sanctions it would be the same as declaring war
on ZANLA and ZIPRA, and Zambia and Mozambique who were
assisting them. Nyerere said that sich action by the United
States or Great Britain could only lengthen the war and
insure the complete destruction of any whites left in
Rhodesia- Finally, on 30 May 1979, the Nigerian government
sent signals to London and Washington implying that they
would be subject to aa oil embargo should they decide to
recognize the Muzorewa government or lift the sanctions.
(Ref. 60]
On 8 June 1979, President Carter announced that the-
United States would continue to act in compliance with UN
economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Carter denounced the
elections as neither fair nor free because:
1- The elections were held under a constitution
that was drafted by and submitted only to the white
minority and that the black citizens who constituted
ninety-six percent of the population of Zimbabwe
never had a chance to consider nor to vote for or
against the constitution under which elections were
held.
2j The constitution gave the white minority vastly
disproportionate numbers of votes in parliament,
continued control over the army, police, judiciary,




3. The representatives of the opposing parties
(ZANU and ZAPU) wera banned from the elections.
fRef- 61]
The Muzorewa government had hopsd to get some support
from the newly elected British Conservative government at
the Commonwealth Conference which convened in Lusaka, Zambia
on 1 August 1979. However, on 3 August 1979, Prime Minister
Thatcher told the heads of state that Great Britain was for
working for a comprehensive settlement involving all
parties. The conference participants then proceeded to
draft a settlement plan that was unanimously approved on 6
August 1979 by all thirty-nine heads of delegation present.
The plan called for Great Britain to convene an all-party
constitutional conference in order to adopt a democratic
constitution including safeguards for minorities and to
bring about a ceasefire and an and to the sanctions.
[Ref. 62]
Initially, the Commonwealth proposals for a constitu-
tional conference met with negative responses from the
involved parties. Both Smith and Muzorewa denounced the
conference. let they wer*e unable to offer an alternative
solution as they could neither end the guerrilla war nor
achieve international recognition foe the Salisbury govern-
ment. Nkomo rejected the 3ritish supervised elections as he
blamed the British for causing the problem in the first
place. An equally uncompromising position was presented by
ZAND" on 7 August 1979 when it declared that:
}.. .The Smith- Muzore wa illegal regime and itsiniquitous constitution must be liquadated.
2. The constitution must contain no racist or
otherwise abridgement on the of the people acting
either directly or through their representatives in
parliament to freely alter it or abolish it.
3. Before reaching any agreement the racist
Rhodesian army and police forces must be disarmed,
barracked. and demobilized to give wav to our
forces. [Ref. 63 ]
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let both Mugabe and Nkomo were being pressured by their
supporters in Mozambique and Zambia to negotiate a peace
settlement, even if compromise was nacessary. Thus, by 20
August 1979, all sides had accepted invitations to attend
the London Constitutional Conference on 10 September 1979.
The Lancaster House talks were organized around an
agenda that called for, in order, (1) discussion of the
independence constitution and (2) "pre-independence agree-
ments divided into three sectors: (a) elections under the
new constitution, (b) the ceasefire and military agreements
and (c) administrative arrangements and maintenance of law
and order during the transition." [ Ref . 64] The constitu-
tion proposed by the British was based upon the independence
constitutions of former British colonies and the current
Rhodesian constitution.
Meeting frequent stalemates throughout the conference,
Lord Carrington conducted the negotiations by dealing bi-la-
terally, first with one side and than with the other. On 21
September 1979, the Salisbury delegation voted to accept the
British constitutional proposals. After the Patriotic Front
was presented with the British proposals, it tabled its own
proposals which differed from the British constitutional
proposals in the following respects:
1. There was no special representation for whites.
2. Provision for an executive president with wide
ranging oowers—including powers to appoint members
of public service, defense, and police commissions.
3. Lack of protection of private property rights.
4. No guarantees for the pension rights of civil
servants.
5. Stringent citizenship requirements. [Ref. 65]
Since the Salisbury government had already accepted the
British proposals, the Patriotic Froat was under pressure to
accept them also. Fearing that their intransigence would
deal them out of the talks, the guerrillas reluctantly
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accepted the principle of reserved seats for whites. On 1
October 1979, Carrington gave the PF delegates a more
detailed version of the British proposals and five days to
make up their minds, A partial compromise was reached on 10
October 1979 and, after Carrington threatened to implement
the constitution with or without the PF, the PF finally
accepted the British proposals on 1 9 October 1979. The
remainder of the conference, dealing with the ceasefire and
transition period, followed a similar pattern. The frequent
stalemates would be broken by 3riti=h pressure in the form
of Carrington 1 s intimidations and bullying. The Lancaster
House Agreement was finally signed on 17 December 1979.
During the two month transition period prior to the
elections, Robert Mugabe and ZAND decided to run separately
in the elections rather than with Nkomo and PF-ZAPU. Thus,
there would be three nationalist blocs competing for power
on election day — Muzorewa ('JANC) , Nkomo (PF-ZAPU), and
Mugabe (ZANU-PF) . Each party leader believed that he was
destined to be the first prime minister of the new country
of Zimbabwe. When the results were finally tallied on 4
March 1980, Mugabe had emerged as the victor. ZANU-PF had
won seventy-one percent of the African seats and fifty-seven
percent of all the seats in parliament and seventy-seven
percent of all Patriotic Front seats. Joshua Nkomo and
PF-ZAPU had won twenty seats, whils Muzorewa and the UANC,
the overwhelming winners just a year earlier, had only won
three seats. The reasons for Mugabe's landslide victory
will be the topic of the ns xt section.
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7. THE NATIONALIST CANDIDATES IN J[98
This section of this study has two purposes. First, it
will examine the personal and political backgrounds,
leadership qualities, and bases of support of the three
principal candidates in the 1980 elections, Joshua Nkomo,
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and Robert Mugabe. Second, by
comparing and contrasting the three candidates, it will show
why Robert Mugabe won the 1980 elections. Throughout this
chapter, the basic position taken will be that the
determining factor in the outcome of the election was the
personal credibility of the candidates. By the time
election day rolled around, only Hugabe had any kind of
meaningful credibility with the majority of the electorate.
A. JOSHUA NKOMO
1 • Biographical Backgr ound
A member of the Xalanga tribe of the Ndebele nation,
Joshua Mqabuko Hyongolo Nkomo was born in June 1917 on the
Semokwe Reserve, Matabelela nd. Southern Rhodesia. 3oth of
his parents worked for the London Missionary Society, his
father first as a driver and later as a teacher and his
mother as a cook. Young Nkomo received his primary educa-
tion at the Tjolotjo School after which he worked variously
as a driver, bakery delivery boy, and carpenter. By 1941
Nkomo had saved enough money to enroll for one year at Adams
College in Durban, South Africa. A clerk at the school, a
Mrs. Hoskins, took an interest in Nkomo and encouraged him
to continue his studies and enabLed him to do so by
employing him after school and paying his fees. In 194U,
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with the financial assistance of Srs. Hoskins, Nkomo
enrolled in a three-year course of study at the Jan Hofmeyr
School of Social Sciences in Johannesburg. While in South
Africa, Nkomo came under the influence of Drs. Zuma and
Lembede, two leaders of the South African African National
Congress (SAANC)
.
Although he showed little interest in
politics at the time, th2 se initial political associations
would influence Nkomo's future.
In 1947, Joshua Nk omo returned to Rhodesia where he
was employed by the Rhodes ian Railway as a social worker,
the first black to hold such a position. During the next
two years, Nkomo complete! his studies at the University of
South Africa and graduated with a bachelor of arts degree in
Economics and Sociology.
2- Ea rly Political Career
If God ever equipped a human being for the world of
politics, Joshua Nkomo is that man. A large, heavy-set man
(well over six feet tall and 250 pounds) , Nkomo has the
impressive physical appeara'nce that is always a great asset
to a politician. A dynamic, exciting speaker, he has the
ability to arouse any audience. Always smiling, always
joking, and always outgoing, Nkomo has the same gregarious,
handshaking, baby-kissing style that many American politi-
ians have. Nkomo loves his role as a celebrity. Thus, it
was totally in character for this charismatic, father-like
figure to throw his hat into the political arena.
Nkomo^ initiation to the world of politics occurred
in 1951 when he was appointed secretary of the Railway
Workers 1 Association, which later became the Rhodesian
African Workers anion (RAWtJ). Onder Nkomo's leadership, the
union was reorganized and its membership increased. In
1952, Nkomo was elected president of the African National
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Congress. Nkomo attempted to unite all the African organi-
zations, including those in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
in the All-Africa Peoples' Convention. This attempt was
unsuccessful and the convention was abandoned in 1954. In
1952, Nkomo joined the United Federal Party (DFP) and
accepted an invitation from Sir Godfrey Huggins, the Prime
Minister of Southern Rhodesia, to represent African opinion
at the London Conference on the proposed federation of the
two Rhodesias and Nyasaland in the Central African
Federation. At the conference Nkomo opposed the creation of
the Federation, but the British government went ahead with
its plans to create it. In January 19 54, Nkomo ran in the
first Federal Flection as an independent candidate for the
African seat of Matabelela nd, but was heavily defeated by
Mike Hove, the OF? candidate. That same year, Nkomo
resigned from the railroad and became an auctioneer and
insurance agent. During this period, he remained active in
the leadership of the Southern Rhodesia African National
Congress (SRANC) and in September 1957 he was elected its
president. The Youth League, which was founded in 1957 f
merged with the SRANC in 19 59 to form the ANC. As president
of the ANC, Nkomo was very active in campaigning against the
Land Husbandry Act. In addition, he was successful in his
efforts to get the Court of Appeals to set aside the convic-
tions of a number of black defendents. Consequently, by
1959, Nkomo was somewhat of a popular hero tc black
Rhodesians.. This, coupled with the fact that he was the
first widely known and well-publicized black politician and
nationalist, placed Nkomo in a position where he was viewed
as "the father of Zimbabwean nationalism."
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3. Dedicated Nationalist or Political Opportunist?
The major factor in Nkomo»s defeat in the February
1980 Zimbabwean elections was his lack of credibility as a
nationalist. From the late 1950's onward, questions would
be continually raised about Nkomo's integrity, courage, and
dedication to the nationalist cause. Was he truly the
father of Zimbabwean nationalism or simply an opportunistic
politician? Why did he always have to be the leader or
president of every organization he ever belonged to? Why
was he inevitably out of the country during government
crackdowns on his organizations? Did he attempt to nego-
tiate separate, internal settlements with the British and
Shodesian governments in order to get the best deal possible
for black Rhodesians or to insure the security of his own
position in Rhodesian politics? During the latter stages of
the guerrilla struggle, why did he keep his large, well-
trained, and well-equipped army sequestered in Zambia while
allowing ZANLA to carry the burden of the fighting? Was his
failure to commit his forces simply due to his conservatism
and caution, or was it because he was planning to use his
army to eliminate his competition in a post-independence
Zimbabwean civil war? Questions like these continually
shadowed Nkomo* s political ambitions.
Doubt was often cast upon Nkomo's personal courage
and dedication because of his propensity for avoiding arrest
by being abroad during turbulant times in Southern Rhodesia.
In December 1958, Nkomo travelled to Accra to attend the
first All-Africa Peoples' Conference and from there to
Cairo. While Nkomo was in Egypt, a state of emergency was
declared in Rhodesia on 2 6 February 1959. The ANC was
banned and over 500 of its members were arrested and
detained. Among those arrested were the entire leadership
of the ANC, minus, of course, Joshua Nkomo. Dn the advice
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of friends in Egypt, he claims, Nkomo did not return home to
face arrest (Ref. 66]- He instead began a twenty-month
self-imposed exile during which time he set up an external
ANC office in London and sought support for the objectives
of the ANC throughout the world. Ihile Nkomo was abroad,
the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed on 1 January
1960. The NDP was simply a new naae for the banned ANC as
it had the same leadership, structure, and goals as its
predecessor. Michael Mawema was elected the president of
the new party with the understandiag that his appointment
was temporary pending the return to Salisbury of Joshua
Nkomo. Nevertheless, many members of the NDP believed Nkomo
to be a coward for not returning to Rhodesia. These critics
of Nkomo, as mentioned earlier, broke away from the NDP to
form the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) which later became
the Pan-African Socialist Party (PASJ)
.
In October 1960, Nkomo finally returned to Rhodesia
to lead the NDP. At the NDP inaugural conference elections
on 28 November 1960, Nkomo defeated Leopold Takawira, Moton
Malianga, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Jlawema for the presidency
of the NDP.
The NDP was banned on 9 December 1961. Ironically,
Nkomo was again out of the country (this time in Tanganyika)
and thus escaped arrest. The NDP*s successor, ZAPO", was
established on 17 December 1961. 3nly nine months later, on
20 September 1962, ZAPO was also banned by the Shodesian
government. Coincidental! y or not, Nkomo was again abroad,
this time in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia. While in Northern
Rhodesia, Nkomo came to the conclusion that nothing useful
could be achieved by party action within Rhodesia. He
therefore decided to set up a ZAPO government-in-exiie that
would exert pressure on the ON, the OAO, and ether
sympathetic bodies in order to bring about change in
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Southern Rhodesia. This plan did not please the other ZAPU
leaders. At the time of the ZAPU crackdown, all of the ZAPU
leaders inside Southern Rhodesia, including Robert Mugabe,
Leopold Takawira, and J. Z. Moyo, had been arrested and taken
to the tribal reserves for three months detention. The ZAPU
leaders had expected that Nkomo would return to Rhodesia to
provide leadership to his followers. They were shocked to
find out that he instead intended to go to Dar-es-Salaam to
set up his government -in-ex ile. Nkomo did this against the
advice of nationalist leaders in Northern Rhodesia. Nathan
Shamuyarira quotes Sikota JJina, the publicity secretary of
the Northern Rhodesia ONI? as saying that Joshua Nkomo had
been
strongly advised that his political leadership and
the solution to the Southern Rhodesia crisis
almost entirely depends on his presence in the
country and among his people, whatever the
circumstances. Remaining away in Northern
Rhodesia, or in any other country, will have the
effect of seriously weakening morale among the
ranks of the toiling n asses of Southern Rhodesia.
Shamuyarira continues to note that "recalling the names of
six leaders in Africa to prove that 'liberation and indepen-
dence are always preceded by sacrifice, and even imprison-
ment of the leader, ,n Sikota added:
Mr. Nkomo has no alternative but to be one of them
if the Southern Rhodesia freedom struggle is to
start seriously and his leadershio pristige is
maintained. [Ref. 67]
Using a disguise and a double, Nkomo travelled from
Lusaka to Dar-es-Salaam, where he mat with President Julius
Nyerere and Ndabaningi Sithole. The leaders pressured Nkomo
to return to Southern Rhodesia to suffer the same restraints
as his ZAPU comrades. Nkomo was finally persuaded and flew
back to Rhodesia where he spent three months restriction at
Kezi south of Bulawayo.
Although Nkomo would eventually (beginning on 16
April 1964) spend more than ten years under restriction, his
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initial success at avoiding arrest aid restriction reflected
unfavorably upon him and would have a lasting effect on his
career- Whether Nkomo's motivation in this period was that
he feared detention and enjoyed the good life of a celebrity
abroad or actually sincerely believed that he could best
influence the situation in Rhodesia by means of a political
organization based abroad will never be known.
Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that thase incidents
cast doubt upon Nkomc's personal courage and dedication to
the nationalist cause. As will be seen later on, they were
contributing factors in tna formation of ZANU in 1963 by his
disinchanted lieutenants who had lost confidence in his
leadership ability.
Throughout his political career, Nkoao repeatedly
did things that either made him appear to be nothing more
than an ambitious opportunist or, much worse, seemed to
compromise his fellow nationalists and their goals. Nkomo*s
habits of making poor decisions and negotiating separate
agreements with the white government, usually without
consulting his advisers and allies, did nothing for his
reputation as a black nationalist leader. Indeed, the
combination of his poor decisions, willingness to compromise
on principle when it was expedient to do so, exclusion of
his nationalist comrades in the decision-making process,
apparent fraternization with the enemy, and constant self-
aggrandizement eventually cost him the trust of the black
majority in Zimbabwe.
The earliest hint that Nkomo was probably more
interested in furthering his own career than in furthering
the nationalist cause oa me in January 1954 when Nkomo
deserted the UNP to run against Mika Hove as an independent
candidate for the Hat abelel and seat in the federal election.
Although Nkomo was defeated by Hove in this election, this
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was the first indication that Nkomo had no intention of
being a number-two man and would desert both his party and
his comrades to insure this.
That Nkomo was mors than capable of making bad deci-
sions, and probably willing to compromise on basic princi-
ples, was demonstrated at the 1961 London Constitutional
Conference- As mentioned earlier, ykomo, at the invitation
of Sir Edger Whitehead, the Prima Minister of Southern
Rhodesia, attended the conference as the NDP representative.
On 7 February 1961, agreement was reached over the main
provisions of the new constitution, including one that
provided for a parliamentary structure that consisted of
fifty "A" Roll (white) and fifteen "B" Roll (black) seats.
The effect of this provision was to reinforce minority rule
of black by whites. Nkomo had agreed to this parliamentary
structure. The HDP executive council unanimously rejected
the constitutional proposals for franchise and representa-
tion. Nkomo, although he initially lefended his actions and
those of his fellow constitutional delegates, soon came to
realize that the opposition from tha NDP executive was too
strong. On 8 February 19 61, Nkomo issued a statement in
which he repudiated tha constitutional agraement. In
explaining why he had changed his mind, Nkomo noted that "a
leader is he who expresses the wishes of his followers; no
sane leader can disregard the voice of his people and
supporters." [Ref. 68] This action by Nkomo damaged his
cradibilitly with all of the parties involved. The British
and Southern Rhodesian governments felt that Nkomo could not
be trusted to adhere to an agreement. The nationalists, on
the other hand, felt that Nkomo would commit them to agree-
ments without consulting them and thus compromise them on
basic principles. In spite of his repudiation of the const-
itution, Nkomo was never able to completely neutralize the
effects of this incident.
105

As was mentioned several times earlier in this
paper, the events leading up to the formation of ZAND typi-
fied some of Nkomo's leadership weaknesses. After Nkomo
completed his term of detention in Rhodesia in 1962, he
called for a meeting of the ZAPtJ executive council in
Dar-es-Salaam. At this conference, which began on 12 April
1963, Nkomo proposed his plans to form a government-in-exile
in Tanzania. President Nyerere and the ZAND executive
council, as discussed earlier, opposed Nkomo on this issue
on the grounds that Nkomo *s leadership was needed inside
Southern Bhodesia and that the liberation struggle could
only be successful if ZAPO operated from inside of Rhodesia.
Additionally, the ZAPO executive council, which was begin-
ning to have doubts about Nkomo 1 s leadership abilities,
called for the formation of a new political party to replace
the banned ZAPO and a more aggressive policy of confronta-
tion against the white Rhodesian regime. Nkomo disagreed
with both of these proposals. At this time Nkomo was
convinced that Southern Rhodesia would receive its indepen-
dence as part of a package deal to end the Central African
Federation. He believed that it was necessary for a
powerful nationalist organization to be in existence outside
of the country to negotiate the terms of the independence
with the British. This was in direct conflict with the
beliefs of the ZAPO executive committee which believed inde-
pendence and majority rule could not be obtained through
negotiation but would have to be taken by force. [Ref. 69]
Not wishing to yield to the wishes of the ZAPO
executive council, Nkomo returned to Salisbury on 2 July
196 3. Once back in Rhodesia, Nkomo made plans to hold an
open conference at Cold Comfort Farm on 10 August 1963.
Nkomo's purpose in holding the conference was to reassert
his own leadership of ZAPO and his authority over the ZAPO
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executive council. NfcooiD invited all members of ZA?U f
including the ZAPO executive council, to the Cold Comfort
Farm Conference. The executive council declined the
invitation.
Nkomo's true colors had been made clear to the ZAPO"
executive council while it was in Dar-es-Salaam. The doubts
about Nkomo's dedication t3 their cause and his willingness
to undergo self-sacrifices were reaffirmed by his proposal
for an external government and his preference for negoti-
ating for change with the Rhodesian regime and the 3ritish.
But Nkomo had also shown himself to be an unethical, disho-
nest opportunist. He had seduced the executive council to
Tanzania by lying to them. He had told them that Nyerere
had requested their presence in Tanzania. In fact, when the
council members arrived in Tanzania, Nyerere told them that
he was very surprised to see them there and that they were
more needed in Rhodesia [Ref. 70]. Then, Nkomo had refused
to go along with the wishes of his own duly-constituted
executive council as he was legally obliged to. To add
injury to insult, Nkomo left eleven members of the executive
council financially stranded in Dac-es-Salaam so that he
could return to Rhodesia to lobby against their wishes. En
route to Rhodesia, Nkomo stopped in a number of African
countries to appeal to their leaders for support for him at
the upcoming Addis Ababa Conference in May 1963 which would
establish the Organization of African Unity. [Ref. 71]
On 8 August 1963, 2 ANU was formed (under the leader-
ship of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole) after seven of the
eleven ZAPO executive council members had voted to depose
Nkomo. At Cold Comfort Farm on 13 August 1963, in front of
more that 5,000 ZAPO members, Nkomo reaffirmed himself as
the leader of ZAPO and suspended the rebellious executive
council members from the nationalist movement. In his Cold
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Contort Farm speech, Nkomo was vague, if not. dishonest, in
explaining the recent events within ZAPU. Describing the
Dar-es-Salaam conference, he said:
Ten of us who ware in Dar-es-Salaam then
discussed. Duties ware allocated to each one of
us. After full consultations with everyone
concerned, we all got down to carrying out our
respective tasks. One of the important duties of
our plan was that after a certain stage, I and a
certain number of ly colleagues had to return
home. This, it was agreed, would be after the
Addis Ababa Conference. [Ret. 72]
Nkomo said nothing about the opposition of the executive
council to his plans nor of his efforts to sabotage the
efforts of the executive council with other African states
before and during the Addis-Ababa Conference. Talking about
the support he had supposedly received for his plans from
other African countries at the Addis Ababa Conference, Nkomo
said that:
The conference went off very well. Our case was
well received. To suggest any form of reluctance
by any of the independent countries because of one
reason or another is the biggest lie ever told
about our political and diplomatic relations with
African countries, [Ref. 73]
In fact a number of African countries, including
Ghana and Algeria, were critical of Nkomo's plans. They
criticized his plans for an external government and his
inaction within Southern Rhodesia. [ Ref . 74] Thus, by
August 1963, Nkomo's weakness as a nationalist leader had
become quite apparent and had caused a complete split in the
nationalist movement. Svidentally, Nkomo's position of
supremacy within the nationalist movement was more important
to him than the strength, solidarity, and effectiveness of
the movement itself.
During the period he was under detention between
1964 and 1974, Nkomo kept a relatively low profile as a
nationalist leader. Indeed, he was in the public eye on
only three occasions. The first was when he was flown to
Salisbury on 29 October 195 5 to discuss the ODI problem with
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British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The next occasion was
when he was again summoned to Salisbury to meed with George
Thompson, the Commonwealth Secretary, in the course of
further negotiations between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith
following the breakdown of the Fearless negotiations*
Hkomo's final public appearance as a detainee was on 10
February 1972 when he was interviewed by the Pearce
Commission. During this period, ZAPO suffered because of
Nkomo's inability to exercise the necessary leadership over
the organizarion. In particular, as discussed earlier, in
1969 and 1970 there were dramatic rifts between and military
and political wings of ZAPO". There were several reasons for
these rifts. The first reason was that the credibility of
the guerrilla commmanders had suffered because of their
battlefield defeats in 1967 and 1968. Second, there were
disagreements along ethnic lines between the Shona and
Kalanga leaders of ZAPO. Finally, Nkomo was unable to
communicate with either his guerrilla commanders or the
political leaders and this precluded a truly coordinated
effort within ZAPU.
Between the time Nkomo was released from detention
in 197U and the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, he made
several efforts to negotiate a separate settlement with Ian
Smith- In December 1974, Nkomo was a signatory to agree-
ments forming the new ANC, which, as previously discussed,
was an organization that combined the ANC, ZAPO", ZAND", and
FROLIZI. The purpose of this organization was to provide a
united front of all the nationalist organizations to nego-
tiate directly with the Smith regime. After talks between
the ANC and the Smith regime broke down at Victoria Falls on
26 August 1975, Nkomo began secret negotiations with Ian
Smith for a separate settlement. On 11 September 1975,
Bishop Jiuzcrewa expelled Nkomo from the ANC for initiating
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unauthorized negotiations with and collaborating with the
Smith government. Nkomo, who desired to head the ANC
himself, responded by challenging Muzorewa's authority and
holding his own ANC congress in late September 1975. At
this conference, which was attended by 6,000 mostly
pro-Nkomo delegates, Nkomo was elected president of his own
offshoot of the ANC. Shortly after this, Nkomo began prel-
iminary meetings with Smith to discuss the possibility of
reopening formal negotiations. On 1 December 1975, Smith
and Nkomo announced their intent to negotiate a constitu-
tional settlement. As discussed earlier, the negotiations,
which began in early March 1976, collapsed on 19 March 1976.
The effect of this whole incident was extremely
detrimental to Nkomo's image as a nationalist leader.
First, Nkomo appeared to be an opportunist who would colla-
borate with anyone in order to become the dominant
nationalist leader in Rhodesia. Second, it appeared that,
by negotiating with Smith, Nkomo was playing into his hands
in his efforts to divide and conquer the nationalist
movement by encouraging rifts within it. Finally, Nkomo
appeared to be compromising with, if not yielding to, Smith
on basic principles. The Victoria Falls Conference had
broken down over the issue of majority rule. If Smith was
willing to negotiate with Nkomo it could only be because
Nkomo was not as adament as the other nationalist leaders
over the procedures for obtaining majority rule. Thus, it
appeared that Nkomo was selling out the nationalists to
enhance his own position after a settlement.
Nkomo would make the same mistake again in August
1978. At this time, Nkomo was a partner with Robert Mugabe
in the Patriotic Front. Remembering 1976, Ian Smith
believed that Nkomo might be the more moderate of the
nationalist leaders and thus might be again willing to
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negotiate a separate agreement. Adnidst an intensification
of the guerrilla war, Nkomo, without the knowledge of his
partner, Robert Mugabe, net secretly with Ian Smith in
Zambia on 14 August 1978. Unfortunately for Nkomo, all
prospects for a Smith-Nkomo deal were shattered when ZAPU
shot down the Rhodesian airliner on 4 September 1978. Was
Nkomo an idealist looking for a peaceful solution or a
political opportunist trying to get the best deal for
himself? To the other nationalist leaders, it appeared that
Nkomo was an opportunist who had again tried to sell them
out. Nkomo* s credibility within the nationalist movement
was shattered and he would never be completely trusted
again.
1 • Guerrilla 3 as
e
Nkomo's failures in the February 1980 elections were
due at least in part to earlier ZIPRA failures in the guer-
rilla war. The elections showed that ZIPRA did not have as
much influence in the country as Nkomo claimed. In addi-
tion, the ways in which Nkomo utilized, or did not utilize,
his guerrilla forces again raised questions about Nkomo's
integrity and real motivations.
As discussed elsewhere in this study, both ZIPRA and
ZANLA, after their defeats at the hands of the security
forces in the late 1960* s, had decided to change their guer-
rilla strategy. Greater emphasis was to be placed upon
mobilizing the local population in order to provide a
popular base of support for the guerrilla forces. ZANLA was
much more successful in this respect than was ZIPRA. The
difference was due to the methods of establishing this
support. ZANLA concentrated on politicizing the population
and preparing the people for a sustained and long-drawn-out
struggle. Consequently, by the time the February 1980
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elections came around, most villages had a ZANO/ZANLA
political organization within then. This country-wide
political infrastructure was the key to ttugabe*s victory.
ZIPRA, on the other hand, had sought to mobilize popular
support by establishing logistical support centers in the
villages and by arousing the people by publicizing its
victories over the security forces. The political eduacaton
of the population was not emphasized by ZIPRA. Thus, while
ZIPRA was able to obtain material support from the
population in the areas within which it operated, there was
no political or ideological basis for this support.
Consequently, at election time ZAP'J really did not have a
political infrastructure with which to run its campaign.
While ZANLA's success was due to the fact that it saw the
guerrilla struggle as both political and military, ZIPRA
ultimately failed because it concentrated on the military
aspects and ignored the political aspects. [Ref. 75]
During the 1970* s, ZANLA was much more successful in
its conduct of the war than was ZIPRA. After the military
defeats of the late 1960's, ZIPSA had struggled with
internal rivalries and factionalism. While these internal
struggles were going on, ZANLA had taken the initiative and
picked up momentum in the war effort. ZANLA's North Eastern
offensive, which was launched in December 1972 and supported
by FRELIMO, was much more ambitious and effective than
anything ZIPRA had bee able to organize. The defeat of the
Portuguese in Mozambique in 197U previded ZANLA with a new
base and opened up a huge border for infiltration of forces
into Rhodesia. In 1970, ZANLA's Eastern and Southern offen-
sives insured that ZANLA would maintain the military initia-
tive over ZIPRA and effectively defined the areas in
Rhodesia in which Nkomo's ZIPRA foroes could not operate if
they wanted to avoid clashes with ZANLA. 3y 1979, it had
112

become apparent that most of ZIP3A* s activities had been
confined to most of Mataba leland, North Mashonaland West,
and the northern Midlands while ZANLA controlled most of the
rest of the country. [Ref. 76]
Thus, because of the high levels of ZANO politiciza-
tion and ZANLA military activity throughout Rhodesia and the
relative inactivity in these areas by ZAPU/ZIPRA, it became
obvious to most of the population by 1930 that ZANLA had
shouldered most of the burden of the guerrilla struggle. In
fact, ZANLA had won the war .
Nkomo»s hopes for the 1933 elections were given
another damaging blow whan it becama public knowledge that
he had been holding out on his ZANLA comrades. By late
1977, there were approximately 10,030 to 11,000 ZANLA guer-
rillas in Rhodesia. ZIPRA, on the other hand, had only
about twenty-five percent of its forces, on 2,500 to 3,000
men, fighting in Rhodesia. [Ref. 77] 3y the 1930 elections,
ZANU claimed to have 21,03 trained guerrillas in Zimbabwe
while ZAPO had only about 12,000 [Ref. 78], To make matters
worse, Nkomo's Zambia based army was trained, much of it as
a conventional force, by the Soviets and eguipped with
modern Soviet weapons. At the sams time, the Soviets had
refused to equip or train ZANLA forces. This imbalance of
forces brought accusations from ZANU that Nkomo was holding
his army in reserve in Zambia to defaat ZANO in any post-in-
dependence civil war between the two organizations. Thus,
Nkomo was suspected of allowing ZANLA to win the war for him
after which he planned to aliminate ZANLA with his own army.
[Ref. 79]
Whether or not Nkomo actually planned to use his
forces to eliminate ZANO will never be known. What is
clear, though, is that by the 1980 elections, ZANLA was the
most influential military force in Rhodesia. It: had
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successfully politicized a large percentage of the
population and earned their support and loyalty.
Additionally, it had shouldered the largest burden of the
fight, without the benefit of Soviet assistance. Finally,
Mugabe was able to capitalize on Nkomo*s refusal to commit
his forces in Rhodesia in order to cast further doubts on
his character, motives, and ultimate goals. Thus, while
Nkomo had a sizeable military force in March 1980, it was of
no assistance to him in the elections. In fact, because of
its lack of activity and location in Zambia, ZIPRA was
probably a political liability to Nkomo.
5« Ethnic Base
One reason for Nkomo's failure in the 1980 elections
was that he failed to expand his ethnic base. Joshua Nkomo
belongs to the Ndebele tribal group. As of 1980, Ndebele
speakers, which include tie Ndebele (14*) and the Kalanga
(5%) made up 19% of the African population in Zimbabwe.
Shona speakers, which include the Karanga (22%), Zezuru
(18%), Manyika (13%), Korekore (12$), Ndau (3%), and other
miscellaneous small groups, made up approximately 74% of the
African population* [Raf. 80] Severally speaking, the
Ndebele occupy the western third of Zimbabwe while the Shona
dominate the eastern two-thirds of the country [Ref. 81].
That Nkomo was unable to ethnicly diversify ZAPO beyond its
largely Ndebele base was reflected in the March 1980 elec-
tion results.
Parliamentary election results show that ZANU-PF
took 62.99? of the votes cast (57 seats) while PF-ZAPU took
24.11% (20 seats) and the UANC took only 8.28* (3 seats).
ZANU claimed widespread loyalty among all the electorates
except the two Matabeleland provinces where PF-ZAPU won
fifteen of sixteen contested seats. The regional breakdown
of the election results is as follows:
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Party Votes % of Vote Seats
Manicaland--1 1 seats




ZANO-PF 146,665 33.84 5
OANC 14,985 3.57
PF-ZAPO 3,947 2.26
Mashonaland East— 15 seats
ZANO-PF 505,313 30.45 14
UANC 75,237 11.90 2
PF-ZAPO 28,805 4.56
flash onaland West— 3 seats
ZANO-PF 203,567 71.95 6
PF-ZAPO 37,388 13.39 1
OANC 28,728 10.15 1
Matabeleland North--10 seats
PF-ZAPO 313,435 79.05 9
ZANO-PF 39,819 10.04 1
OANC 30,274 7.64
Matabeleland South— 5 seats





5 85^35 sel5?72 3
PF-ZAPO 94,960 27. 12 4
OANC 30,245 3.64
Victoria— 11 seats




The problem of tribalism in ZAPO surfaced as early
as 1969. As discussed earlier, there were repeated disa-
greements between the members of the ZAPO executive council
over how the organization was to be governed while Nkomo was
under detention. One faction consisted of the Sindebele
speaking Kalingas of the executive council and included J.D.
Moyo, the treasurer, George Silundika, the publicity
director, and Hasocha Ndlova, the assistant secretary. The
other faction led by James Chikerema, the acting president
and George Nyandoro, the secretary-general, consisted
entirely of Shonas. After repeated disputes in 1970 and
1971, Chikerema and Nyandoro left ZAPO in October 1971 to
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form FROLIZI. Although ethnicity played an important role
in this dispute, it is important to note that the central
difference between the two groups concerned the guerrilla
strategy that was to be implemented. The two factions were
not able to agree on how to best mobilize the popular
support among the masses. Although ZAPO" eventually
regrouped behind Moyo, the organization was never able to
politicize the population to the extent necessary to insure
a strong base of support.
After Nkomo was released from detention in 1974, he
was always careful to insure that there was a balance
between Ndebele and Shona speakers Dn his executive council
in order to prevent any future splits within the party.
Nevertheless, critics continued to accuse him of placing
Shonas in token leadership positions in order to disguise
the Ndebele orientation of the party. Responding to these
accusations, Nkomo ran some of his most senior Shona leaders
as PF-ZANU candidates in the Mashonaland constituenties in
the 1980 elections. All of these candidates, with the ex
ception of Austin Chambati, who ran in Mashonaland West,
were defeated. Martyn Gregory notes that one of the ironies
of this defeat is that what started out as an effort by
Nkomo to increase the prestige of the Shonas in ZAPU actu-
ally resulted in the strengthening of the Ndebele position.
[Ref. 83]
During the election campaign, Nkomo made other
efforts to neutralize the accusations of Ndebele favortism.
ZAPO attempted to exploit the popularily held 7iew of Nkomo
as the "father of Zimbabwean nationalism'1 and to emphasize
his position as a national leader rather than as a regional
or tribal leader. When Nkomo returned from exile in Zambia,
his first stop was at a rally in Salisbury, not in his home
city of 3ulawayo in Matabel eland. In his campaign speeches
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he con iii: udx ly ciupudoj.i.'ra tiis .ic5i lor p-~dci» national
reconciliation, and the burying of personal and tribal
animosities.
Yet, Nkomo's efforts to broaden ZAP0*3 ethnic base
were unsuccessful for several reasons. First of all, ZAPO
had not politicized the population in order to provide a
reinforcing political infrastructure for the elections.
Secondly, ZIPRA, despite being well trained and equipped by
the Soviets and achieving a number of flamboyant successes
against the Rhodesian security forces, did not have as much
prestige among the people as did ZANLA. ZIPRA had confined
its activities mostly to Matabeleiand, North Mashonaland
West, and the northern Midlands. 2ANLA was active in most
of the rest of the country. Consequently, by the 1980 elec-
tions, ZANLA was, if not in control of more of the country,
at least better known in more of the country than was ZIPRA.
Finally, ZANU*s decision to run separately from ZAPO* in the
elections was probably, at least to a certain extent, due to
its view of Nkomo as a tribalist. During the Lancaster
House Conference, Mugabe received messages from the ZAND
treasurer in Salisbury, Enos Nkala, which advised him that
Nkomo was only expected to win seats in Matabeleiand and
that he should therefore be viewed as an electoral
liability. [Ref. 84]
6 • External Support ers
The Soviet Onion, sometimes assisted by allies such
as East Germany and North Korea, was Joshua Nkomo^ oldest
and most consistently loyal external supporter. This
support began in 1965 when the first group of fifty-two ZAPO*
recruits went to Moscow, Pyongyang, and Peking to undergo
military training. Shortly after that time, ZAPO ceased
sending recruits to China and Looked mostly to the
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Soviet-bloc countries for support, Soviet support of ZAPO
continued throughout the war. In 1976, Rhodesian mililtary
intelligence reported that between 1970 and 1976 ZIPRA r
although it was playing a very small role in the war, had
been sending large numbers of guerrillas on extended courses
in Russia, Cuba, and North Korea [Ref. 85]. In May 1978,
Cuba and East Germany began airlifting massive quantities of
food and medical supplies to Zambia to aid ZAPU sponsered
refugees [Ref. 86]. In June 1978, Nkomo visited Moscow,
Havana, and a number of eastern European capitals to seek
increased support for his cause [Ref. 87]. Between February
and July 1978, approximately 2,000 ZIPRA guerrillas based in
Zambia attended a six-month Cuban operated training course
in Angola where they were trained not only in guerrilla
tactics, but also in conventional military tactics. During
that same period, seventy-two Cuban advisers in Zambia
instructed ZIPRA forces in the use of light artillery and
rocket launchers. [Ref. 88] In September 1978, it was
reported that the Soviet [Jnion had provided the ZIPRA guer-
rillas in Zambia with 137 5AM-7 missiles [Ref. 89].
Throughout the fall and winter of 1978-79, both humanitarian
and military aid from the Soviet anion, the German
Democratic Republic, Cuba, and Yugoslavia to ZAPO" increased.
Thus, by the April 1979 Rhodesian elections, NXomo had a
relatively large Soviet supplied and Cuban trained conven-
tional force in Zambia. Peeling confident in his military
situation, Nkomo announced on 15 April 1979 that the
Rhodesian government no longer had i monopoly on sophisti-
cated weaponry and that his Cuban trained ZIPRA fighters
were prepared to introduce sophisticated weaponry against
the Rhodesian security forces [Ref. 90].
Eastern block aid to ZAPCJ intensified during the
year the Muzorewa government was in office. On 2S May 1979,
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the London Daily. Telegraph reported that the nature of
So?iet assistance to Nkomo's Zambian based guerrilla forces
had changed dramatically. Russian aid had changed from
advising, training, and supplying war materials to direct
control and organization of the ZIPR& military effort. The
Russian effort was directed by Mr. 7assily Solodonikov, the
Soviet ambassador to Lusaka, who was also a senior KGB
officer. The article reported that the increased Soviet
involvement with ZAPO had been prepared by a twelve-man team
of Soviet officials assigned to Nkomo's movement in Lusaka
in 1978. The team had recommended drastic changes in ZIPRA
after reviewing the logistics, operations, intelligence,
communications, reconnaissance, and general staff procedures
of the army. As a result, a number of ZIPRA coamanders were
dismissed while others were sent to the Soviet Union for
training. No one who had not attended a training course in
the Soviet Onion held an important position in ZIPRA.
Delivery of military supplies to ZIPRA, including mortars,
anti- personnel mines, rocket launchers, and SAM-7 missiles
was stepped-up considerably. [Ref. 91] Other examples of
increased eastern block support to ZAPO were common during
this period. In June 1979, in a meeting between GDP.
President Erich Honecker and Joshua Nkomo, the former
denounced the new S mixh-Muz orewa regime and reaffirmed East
Germany's support of ZAPO [Ref. 92], In late July 1979, the
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Military Command reported that it was
intercepting increasing quantities of communist made arms
during clashes with ZAPO guerrillas [Ref. 93].
Overall, Nkomo's close relationship with the Soviet
Onion was probably a hindrance to him in the 1980 elections.
There are several reasons why this aid was harmful to
Nkomo's efforts to become Zimbabwe's prime minister. The
first involves the problem of politicization of the
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population. As discussed earlier, Nkoao's election campaign
was seriously damaged because ZAPU hid failed to establish a
political infrastructure in the villages. This was due in a
large part to the Soviet theories of guerrilla warfare,
which differ from the Maoist approach adopted by ZANU. The
basic difference between the two philosophies of guerrilla
war were well described by Hex Nhongo when he left ZAPU to
join ZAND in 1971. Finding the ZANU and Chinese emphasis on
political education much greater than that of the Russians,
Nhongo noted that:
In the Soviet Union they had told us that the
decisive factor of the war is the weapons, when I
?ot to Itumbi. where there were Chinese instruc-
ors, I was told that the decisive factor was the
people. This was a contradiction. Now I agree
with the Chinese. [Ref. 94]
The Chinese method was to teach tha masses why the guer-
rillas were fighting so that they would support the guer-
rillas. The Soviet emphasis on weaponry and conventional
engagements with the security forces prevented ZAPU from
establishing a grass-roots political organization within the
villages that could provide a base of support for Nkomo's
election campaign.
The second detrimental effect of Soviet aid was that
it probably made Nkomo appear to be too dependant upon the
Soviets. Mugabe and ZANU did not have any single dominant
source of support. Nkomo, on the other hand, received the
vast majority of his support from the Soviets.
Consequently, he was always open to accusations that he was
really just fronting for the Soviets. Nkomo 1 s election
prospects worsened in April 1979 whan accusations were made
that ZAPU was completely controlled by the Soviets.
[Ref. 95]
This question of Nkomo's dependency upon the
Russians was further complicated by the fact that Mugabe had
tried and failed to get aid from the Soviets for ZANU.
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Thus, Mugabe was able to use this apparent advantage of
Nkomo's to his disadvantage. He oould show that ZANLA,
without Russian assistance, did more fighting than ZIPHA.
He could argue that Nkomo was holding his Russian equipped
forces in reserve in Zambia so that they would be available
to defeat his opponents (i.e., Mugabe and ZAND) in a post-
independence civil war. Finally, he could cast doubts about
the true intentions of Nko mo and his Russian supporters by
suggesting that they were not truly dedicated to the nation-
alist cause because they were not interested in supporting
all the nationalists in the PP. Questioned on this issue in
flay 1979, Mr. Mugabe stated that:
we stil+ do not receive direct arms ship-
ments from Russia and we have naver condemned them
for that. 3ut we have argued that such equipment
should be shared by all those fighting in
Zimbabwe. Now that wa have unity, this should not
be a problem.
As far as ZANU is concerned, we have
plenty of weapons with which to fight the war, but
what we need badly is sophisticated equipment like
?round to air missiles and lDng-range rDckets.he war is changing and these are the weapons we
need. [ Ref . 96]
Oddly enough, the only other external supporter who
had an effect on Nkomo's ability to win the 1980 election
was his old adversary, Ian Smith. On 1 February 1930, Ian
Smith deserted Bishop Muzorewa and called on the white
minority to support Nkomo's party. Noting that although
Nkomo might be distasteful, Smith called for opposition to
Mugabe because he was a Marxist with which there could be no
compromise. Expressing doubts about Muzorewa* s political
and leadership abilities, Smith suggested that Nkomo's brand
of nationalist leadership would offar the best future for
black and white Rhodesians. Although whites could not vote
for African parties, Smith called on the whites to support




Tell your workers that the Marxists will
take everything they have: their goats r their
cattle, and chickens. Tell them they will also
take away their children. [Raf. 97]
When one has a supporter like Ian Smith he doesn't
need any enemies. This event was the fatal blow to Nkcmo's
credibility. Again he was being accused of fraternizing
with the RF and of making a political deal and compromising
his principles at the expense of his fellow nationalists.
Thus, Smith's actions had an effect axactly opposite of what
he had intended.
B. BISHOP ABEL MOZOREWA
1 - Biographical Backgr ound
Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa was born on 14 April 1925 to
a peasant family living at the Old CJmtali Methodist Center.
Muzorewa's father, Haadi Philemon Muzorewa, traced his
ancestry back through the Sakombe tribe, whose members had
fled Mozambigue during the days of Portuguese rule. His
fraternal grandmother was a member of one of the royal
houses of the Makoni tribe, who caae from the area between
Salisbury and Omtali. Muzorewa's maternal grandfather was a
member of one of the royal families of the Zimunya tribe
while his grandmother was a Warozvi 3hona, the ancestors of
which were credited with building ancient Zimbabwe. If
Muzorewa's ethnic background was mixad, his religious back-
ground certainly was not. Both of Muzorewa's parents were
very strict, devout Methodists, his father serving the
church as a pastor and teacher. The lives of Abel and his
eight brothers and sisters revolved, spiritually and
socially, around the Methodist Church. Muzorewa describes
his childhood in the following manner:
Discipline, sharp, temper. humour--those
words summarize my upbringing. * Add regular Bible
lessons plus Church-going, and you have the ingre-
dients which have molded my character and that of
my five brothers and three sistars. [Ref. 98]
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Muzorewa credited his parents' religious convictions
with forming his character. In later life, his actions as a
nationalist leader, specifically his emphasis on moderation
and negotiation, would be effected by his family and reli-
gious upbringing. Muzorewa further elucidates this point
when he says in his autobiography that:
My father 1 s, i eep religious convictions,
and the irreproachable life in which he lived out
what he preached on Sundays, left an indelible
impression upon me.
Like father, ay mother is a devout oerson.
Hers however was a faith which taught more through
persuasion, compassion, and example than through
formal teaching and discipline. This was effec-
tive and long-lasting. [fief. 99]
As tribal tradition required for the first-born
child, Muzorewa spent his early years with his maternal
grandparents who lived at the foot of Mount Samzaguru near
Tikweri Mountain in the Makoni Reserve. At the age of nine,
Muzorewa began his Sub-standard k education at the Chinyadza
School, which was run by English Methodist missionaries.
when Abel was thirteen years old, his father sent him to the
Old Umtali boarding school for further education. While at
Old Umtali, Muzorewa underwent what he calls his "spiritual
rebirth":
Although I had been brought up in a devout
Christian home, I made that morning my own commit-
ment to follow Christ as my Savior. On that day
of days Christ gave me a spiritual microscope,
spectacles, and earphones to see and hear for
myself what Christ offers. I realized that I was
a sinner, but that Sod loves me and forgives me.
[Ref. 100]
5 believe that the Christian faith aives a
a centre to all of life. It is an ethic
not :just for the professional minister, but for
every believer. It is a call to each person to
seek Christ in his personal life. With it you can
go anywhere in the world, to work as a farmer or
driver, politician, or nurse, and find Christ to
be your source of happiness, strength, and
victory. [Ref. 101 ]
Muzorewa remained at UmtaLi until 194 1 when he
finished Standard Pour. That year he transferred to a
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Methodist school at Nyadiri where, in 1943, he received a
Standard Five certificate. Between 1944 and 1948, Muzorewa
served as a teacher in the lower primary school grades and
as a lay evangelist. He then entered the Hartzell
Theological Seminary, Old Umtali. After completing his
theological studies, he was ordained a minister of the
Methodist Church in August 1953. After working as a pastor
in the Eusape area for five years, Muzorewa went on a scho-
larship to the United States to study for a theological
degree. He spent the years from 1958 through 1962 in
colleges in Missouri and Tennessee and earned a Bachelor's
Degree and a Master's Degree. Upoa returning to Rhodesia,
he became the pastor of the Old Umtali Mission. In 1964,
Muzorewa was appointed the national director of the church's
Christian Youth Movement and in 1966 he became the secretary
of the Student Youth Movement. Muzorewa was consecrated a
bishop of the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia at a cere-
mony at Basutoland in August 1963. Thus, he became the
first black bishop ever in the United Methodist Church in
Rhodesia. [Ref. 102]
2« Early Political Career
Bishop Muzorewa first became well-known to the
general public in September 197 1 when the Rhodesian authori-
ties banned him from entering the Tribal Trust Lands. At
the time, Muzorewa was a pastor in the upper-middle class
black residential suberb of Marimba Park and was working out
of an office in Salisbury. The reason for the banning was
that Muzorewa had spoken out against government proposals to
tax church managed black schools and government policies on
black land tenure. Up to this time, Muzorewa's involvement




, it became apparent that the
British government was again anxious to solve the Rhodesian
crisis. As discussed earlier in this study, the fruits of
the British-Rhodesian efforts were the Smith-Home proposals.
Since the proposals were basically amendments to the illegal
1969 constitution and since black nationalist leaders had
not even been consulted during their formulation, there was
wide-spread black opposition to tha Smith-Home proposals.
In October 1971, four former members of the ZAPU and ZANU
executive councils, Edson Sithole, Michael Mawema, Cephas
Msipa, and Josiah Chinaraano, decided to form a new unity
movement to oppose the constitutional settlement proposals.
Using the same initials as the first Zimbabwean nationalist
movement, the African National Congress, they named it the
African National Council (ANC). In order that their efforts
at mobilizing popular opposition to the proposals and in
negotiating with the British and Rhodesian governments might
be successful, they needed to find a neutral leader of
national reputation who had been a member of neither ZAPU
nor ZANU. As a politically neutral but well known national
religious leader, Muzorewa fit the bill. In November 1971,
the four nationalist leaders approached Bishop Muzorewa and
asked him to lead the ANC in its fight against the
Smith-Home proposals. After much thought, Muzorewa agreed
to their request and on 16 Decenber 1971 the African
National Council was officially founded. [ Ref. 103] As was
discussed at length earlier in this study. Bishop Muzorewa
and the ANC were successful in mobilizing enough support to
convince the Pearce Commission that the constitutional
proposals were not acceptable to the majority of Africans




This series of e vents was very significant for
Muzorewa's future. First of all, Muzorewa very suddenly
emerged as the best known nationalist leader within
Zimbabwe. What is interesting about this is that Muzorewa,
unlike Nkomo, did not seek national political stature. He
was perfectly satisfied to be solely a religious leader.
But when he was drafted, he accepted the challenge.
Ironically, Muzorewa was selected to head the ANC because he
was relatively apolitical and unknown in the political
world. Nevertheless, Muzorewa would soon find that he too
liked politics and would aspire to a position of national
leadership. Finally, Muzorewa would arrive on the national
political scene as a man of Sod whose personal reputation
and integrity were above reproach. But, like Nkomo, seven
years later he would enter the national elections as a
candidate whose personal honor and true motivations were
very much in doubt among the electorate. Never again would
Muzorewa's reputation as a nationalist leader be as high as
it was in 1972.
3« Smith-Muzorewa Negotiations
Although the ANC had been created solely to oppose
the Smith-Home proposals, Muzorewa saw a further role for
the organization as a base from which to urge whites to
discuss an alternative settlement. Although the original
ANC executive broke up when its senior members either left
the country or were arrested, Muzorewa continued to address
white groups and to consult with the more progressive
parties, such as the Centre Party and the Rhodesia Party,
over the possibility of reaching a new settlement. In early
1973, Smith and Muzorewa began unofficial discussions. On
10 March 1973, the ANC became a legal political party.
Finally, on 17 July 1973, during a peak in the guerrilla
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war, Ian Smith invited Muzorewa to bagin official talks on a
constitutional settlement.
Smith and Muzorswa held over fourteen meetings
during the next ten months, the details of which were
discussed earlier in this paper. On 20 June 1974, the talks
broke down. Like Nkomo, Muzorewa had damaged his reputation
by undertaking negotiations with an uncompromising Ian
Smith. First of all, he had been discredited with the main-
stream of the nationalist movement when, on 20 March 1974,
six members of the imprisoned ZAND" executive council,
including Sithole and Mugabe, wrote a letter condemning
Muzorewa for negotiating with the illegal regime and calling
on him to cease negotiations immediately. Obviously,
Muzorewa was in no position to negotiate if he did not have
the backing of those who controlled the guerrillas. Second,
as discussed earlier, after the talks broke down Ian Smith
leaked a report that Muzorewa had agreed to a settlement
based upon the 1971 proposals. A document to this effect,
dated 17 August 1973 and signed by Bishop Muzorewa, was
reprinted in the Rhodesian Herald on 27 September 1974.
Since Muzorewa had previously denied the existence of any
such agreement, this incident was extremely damaging to his
reputation. The Rhodesian Front called him dishonest for
reneging on an agreement. The nationalists condemned him
for selling out on their principles. In reality, Muzorewa
probably signed the agreement either without raading it or
before Ian Smith had added certain previously agreed to
amendments. In any case, Muzorewa same out of the incident
looking like either a traitor to his cause or a naive fool
or both- His reputation as a nationalist leader would never
completely recover from this incident. [ Ref . 104]
In December 1974, the leaders of ZANO, ZAPO", and
FROLIZI (Sithole, Nkomo, and Chikerema respectively), at the
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urgings cf the presidents :f the Frontline States, agreed to
dissolve their organizations and form a united front under
the name of the African National Council with Muzorewa as
its president. The mission of the new ANC was to negotiate
directly with the Rhodesia n government in order to bring
about a peace settlement and majority rule. The failure of
the new ANC at the Victoria Falls Conference, the internal
bickering among the four nationalist leaders, and the even-
tual break-up of the organization ware discussed at length
earlier in this paper. Let it be said, however, that the
failures of the new ANC *ere due in no small part to the
leadership shortcomings of Muzorewa. Muzorewa* s ineffec-
tiveness as a leader manifested itself in a number of ways.
Ian Smith was able to play upon the rivalry between Muzorewa
and Nkomo to divide the organization. Muzorewa demonstrated
that he lacked political insight. He worked fairly well
with Sithole of ZANO, but failed to realize that Sithole was
on the way out as the leader of ZANU and no longer had
control of his guerrillas. Thus, Muzorewa could never hope
to negotiate with Smith from a position of strength as he
had influence over neither ZANLA nor ZIPRA. The final blow
to Muzorewa as the leader of the new ANC came in September
1975 when, in the "Mgagao Declaration," the members of the
ZANLA DARE condemned him for appointing incompetent politi-
cians instead of guerrilla leaders to lead the ZLA, the
military wing of the ANC-formed ZLC. The ZANLA DARS also
condemned Muzorewa, along with Sithole, as an incompetent,
inefficient leader. Thus, by late 1976, when Sithole also
defected from the new ANC, Muzorewa' s organization was in a
shambles. The united front had proved to be nothing more
than an illusion. A strong leader might have welded the
nationalist organizations into a united, strong ANC, but
Muzorewa was not the man to do it.
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3y lats "375, tha situation was becoming ripe for
3ishop Muzorewa to be seduced by Ian Smith. When the Geneva
Convention convened in October 1976 r Bishop Muzorewa found
that ZAND and ZAPD had broken with his ANC and were partici-
pating in the conference as the Patriotic Front (PF) . On 14
December 1976, the convention broke down over the issues of
tha structure of the interim government and the control of
the security forces. On 9 January 1977, the leaders of the
Frontline States announced that they were going to support
the Patriotic Front as the sole legitamate nationalist
organization in Rhodesia. With Muzorewa' s prestige within
the nationalist movement fading rapidly, Smith felt that he
would be very anxious to negotiate a separate internal
settlement before he lost his position as a nationalist
leader all together. On 2 4 January 1977, Smith announced
that he was rejecting the British proposals at the Geneva
Convention and that he wanted to begin negotiations with
Muzorewa for a separate internal settlement. Throughout
1977, Muzorewa conducted informal exploratory talks with the
Smith regime. The details of these talks and the events
surrounding them were discussed earlier in this paper. It
is important to note that several events occurred which
evidently convinced Muzorewa that reaching a quick agreement
with Smith was to his advantage. First, following the lead
of the Frontline States, the Oid Liberation Committee
announced on 8 February 1977 that it was throwing its
support behind the PF and that it would assist it in esca-
lating the guerrilla war. Second, the PF had agreed in
substance to the Anglo-American peace proposals and had
renewed negotiations with the British. In January 1978, PF
leaders met with the Anglo- American representatives at
Malta. Muzorewa was angered by British intentions to
exclude him from the ceasefire negotiations and feared that
129

it was part of a scheme to make Nkoao the future leader of
Zimbabwe. [fief, 105] Finally, Muzorewa had gotten Smith to
commit himself to majority rule and to one-man, one-vote as
a precondition to the talks.
Formal negotiations between Smith and Muzorewa began
in November 1977. The internal agreement was signed by
Smith, Muzorewa, Chief Chirau, and Sithole on 3 March 1978.
The details of the internal settlement were dealt with
earlier in this paper. Nevertheless, the significance of
the settlement to Muzorewa 1 s political future was that it
further damaged his credibility and apparent integrity. He
had entered into the agreement without even discussing its
terms with the leaders of the PF. Also, it appeared that he
had rushed into the agreement in order to undercut Mugabe
and Nkomo before they could reach an agreement with the
British and insure for himself the primary leadership posi-
tion in Zimbabwe. Finally, the agreement reserved twenty-
eight of the one-hundred assembly seats for the whites,
giving them the power of veto, and provided for the control
of the police, army, judiciary, and public service by a
white-dominated bureaucracy. Consequently, the white
minority was still in a position to usurp many of the powers
of parliament. Thus, Muzorewa had made an agreement that
was contrary to the visws and wishes of the other nation-
alist leaders and organizations and to the majority of black
Zimbabweans.
*• The Interim Government and the 192.9 Elections
Muzorewa' s lack of effectiveness and knack for
making bad decisions, or at least being a partner to bad
decisions, continued during the period the interim govern-
ment was in power. On 14 September 1978, the iciterim provi-
sional government, citing the escalation of the guerrilla
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war by ZANLA and ZIPRA, banned ZAND and ZAPU from Rhodesia,
thus effectively excluding these two parties from partici-
pating in the scheduled national elections. It appeared to
most nationalists that MuzDrewa was eliminating the competi-
tion in order to further entrench his own position. Not
only did the transitional government fail to achieve any
meaningful social reforms, but Muzorewa himself assisted,
wittingly or unwittingly, in the obstruction of reforms. In
April 1978, Brian Hove, a member of the tJANC and the
co-Minister of Justice, Law, and Order, spoke out against
police brutality in his first public statement and soon
thereafter clashed with his co-Minister, Hilary Squires,
over changes in the judiciary and career opportunities for
blacks in the police. Squires accused Hove of "breaking the
spirit of the agreement" and the ruling Executive Council
(Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau) demanded of Hove that
he withdraw his remarks. Hove refused and returned to a
legal practice in London after only a few days in office.
The loss of Hove, a true reformer, cost Bishop Huzorewa a
considerable amount of credibility with the Zimbabwean
people. [Ref. 106]
Chief among the transitional government's failures,
however, was its total lack of success in achieving interna-
tional recognition, ending the sanctions, or ending the war.
The Frontline States continued to support the PF. The
United States and Great Britain withheld recognition of the
transitional government. In early March 1973, the transi-
tional government appealed to the JN for recognition. On 10
March, Sithole was prevented from addressing the ON General
Assembly by a coalition of African, socialist, and third-
world countries. Finally, on 1 U March 1978, the ON Security
Council voted to condemn the interim Rhodesiaa government.
Obviously, in the eyes of the rest of the world, Muzorewa
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was not the authentic leader of the Zimbabwean people.
Failure to achieve international recognition also meant a
failure to end the sanctions and to improve
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's economic condition.
The ineffectiveness of Muzorewa as a leader was no
more apparent than in his failure to end the war. Ian Smith
had hoped that a settlement with Muzorewa and Sithole would
lead to a ceasefire. Instead, much to Smith's chagrin, the
war escalated."- The reason for this was very simple.
Muzorewa had absolutely no control over the ZANLA and ZIPRA
guerrillas. Consequently, it was not in his power to end
the war.
The national elections, which had been postponed
from September 1978, were finally held in April 1979.
Muzorewa*s UANC, running on a platform of its ability to end
the war, achieve international recognition, end the sanc-
tions, and institute social reform, won fifty-one of the
seventy-two black seats in Parliament. In June, Muzorewa
was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
How did Muzorewa manage to win such an overwhelming victory
when he ran on a record of failures? Muzorewa and the UANC
won the 1979 elections because, since ZAND and ZAPO were
legally prohibited from participating in the political life
of the country, there was no other influential nationalist
party to run against them. The security forces and auxili-
aries loyal to Muzorewa were mobilized to insure a high
voter turn-out that would make his victory appear to be




5. Prime Minister Muzorewa and the 128 Election
Campaign
Bishop auzorewa* s 2 f fectiveness as a national leader
did not improve during the period he was the prime- minister
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The national elections and the imple-
mentation of a new constitution had not improved the situa-
tion in the country in the slightest- With the civil
service, police and security forces still in the hands of
the same bureaucracy that ran than during the Rhodesian
Front government, very few meaningful social reforms were
implemented. Unable to fulfill his election promises of
ending the war, obtaining international recognition, and
thus legitamacy, and ending the ON sanctions, auzorewa was
finally forced to yield to the pressures of Great Britain,
the Commonwealth Nations, the Frontline States, and the ?F
to agree to an all-parties constitutional conference.
As discussed earlier, the Salisbury government
accepted the British constitutional proposals at the very
beginning of the Lancaster House talks in September 1979.
With the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in
December 1979, the number one priority of the Huzorewa
government became the winning of the elections that were
scheduled for February 193 0. On the surface, it would
appear that auzorewa and the UANC had a number of advantages
over ZANO-PF and PF-ZAPO" in the 1980 election campaign.
That the UANC lost the elections despite having these advan-
tages was due largely to .luzorewa»s lack of a popular base
and the artificiality of his position as a national leader,
let alone a nationalist leader.
In January 1980, the same Muzorewa-OANC political
machine that had won the 19 79 elections was still in place.
Thus, Muzorewa, unlike Mugabe and Skomo, was in the envious
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position of being an incumbant who had an election campaign
organization with very rscent and successful experience at
winning elections. The UANC's recent experience in
mobilizing the voters and experience in operating under
election laws that had remained virtually unchanged by the
terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, gave Muzorewa a head
start over his competitors. This advantage was magnified by
the fact that ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, who obviously had neither
overt political organizations nor recent election campaign
experience inside Rhodesia, were not legalized in Rhodesia
until more than a month after Muzorewa had begun his
election campaign. [ Ref . 107]
Bishop Muzorewa also took advantage of his position
within the government to enhance his election campaign. In
late November 1979, realizing that a final settlement and
national elections were just around the corner, Muzorewa
released hundreds of political prisoners in the hope of
gaining the support of the electorate. Martyn Gregory notes
that the trade mark of the OANC during the 1980 election
campaign was that it was able to combine its close relation-
ship with the government with its ability to monopolize
private transport facilities and key public venues in order
to neutralize the opposition parties during the late stages
of the campaign. An example of this was the Huruyadzo rally
in the Zimbabwe Grounds in Salisbury. The UANC hired nine
trains and 500 coaches to ferry supporters from all over the
country to the four-day rally. It had been agreed to by the
all-party Election Council that, in order to prevent
possible violence between the political parties, no two
parties would be allowed to hold rallies in the same city or
area at the same time. Thus, when the UANC announced its
plans to hold this rally from Thursday 21 February to Sunday
24 February, all other parties were prohibited from organ-
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izing rallies in the capital on the weekend 'before the elec-
tions. The high cost of this rally also demonstrated the
financial resources at Muzorewa's disposal. Nevertheless, a
number of other factors effectively neutralized all of
Muzorewa's campaigning advantages. [ Hef • 108]
6. External Su pport ers
Bishop Muzorewa's a lection campaign was an extrava-
gant affair that was in many ways vary similar to American
presidential campaigns. In addition to the usual party
hats, T-shirts, and stickers, the ANC provided those who
attended the February Salisbury rally with 60,000 free meals
every day, free accomodations, and entertainment which
included athletics, boxing, wrestling, weightlifting, and
film shows. The only political part of the rally occurred
when a speech was delivered by Muzorewa, who had made an
ostentatious arrival in ona of four helicopters lent to the
ANC by a West German firm. [Sef. 109] It was readily appa-
rent to all who followed Muzorewa's campaign that it was the
finest campaign that monay could bay. Bishop Muzorewa's
seemingly endless reservoir of funds came principally from
three sources— big business (both in southern Africa and in
western Europe and the United States), South Africa, and
white Rhodesians.
Muzorewa received considerable financial support
from business interests in South Africa, the United States,
Great Britain, and other western countries. The OAO esti-
mated that the UANC had received more that 355 million
(0. S.) from western business corporations. The
Anglo-American Corporation probably donated more than $5
million to the bishop's campaign. [Sef, 110] In January
1980, it was reported that in Great Britain officials of the
Confederation for British Industry (CBI) had met with
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Muzorewa to discuss giving financial support to his camp-
aign- Shortly thereafter, a "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Electoral
Fund" was set up in Great Britain. Although CBI officials
denied any involvement with the fund, all of the directors
of the fund were affiliated with CBI. Most of the money was
donated by subsidiaries of British corporations in Rhodesia.
Organizers of the fund claimed that there had been no viola-
tion of the sanctions as all of the contributions had actu-
ally been raise inside of Rhodesia. [Ref. 111] Muzorewa's
largest supporters were mining corporations, to include the
Lonrho Group, Anglo-American Corporation, American Union
Carbide Corporation, and Johannes Consolidated Investment of
South Africa.
Throughout the tenure of the Muzorewa government,
the bishop and the ANC received considerable financial,
military, and political support from both private and
government interests in South Africa. In April 1979, the PF
sponsered Voice of Zimbabwe reported that the Muzorewa
regime was continuing to receive military hardware,
primarily counterins urgency aircraft, from South Africa
[Ref. 1121. Tne aircraft were transhipped through South
Africa from arms dealers in the United States and western
Europe, inspite of the J N sanctions. That same month.
Bishop Muzorewa expressed his support for an economic and
military alliance with South Africa. In a South African
radio interview, the bishop declared that such cooperation
would insure a prosperous future for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and
that such prosperity would in turn assure the stability and
independence of the new state. [Ref. 113]
Between June 1978 and July 1979, Bishop Muzorewa
made several trips to South Africa in order to gain support
for his government from both private individuals and the
government [Ref. 114]. Finally, in late 1979, a number of
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SodCu. a mi. can citi^ciiSi 1ppo.z3n1.x7 winii the approval and
encouragement of the South African government, established
the "Fund for Rhode sian Democracy." Formed in order to
counter the influence of Russian and other communist coun-
tries in southern Africa, the fund provided millions of
dollars to Muzorewa's election campaign. [Ref. 115]
The landslide nature of the election results would
seem to indicate that Muzcrewa*s extravagant campaign style
and seemingly limitless financial resources were of little
help. There are several reasons for this phenomena. First,
Muzorewa's close relationship with white business interests
both within and outside of Rhodesia damaged his image as a
black nationalist leader. Second, the fact that Muzorewa
was receiving considerable financial and political support
from individuals and in and the gorenment of an apartheid
South Africa appeared to the voters to be a contradiction.
The UANC, a black nationalist organization, was viewed as
fraternizing with the last bastion of racism in southern
Africa. Finally, the fact that Bishop Muzorewa himself was
somewhat less than candid in disclosing the sources of his
campaign funds caused the voters to suspect the worst. When
asked by a reporter at a 1 9 February 1980 press conference
about the sources of his campaign funds, Muzorewa replied,
"None of your business." When the reporters persisted in
this line of questioning, the bishop replied, "I am not
interested in answering that question. .. We have said that it
does not matter where we get our funds, as long as it is not
from Communists." Matters were net helped when one of
Muzorewa's aids, in defending the bishop* s brusqueness,
said: "What did you expect him to say, that our funds our
limitless? We have funds to suit our needs, of course, bur
what advantage does it give us to adait it." [Ref. 116] The
flamboyant style of Muzorewa's election campaign, coupled
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with his own secretivensss about his sources of funds, could
not help but give the elsotorate second thoughts about his
suitability as a national leader.
7- Guerrilla and Ethnic Base
The most striking difference between Muzorewa and
his two opponents, Nkomo and Mugabe, was his lack of a base
of popular support. Bishop Muzorewa simply did not have the
popular support enjoyed by the other two nationalist
leaders. Nkomo could call on ZIPRA and the Ndebele-speaking
regions of Zimbabwe for support. Sugabe had ZANLA and the
Shona majority to back him up. But Bishop Muzorewa had
neither an army nor an ethnic group that he could call his
own. Consequently, it was nearly impossible for him to
organize any kind of country-wide, grass-roots support for
his campaign. Mugabe and Nkomo had already cornered the
market in that area.
Muzorewa' s relationships with the guerrilla organi-
zations had been extremely poor almost from the very begin-
ning of his career. In the early 1970's, Muzorewa was the
object of the ire of ZIPRA and ZANLA because he advocated a
peaceful negotiated settlement while they were convinced
that their goals could be attained only through violent
conflict. As chairman of the new ANC, Bishop Muzorewa had
again angered the guerrillas by appointing politicians and
inexperienced junior officers to command positions in the
ZLA. Consequently, ZIPRA and ZANLA never were united under
the ZLA.
Muzorewa 1 s poor rslations with the guerrillas and
lack of influence over them was no better illustrated than
during the periods he was a member of the ruling Executive
Council and the Prime Minister. Daring his 1979 election
campaign, Muzorewa had campaigned on his ability to end the
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war. He had claimed that thousands of PF guerrillas would
surrender when they realized that ha had achieved the ideals
for which they had been fighting. As discussed earlier,
this was one of the factor that motivated Ian Smith to come
to terms with Muzorewa in the first place. But Prime
Minister Muzorewa was unable to convince more than a few
guerrillas to surrender to the new government. Instead, the
guerrillas intensified the war effort. As prime minister,
Muzorewa was also the Minister of Defence and Combined
Operations. As such, he had at least nominal control over
the security forces. Jiuzorewa's close identification with
the white commanded and manned security forces caused his
image as a nationalist political leader to plummet when the
security forces intensified the coun terinsurgency effort in
1979.
Muzorewa*s weaknesses as a national leader were
exemplified by his inability and unwillingness to control
the security forces. Prior to the March 1978 Internal
Settlement, the War Council, which was responsible for
prosecuting the war, consisted of the prime minister, who
was the chairman, and senior cabinet officers and security
force commanders. Just before the signatories of the March
1978 Internal Settlement formed their four-man Executive
Council, the prime minister's chairmanship of the War
Council was abolished and the seats formerly occupied by the
cabinet ministers were assumed by white civil servants.
Thus, the black signatories to the settlemnent were virtu-
ally excluded from participating in the decisions affecting
military policy. [Ref. 117]
Muzorewa 1 s influence over security matters does not
seem to have increased after his election as prime minister
in April 1979. The state of martial law, which extended
over 90^ of the country by mid-1979, enabled the white
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security forces to pusue the "suppression of terrorism"
without referring to Muzorewa or the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
parliament for guidence. During Muzorewa* s administration,
guerrilla bases and refugee camps in Mozambique and Zambia
were bombed, approximately one-half million people were
forcibly confined in "protected villages" in an attempt to
starve the guerrillas of their support in the rural areas,
and 186 auxiliaries loyal to Sithole were massacred.
Incidents like these severely damaged Muzorewa' s image as a
"man of God" and "champion of unity." During the 1980 elec-
tion campaign, ZANU-PF and PF-ZAP(J portrayed Muzorewa as
being both responsible for the actions of the security
forces and as being impotent in controlling them.
Exploiting the situation, the two nationalist organizations
sought to show both that Muzorewa was in collusion with the
security forces and thus responsible for their atrocities
and that he still did not have the power to end the war.
Finally, Muzorewa's alienation from the nationalist guer-
rillas was completed when he came out in favor of the pres-
ence of South African troops in Zimbabwe during the election
campaign. There were no doubts in the minds of black
Zimbabweans that Muzorewa was closer to the former white
regime than to them. Muzorewa may have been the prime
minister, but the white controlled security forces were
still calling the shots. [ Ref . 118]
In the final analysis, Muzorewa's downfall was that
he was an artificially created leader with a uythical base
of support. The great irony is that the conditions and
situations that brought Muzorewa to the forefront of the
national political scene were the same situations and condi-
tions that would ultimately bring about his downfall. A
late-comer to the national political scene, Muzorewa was
asked by the nationalists to lead the ANC precisely because
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his was a neutral with ?.o national organization or
following. Smith negotiated with him because he was apart
from the mainstream of the nationalist movement. A candi-
date with no popular base, Muzorewa was able to win the 1979
elections only because there was no real competition and
because of the ability of the security forces to get the
voters to the polls. Thus, it should not have been
surprising that he collapsed in ths 1980 elections. His
failure to end the war, to end the sanctions, to achieve
international recognition, and to control the security
forces had destroyed his credibility as a head of state.
Faced with viable competition in the elections and having
the support of neither a guerrilla army nor a large sector




Robert Gabriel Mugabe was born on 21 February 1924
in the "Christian village" at the Jesuit operated Kutama
Mission. The son of a carpenter, young Mugabe spent his
youth tending cattle, fishing, and boxing with other boys.
At Kutama, Mugabe completed six years of primary education
and two years of teacher training, which gualified him as a
Standard 2 teacher. Initially Mugabe taught at Kutama for
the low salary of two pounds per month, and then at a number
of other schools in the region. In 1950 he went to Fort
Hare University College in South Africa where he obtained
the first of six university degrees. (Three of his degrees,
a Bachelors and Masters in Law and a Bachelors in Public
Administration, would be earned by correspondence while he
was in detention.) While in South Africa, Mugabe came into
contact with members of the youth wing of the South African
141

African National Congress and the South African Communist
Party, During that period he also started to read the works
of Karl Marx. On returning to Rhodesia, Mugabe was frus-
trated in his attempts to get involved in nationalist
politics. He considered himself a revolutionary and a
militant and found the nationalist leadership in Rhodesia
too conservative for his tastes. In the mid- 1950*3 he moved
to Northern Rhodesia where he was exposed to that country's
most important nationalist leader, Kenneth Kaunda. Four
years later, after Ghana had obtained its independence,
Mugabe took a teaching post there. While there, he was
heavily influenced by that country's leader, Kwame Nkrumah.
It was there that Mugabe met and married his wife, Sally.
[Ref. 119]
2- The Ascetic Militant
Robert Mugabe is as different from Joshua Nkomo and
Bishop Abel Muzorewa as any man could hope to be. The
physically imposing Nkomo is a flamboyant showman. Muzorewa
is a bible-thumping preacher. Robert Mugabe is neither
imposing, flamboyant, nor a preacher. Quiet and subdued, he
is rather the thinking man's revolutionary.
Raised a Roman Catholic, Mugabe was never infected
with protestant revivalism as were Nkomo and Muzorewa. A
teacher, intellectual, and philosopher, Mugabe had little
taste for Nkomo 1 s flamboyant methods, but instead preferred
persuasion. An ascetic who doesn' t smoke or drink and
rarely smiles, Mugabe is more comfortable reading a book by
Karl Marx, Mao-Tse-tung, or Mahatma Sandhi than on the elec-
tion campaign circuit. Mugabe has said that the most impor-
tant single political influence on his life was Mahatma
Gandhi, whose "passive resistence" inspired nationalists in
both India and Africa [Ref. 120]. Mugabe believes that
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personal and collective se lf-sacrifioe and self-discipline
are the keys to success in any endeavor and he imposed these
standards both upon himself and his party [Ref. 121].
Unlike Nkomo and Muzorewa, who never really got much
beyond the concepts of "independence" and "majority rule,"
Robert Mugabe had an ideology within which he operated.
Mugabe was and is a Marxist. As such, his struggle was not
simply aimed at obtaining independents and the vote for his
countrymen, but also at eventually transforming Zimbabwe
into a socialist society. During the 1980 election camp-
aign, Mugabe's basic platform was the nationalization of
industry, the radical redistribution of land, the introduc-
tion of sweeping state controls, and the public ownership of
the country's natural resources, to include land, minerals,
water, and forests. Mugabe himself probably best described
his vision of Zimbabwe after the elections when during the
election campaign he told an interviewer that:
If the whites believe in. democracy , then
cannot come about by imposition, there will have
to be a demarcation between the areas where vou
collectivise and areas which must remain in indi-
vidual hands until you can cultivate under-
standing.
.There will be some who will not want to
put their six acre, eight acre, ten acre land
units together with the others. lou cannot actu-
ally compel. You can develoo an understanding,
raise a consciousness towards acceptance.
Therefore you do not force out those whiles who
want to remain as users of land. But they have to
accept that the land belongs to the state and they
will not be in any different position from the
Africans.
But of course you have to maintain the
system of private land use. I don't see how this
can be disadvantageous to those whites who want to
remain as growers of tobacco. But a lot of things
will have to be done to reform the present system.
[Ref. 122]
The fact that Mugabe had an ideology he was oper-
ating under enabled him maintain his consistency, and thus
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his principles, Unlike Nfkomo and Muzorewa, Mugabe never
entered into any separate dt internal agreements or comprom-
ises with the Rhodesian or 3ritish governments. For Mugabe,
compromise was treason. The best agreement one could get at
any given time was not necessarily the best agreement, and
Mugabe was willing to hold out for the best agreement. He
was not simply a freedom fighter, he was a revolutionary.
Ultimately, it was Mugabe 1 s unswervingly consistent adher-
rence to a basic set of principles aad goals that earned him
the confidence of the voters in the 1980 elections.
Mugabe also differed from Nkomo and Muzorewa in the
extent of his militancy. Although Nkcmo was willing to
carry on the guerrilla struggle indefinitely, he was always
open to a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Muzorewa, in
priciple, never would really accept anything other than a
negotiated solution. From the very beginning, Mugabe
believed that change could be brought about only through
military force. In 1963, he had begun to organize the mili-
tary wing of ZAPU for the armed struggle. That same year,
he helped form ZANU because ZAPU was not militant, enough.
In 1975, foreseeing the failures of the new ANC and the
Victoria Falls talks, he and the members of the ZANU DARE
planned an intensification of the guerrilla war. In
Mugabe's view, the RF regime would only be willing to seri-
ously negotiate an agreement acceptable to the nationalists
once it had been brought to its knees or defeated on the
battlefield. It was Mugabe •s consistently militant attitude
that would endear him to the guerrillas and enable him to
begin the election campaign with the majority of the country
already under his control.
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3- Early Political Career
Returning to Rhodesia from Ghana in 1960, Robert
Mugabe joined the NDP. Lecturing about what he had observed
in Ghana and independence, he soon becam a popular speaker
in the Highfield township of Salisbury. In October 1960,
Mugabe chaired the NDP CoQgress and was elected Information
and Publicity Secretary. When the NDP was banned in 1961,
Mugabe, along with the rest of the NDP leadership, continued
his activism in ZAPO". When ZAPU was also banned, Mugabe and
a number of his collegues decided "that we would establish
an underground movement waich would train an army and start
the armed struggle." [Ref. 123] That same year, Mugabe was
charged with "sedition and subversive statements" for refer-
ring to the Rhodesian Front as a "bunch of cowboys." His
wife was also charged with bringing the Queen's name into
dis-esteem for saying that she was doing nothing for the
Africans. When Joshua Nkomo called the members of the ZAPU
executive to Dar-es- Salaam in 1963 to discuss forming a
government-in-exile, Mugabe and his wife jumped bail and
made their way through Botswana to Tanzania. On returning
home to Rhodesia in December 1963, Mugabe was imprisoned for
four months for jumping bail.
With the dissatisfaction among the ZAPU executive
over Nkomo 1 s leadership gualities, the stage was set for the
creation of ZANO. Just before ZAND" was formed, Mugabe
returned to Ghana where he persuaded the Nkrumah government
to train fifty guerrillas. On returning to Rhodesia, he was
a driving force behind the formation of ZANU in August 1963.
A year after ZANU was formed, it too was banned and Mugabe
began over ten years in detention. While in detention,
Mugabe not only earned three additional academic degrees,
but also taught other detainees. But more importantly,
unlike Nkomo and Sithole, Mugabe kept his communications
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channels with ~ne ot ner political and military leaders of
ZANO open. Consequently, with his colleagues, he was able
to plan the war effort and maintain his own postion of
influence within ZANO even though he was in prison.
[Ref. 124]
u
- Gu err illa 3ase
One of the greatest assets that Mugabe had in the
1980 elections was the nature of his relationship with the
ZANLA guerrillas. The closeness of Mugabe to his guerrilla
forces gave him several distinct advantages over his oppo-
nents* First, the fact that the ZANLA guerrillas recognized
Mugabe as their leader gave him an advantage in all negotia-
tions as he was able to negotiate from a position of
strength. His control over the ZANLA guerrillas meant that
he had the power to end or continue the war, regardless of
election results. Additionally, ZANLA had the highest visi-
bility and best reputation of any guerrilla organization in
the country. Indeed, ZANLA was in control of most of the
country by late 1979. ZANLA was the main vehicle by which
ZANU politicized Zimbabwe's rural, black population.
Mugabe»s close association and identification with an organ-
ization that had both won the war and politically indoctri-
nated the population was probably the determining factor in
the 1980 election outcome.
As discussed earlier, on 1 November 1974 Sithole was
suspended as the president of ZANO by the imprisoned execu-
tive committee members and Robert Mugabe, as
Secretary-General, was selected t o represent ZANO at the
conference with the Frontline State leaders in Lusaka. When
the Frontline State leaders refused to recognize Mugabe as a
representative of ZANO, the executive committee reluctantly
reinstated Sithole. In December 21974, Sithole, along with
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Muzorewa, Nkomo, and Chikerema signed the "Zimbabwe
Declaration of Unity, " which formed the new ANC. Released
from detention that same aonth as a result of the "Detente
Scenario," Mugabe was totally opposed to the unification of
the nationalist organizations under the ANC, negotiations
with the Smith regime, and any discussion of de-emphasizing
the guerrilla effort. Believing that the war had not
progressed far enough to force any real concessions from the
Smith regime, the parolad members of the ZANU central
committee met secretly in Lusaka with the members of the
ZANU DARE. At that meeting it was decided to intensify the
war effort and to send the six central committee members
home to Rhodesia to recruit soldiers for ZANLA. Mugabe was
sent to recruit in Salisbury and Mashonaland North. During
the next several months, thousands of ZANLA recruits crossed
the border from Rhodesia into Mozambique.
By March 1975, the pressure was again on ZANU. On 4
March Sithole was re-arrested. With the assasination of
Herbert Chitepo on 18 March, the entire ZANU political and
military leadership in Zambia was placed in detention by the
Kaunda government. The members of the ZANU central
committee held an emergency meeting, chaired by Mugabe, in
Salisbury on 25 March 1975. Ar that meeting it was decided
to send Mugabe and Edgar Tekere out of the country to
provide leadership for ZANU's external members.
Specifically, their mission was to try to get aid from coun-
tries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and China and to make
contact with and assist the ZANLA guerrillas based in
Mozmbique. The two men were to place specific emphasis upon
improving ZANLA's logistical situation and upon insuring
that the new ZANLA recruits whs were being sent to




Mugabe arrived in Mozambique in early April 1975.
With the exception of trips abroad to obtain international
support, he would spend the rest of the war in Mozambique
with his guerrillas. While in Mozambique, Mugabe spent most
of his time politicizing the recruits—teaching them what
the revolution was about, why the war was being fought, and
why they had to join the war effort. He also taught them
about the history of their country and the history of the
nationalist movement. Because of his efforts in indoctri-
nating the guerrillas in the nationalist cause and his will-
ingness to live and work with the guerrillas, Mugabe had won
the support and loyalty of the guerrillas by late 1975. The
''Mgagao Declaration" of 11 September 1975, in which the
guerrilla commanders denounced the ANC and Sithole and first
acknowledged Mugabe as their leader, has already been
discussed at length. On 24 January 1976, the imprisoned
DARE leaders in Zambia sent Mugabe a personal latter with an
attached declaration in which they explained their reasons
for removing Sithole and pledged their support to Mugabe's
leadership of ZANU. In the letter, the DARE members* said:
On line with our party policy and party procedure,
we decided that you as the number two man in the
party would automatically take over the leadership
of the party until the party congress was
convened. We communicated this decision to the
Comrades at Mgagao and they in turn made the
famous Mgagao statement denouncing the ANC-ZLC and
calling upon you to lead the ANC. We also started
an extensive campaign to inform all our members
and organs or our decision and urged them to
openly and publicly support the stand taken by the
Comrades at Mgagao. The response of our oarty
members and ordinary Zimbabweans has been over-
whelming.
Because of lack of communication with you
it was difficult for as to make a formal statement
to the world of our decision until we got to know
your stand. Now that we know your position we are
in a position to make a formal declaration calling
upon you to immediately take over the Darty lead-
ership-. .. The burden and responsibility of leading
our party and revolution now rests on TOO. Should
we be released by our captors we shall be glad to
join you in the field. Let us stress again that
our decision to have you as our party leader was
reached after exhaustive consultations aad takes
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into account the vi=ns of most of the rank and
file members of the party.
The declaration added that:
Our revolution is passing. a highly critical
period. The crisis coincides with the great
crisis within our party (ZANU) which was initially
sparked off by the tragic and untimely murder of
our dynamic chairman Comrade Herbert Chitepo on
the 18th March 1975 by agents of imperialism and
the enemies of Zimbabwe revolution and the
subsequent attempted decimation of the leadership
of the party's external wing by the Zambiah
Government and later the defection and
capitulation of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole to the
dark reactionary forces in the African National
Council (ANC). A gigantic task is therefore beina
presented to the responsible leaders of our party
and failure to perform it will involve the danger
of a complete collapse of our revolution. The
situation is such that any further delay will be
fatal. It is within the perspective that after
much soul-searching and extensive consultations
with all the external organs of the party (armed
forces in the camps, branches, districts, and
provincial councils in Zambia and abroad) DARE has
come to the final and irrevokable conclusion that
the only man who can serve our revolution by
providing a viable leadership in our liberation
movement is Robert Gabriel Mugabe. We members of
DARE solemnly, publicly declare:
1. That Comrade Robert Mugabe is now the
provisional leader of our party (ZAND) and our
revolution pending the convening of a party
Congress and" we call upon all Zimbabweans ana all
Progressive forces in the world to support the
ynamic leadership of Comrade Mugabe in Zimbabwe.
2. That Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole ceases
with immediate effect to be the party leader and
spokesman.
3. That Comrade Mugabe from now onwards
will be the party's spokesman in the ANC national
united front and other forums.
U. That the statement by the Comrades at
Mgagao, Tanzania, pledging their support to
Comrade Mugabe's leadership was in full conformity
with the party's revolutionary line.
5. That the unity of our people, the
ldentitiy of their aims, the unity of their views
and their disposition to unite in carrying out the
struggle are the elements characterizing the
common strategy that must be opoosed to that which




That the principla objective of our
revolution is the seizure or power by means of
destruction of the racist politial-nilitary
machine and its replacement by the people in arms




7. That armea revolutionary , struggle,
constitutes the fundamental and principal form of
our revolution.
8. That all other forms of struggle must
serve to advance and not to retard the development
of this fundamental form of struggle.
9. That guerrilla warfare as a genuine
expression of the people*s armed struggle is the
most adequate form of waging and developing revo-
lutionary warfare in our country in particular and
Southern Africa in general.
10. That the leadership of the revolution
requires an organizing principal, the existence of
a unified political and military command, in order
to guarantee victory.
11. That our revolutionary struggle
constitutes a decisive contribution to the
historic struggle of Africa and humanity to
liberate themselves from slavery. [Hef. 125]
Thus, by early 1975, Mugabe had secured the allegi-
ance of both the imprisoned guerrilla leaders in Zambia and
the guerrillas operating from Tanzania and Mozambique.
During the negotiations and controversies involving the ANC
in the first nine months of 1976, Suzorewa, Sithole, and
Nkomo would each claim to control the ZIPA guerrillas.
Realizing that it would be necessary, while conducting nego-
tiations, to determine which political leaders the guer-
rillas really recognized, President Machel of Mozambique
asked the ZIPA guerrilla commanders to write a list of their
political leaders. Mugabe's name was at the top of the list
Machel received from the ZANLA commanders. [Ref. 127]
One final comment is necessary about the extent of
the ZANIA guerrillas 1 allegiance to Mugabe. Nkomo,
Muzorewa, and Sithole always seemed to be in positions where
they had to lobby among the guerrillas for support. This
was not the case with Mugabe. He was actually drafted by
the guerrillas to be their political leader. Unlike the
other three nationalist leaders, Mugabe had demonstrated a
hard-line attitude and willingness to undergo the same hard-
ships as the guerrillas. Thus, he endeared himself to them.
He was one of them and they wanted him as their leader.
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5« External Su pport ers
The type of external support received by ZANU
differed considerably from that received by ZAPU and the
UANC. While Nkomo and Muzorewa each received the majority
of their support from a single source, the former from the
Soviets and the latter from southern African and Western
business interests, Mugabe received support from a wide
variety of different sources. Although the assistance given
to Mugabe and ZANU by communist bloc countries was signifi-
cant, they also received considerable aid from western
European countries r third-world countries, and a number of
African nations. The large variety of ZANU's supporters
gave Mugabe a number of advantages over his opponents in the
1980 elections. First the large number and variety of ZANU
external supporters tended to give Mugabe and ZANU legita-
macy as representatives of the Zimbabwean people. In
effect, this was de facto international recognition, some-
thing the Muzorewa government had been unable to obtain.
Second, Mugabe and ZANU were not tainted by their close
association with any single supporter. While Nkomo and
Muzorewa could be accused of being puppets of the Soviets
and white business interests, respectively, it was very
difficult to accuse Mugabe of fronting for forces other than
the Zimbabwean people. Mugabe's apparent independence was
one of the key factors in his credibility with the
electorate.
During the 1960's and early 1970* s, ZANU received
the majority of its military assistance from Communist
China. As discussed earlisr, the People's Republic of China
(PRC) assisted ZANU by providing training in China, weapons,
advisers, and, most importantly, a theory of how to conduct
a guerrilla war. During this period, ZANU also received aid
from Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea, who were all
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closeiy alligned with tha Chinese communists. [Ref. 128]
With the death of Mao and a decrease of Chinese intervention
in Africa in the mid- 1970* s , ZANU started receiving less aid
from China. Although China would continue to give ZANU at
least a nominal quantity of aid, Mugabe was forced to look
for other sources of support.
In mid and late 197 8, Mugabe began lobbying a number
of communist, third-world, African, and western European
countries for support for ZANU/ZANL&. In the summer and
fall of 1978, Mugabe and his representatives visited a
number of communist and socialist countries, including the
Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korrea, Irag, Ethiopia,
Romania, and Yugoslavia. Mugabe personally travelled over
25,000 miles seeking aid from countries that had tradition-
ally only supported ZAPU. With the exception of the Soviet
Union, where Mugabe claimad no ona of importance would talk
to him, he was extremely successful in obtaining financial,
logistical, and military support foe ZANU. [Ref. 129] The
reason for Mugabe's success was that it was becoming appa-
rent to these countries that ZANLA was doing most' of the
fighting in Zimbabwe-Rhodasia and that, of all the nation-
alist organizations, ZANU was the most representative of the
Zimbabwean people.
Communist countries were not the only places from
which Mugabe sought and obtained aid. Between 1979 and
1980, ZANU officials visited a number of countries in
western Europe, to includa Spain, West Germany Denmark and
Norway. In addition to financial aid, these countries
provided ZANU with food, clothing, and medical supplies.
[Ref. 130] India and Pakistan also gave ZANU considerable
political and moral support and supplied the organization
with foodstuffs and medical supplies [Ref. 131]. Within
Africa itself, ZANU's strongest and most consistent
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supporters were Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola, Ghana, and
Nigeria.
Of ZANU»s African supporters, Presidents Nyerere and
Machel were by far the strongest and the most consistent.
Besides providing diplomatic support for ZANU, Tanzania and
Mozambique provided ZANLA * ith training, equipment, bases,
and other military support. In 1978, the two Frontline
State presidents renewed their efforts to obtain increased
military aid for ZANU/ZANLA from tha Soviet Union and Cuba.
While they were somewhat successful in getting assistance
from Cuba, the Soviet Onion continued her policy of
supporting only ZAPU/ZIPEA.
In September 1978, Mugabe mat with Fidel Castro in
Addis-Ababa. The meeting had two purposes. The first was to
strengthen Cuban-ZANU relations. At that time, over 500
ZANLA guerrillas were being trainad near Addis-Ababa by
Cuban instructors. Cuban advisers were also training ZANLA
forces in Mozambique and Angola. Castro told Mugabe that he
was more than willing to provide ZANU with training, food,
medical supplies, and international support and generally to
develop closer relations with ZANU. However, he also told
Mugabe that Cuba was in no position to provide arms to
ZANLA. Cuba was dependant upon tha Soviet Union for arms
and could not transfer weapons to ZANLA without Soviet
approval. This was the sacond reason for Mugabe's meeting
with Castro. ZANU wanted Castro to use his influence with
the Soviets to convince them to start supplying military
hardware to ZANLA. [Ref. 132]
In October 1978, Presidents Nyerere and Machel
called upon the Soviet Onion to start supporting ZANU.
Machel had assigned his own FPLM troops to accompany ZANLA
guerrillas on operations inside of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. They
had reported back to Machal that the ZANLA guerrillas had
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been extremely successful in gaining the support of the
population and that they were winning the war against the
security forces. Nyerere and Machel argued that the Soviets
should support ZANO for several reasons- First, they argued
that the divisions within the Zimbabwean nationalist move-
ment were being exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet feud.
Russia, they argued, should put aside its feelings about
China and start giving ZAND" the sans support she had been
giving ZAPO* in order to unite the two nationalist organiza-
tions and insure a nationalist victory in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
Also, China was incapable of providing ZANLA with the type
and quantity of weapons it would need to bring the war to a
successful conclusion. Thus, the two Frontline State
leaders believed that Russian weapons were critical to
ZANLA»s success. [Ref. 133]
Throughout late 1978 and early 1979, Mugabe main-
tained the hope that Russia would supply ZANO with armaments
[Ref. 134], But Russian aid was not forthcoming. The
Soviets were continuing to back ZAPU and if ZANO wanted
Soviet military aid, it would have to join ZAPO. Mugabe and
ZANO refused to yield to Soviet wishes and by July 1979 had
given up all hope of obtaining Sovist weapons, except for
those that Machel could spare them. [Ref. 135] Mugabe's
failure to obtain Soviet aid probably assisted him in the
1980 elections. For having been snubbed by the Soviets, it
was very difficult for anyone to claim that he was fronting
for them.
6 - Political Mobilization of the E lector ate
As has been mentioned a number of times previously,
the key factor in the Mugabe-ZANO victory in the 1980 elec-
tions was the mobilization of the electorate by ZANO. The
instrument of this mobilization was the ZANLA guerrilla
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organization. The party was able to use the rural political
infrastructure that was sat up to sipport the guerrillas to
get the votes on election day.
According to Josiah Tongogara, the ZANLA guerrilla
commander, the ZANLA guerrilla fighters of the early 1970»s
were more like political commisars than guerrilla soldiers.
They were given very generalized training in guerrilla
warfare, but very specialized training in mass mobilization.
During a guerrilla*s training, special emphasis was placed
upon his political education. The guerrilla recruits were
taught about the grievances they would be fighting to
correct, namely the deprivation of the land, the limitations
of the number of cattle a family could keep, restrictions on
education and job opportunities, and the inferior African
healthcare service. Additionally, the guerrilla recruits
discussed the writings of 3arx, Lenin, and Mao, analyzed
capitalism, communism, and colonialism, and studied the
history, geography, climate, vegetation, agriculture, wild-
life, minerals, industry, population, and economic base of
the country of Zimbabwe. Finally, the guerrillas were
taught that their primary source of supply, shelter, and
other assistance was the people of Zimbabwe, from whom they
all came. [Ref. 136]
Thus, the guerrillas would go into the Tillages with
the idea of winning the "hearts and minds" of the local
people through persuasion. Initially, the guerrilla poli-
tical cadre would answer the villagers' questions about
their grievances and the goals of the war. Gradually, they
would infiltrate political commisars into the villages as
permanent residents, installing them first as teachers in
the schools and later in positions in the local government.
At this time, a more formalized political infrastructure
would be set up within the village. An intelligence network
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would be established to identify and eliminate the security
force informants among the populatioa. Next, the guerrillas
would challenge, embarrass, discredit, and finally destroy
the credibility of the government sponsered civilian admin-
istration- It its place would be established the councils
and committees who would have the responsibility for the
logistical support of the guerrilla effort. When possible,
the members of these councils were elected by the population
at large. Officers were appointed to manage specialized
areas such as transportation, agriculture, finance, and
health. Councils were established not only at the village
level, but also at the district and provincial levels. If a
decision of great importance or involving great expense had
to be made, it was generally referred from the village level
up to the district or regional level. Finally, this
"shadow" government, whose sole mission was to support the
guerrillas, only emerged at night so as to avoid detection
by the Rhodesian security forces. [Ref. 137]
Through these techniques, ZANLA was able to influ-
ence, if not control, the vast majority of rural Rhodesia by
the late 1970's. ZANLA was most successful in organizing
these grass-roots political infrastructures in the
Mashonaland, Manicaland, and Victoria provinces, although
their success was by no means limited to just these regions.
Although guerrilla claims of controlling over 90* of the
country were probably somewhat exagerated, the best testi-
mony to the great extent of guerrilla control was probably
given by the actions of the Rhodesian government. In 1974,
the Rhodesian Minister of Justice opposed placing certain
areas of the country under martial law because to hand over
the maintenance of law and order to the army would be admit-
ting that the civil government had lost control of those
areas. But between March 1978 and mid-1979 over 95% of the
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country was brought under martial law. Thus, by white
Rhodesian standards, control of the greater portion of the
country had been lost to the guerrillas, [Ref. 138]
Having control of a large percentage of the black
Zimbabwean population, in January and February 1980 ZANLA's
mission was to insure that the local support of the guer-
rillas was transferred into votes for Mugabe and ZANLA. If
election results are considered a good indication, ZANLA was
extremely successful in this endeavor. Since ZANLA already
had the loyalty of the local population, its political cadre
did not view their task as one of converting voters or
convincing them of the correctness of ZANO's position.
Instead, they spent the greatest part of their efforts in
trying to insure that the black voters would be able to
fulfill the mechanical requirements for voting. The ZANLA
cadre made sure that the voters knew who the candidates
were, where the voting places were, and how to vote.
Considerable effort was also spent in countering the decep-
tive and confusing literature and verbal propaganda that was
being disseminated by the 0"ANC and the security forces.
These efforts were concentrated in the areas with the
highest illiteracy rates. Campaign rallies and sing-alongs
were used to keep morale up, especially when pro-fluzorewa
auxiliaries were in the area. When the auxiliaries intimi-
dated villagers during the day, the ZANLA cadre would move
into the villages at night and hold meetings to get the
people back on the right track. At the rallies and meeting,
the ZANLA cadre did not emphasize Muzorewa's or Nkcmo's
shortcomings or waste much effort in praising the ZANU plat-
form. Instead, they reminded the people of ZANLA 1 s decisive
role in the war and thus appealed to their sense of loyalty
to the guerrilla army. [8ef. 139]
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In conclusion, one of the most interesting, and
probably most accurate, analyses of the reasons for ZANO's
landslide election victory was provided by a high ranking
ZAPU official when he said that:
The PF lost the election two years .ago
when ZANU began intensive political campaigning.
using ZANLA to politicize the masses. ZANLA moved
into the former* ZIPRA areas at this time, such as
Hashonaland West. They held pungwes (meetings)
for two years covering 80 percent of the country.
This is the most important factor about the elec-
tion results. ..Of ZIPRA. 99 percent were Ndebele
speaking and therefore they had language difficul-
ties in Shona speaking areas. ..We concentrated in
one area of the country for recruitment of
soldiers.
Commenting on accusations of ZANCJ intimidation of voters,
the official stated that ZANU probably would have won a few
less seats without intimidation,
peDp *.
Zimbabwe.. .It would would be idiocy to say there
was corruption by the British in favour of Mugabe.
ZANU(PF) beat the British, the Americans, and
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